the women's movement in post-war Lebanon by Khattab, Lara
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY  
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN A SECTARIAN CONTEXT: 
THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN POST-WAR LEBANON 
By 
 
LARA KHATTAB 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis  
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Arts and Sciences 
Summer 2010 
 



 iii 
 
 
For my mother and father who gave me wings to fly and taught me the value of 
perseverance and dedication 
 
For my twin, Ranya, who provided me with love and support while in Montréal 
 
For all the Lebanese women, who like me share this love hate relationship with their 
country that continues to treat them like strangers 
 iv 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
     Those are the first words that you read from this thesis, yet they are the last 
words that I have written for a research that has taken a little bit more than a year to 
complete. The finishing of this long learning process is eclipsed by events that remind me 
of the issues addressed here. Only a month ago, newspaper articles reported that 
husbands and children of Lebanese women married to non-nationals continue to be 
expelled from Lebanon. When people continue to be humiliated, imprisoned, expelled 
and tortured on a daily basis, can an MA student like me justify her pursuit for 
knowledge, safely at home or in the library? If this thesis has any significance at all, I 
hope is to help understand the circumstances that shape our daily routine or in the words 
of my advisor, the context that we live in. By doing so, we can take decisions in light of 
these contexts and avoid jeopardizing rights that are necessary for the health of 
democracy in Lebanon. 
 This thesis is the product of the work that extended over a full year. All my 
gratitude goes to the people who helped me finish it. First of all, I would like to thank my 
advisor, Dr. Bassel Salloukh, for the academic guidance, comments, patience, support, 
ongoing encouragement and most importantly for infusing me with a passion for research 
in general and fieldwork research in particular. I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Amal 
Sabbagh, who influenced my understanding of qualitative fieldwork research. I would 
also like to thank the women and men who shared with me their interesting stories. 
Without them, this learning experience would not have been possible.  Finally, I would 
like to thank my father and mother for their ongoing support and patience. Sorry for 
making your life a living hell throughout this year!  
 v 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
 
Lara Khattab     for  Master in Arts 
                     Major: International Affairs  
 
 
 
Title: Civil Society in a Sectarian Context : the Women’s Movement in Post-War 
Lebanon. 
 
 
 
 This thesis problematizes the literature underscoring the role of civil society in 
bringing about democratic reforms, complementing the most recent approaches in 
studying the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world but moves away from 
them by focusing on the highly fragmented context of Lebanon where sectarian leaders 
developed strategies towards women’s advocacy community to impede gender social 
policy reforms and democratic outcomes. It thus focuses on the limited success that the 
women’s movement in Lebanon achieved since its inception. The thesis examines the 
strategies of the sectarian ruling elite vis-à-vis women’s rights NGOs to explain how they 
may neutralize, divide, co-opt and manipulate these associations to preserve their 
sectarian control or use them to further their own political interests. This thesis also 
argues that sectarian leaders are not the only party to blame for the neutralization of 
women’s groups, but also elite women with strong ties to the sectarian and religious 
leaders play an instrumental role in this process. This, consequently, impedes prospects 
for gender-based reforms and democratic consolidation. Grassroots women’s demands 
are downplayed as they upset the formal and informal pillars of political power in 
Lebanon: sectarianism and clientelism. In this deeply divided context, civic groups 
seeking gender equality and a greater democratization of the system are only allowed to 
raise issues that consolidate or, at best, fail to challenge the hegemony of the sectarian 
ruling elites and their social allies. Moreover, this thesis examines the role of 
international funding and their gender agendas in Lebanon. It contends that international 
aid agencies’ policies and strategies in Lebanon strengthen the sectarian hegemony of the 
ruling elite and impedes prospects for real women’s empowerment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Situating the Thesis 
With the collapse of communist and military regimes in the Soviet Union and 
Latin America, political theorists and analysts started to analyze the role of civil society 
in democratization processes. 
Since the 1990s, a wave of political and economic liberalization swept through 
the Arab world leading to the proliferation of rights-based non-governmental 
organizations. However this process did not last and the dynamics were reversed from 
encouraging, to cracking down against civil society organizations, to appropriating and 
containing them (Heydemann 2007).  
The resistance of the Arab world to change was not only a concern for many 
scholars looking for answers, it also became a major policy concern in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Anderson 2002).  These attacks prompted a shift 
in American foreign policy from supporting authoritarianism in the Arab world to a new 
“forward strategy for freedom” (Anderson 2006: 203; Heydemann 2006: 155). Engineers 
of Bush’s democratization campaign argued that anti-American terrorism blossomed in 
the vacuum of a “freedom deficit”. Hence, the “foreword strategy for freedom”, they 
argued, “would drain the swamp for the frustration and rage that fed anti-American 
terrorism by waging wars or initiating socio-economic reforms” (Heydemann 2007: 155). 
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American policy makers and some scholars projected a hegemonic discourse 
which imposed “American institutions, values and purposes on the rest of the world” 
(Anderson 2006: 191). Investments in Arab civil societies reached unprecedented heights. 
These investments were underpinned by a Tocquevillian perception of associations that 
depicts them as schools of civic virtue where social capital takes root and democratic 
attitudes and norms develop (Heydemann 2007: 34; Jamal 2007). However, in the Arab 
world, the promotion and projection of these values faced resistance (Anderson 1998; 
2002). Survival in power remained the ultimate objective of authoritarian Arab regimes. 
In this regard, Arab elites upgraded their rule by “managing political contestation, 
appropriating and containing civil society, capturing the benefits of selective economic 
reforms, controlling new communication technologies and diversifying international 
linkages (Heydemann 2007: 5).  
The failure of democratization to take root in the Arab world divided the 
academic community. Proponents of the political cultural approach argued that Arab 
culture lacks values and practices that are essential for the process of democratization. 
Bernard Lewis (1990; 2001) posits that Arab and Muslim culture is what makes the 
Middle East resilient to democratization. On this view, Islam is the antidote of 
“democratic, secular and industrialized western values and inspires its followers with 
hatred, envy and violence towards western nations.”1 Michael Hudson suggests giving 
time for Arab societies to learn and assimilate democratic values. “Decades, if not 
centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and 
habits” (Hudson 1989: 71; Heydemann 2006: 2). 
                                                
1
 Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, Atlantic Monthly online : 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/past/issues/90sep/rage.htm> 
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On the other hand, Lisa Anderson (1998), Quintam Wiktorowicz (2000) and 
Albrecht and Shlumberger (2004) argued that civil societies and civic engagement are 
influenced by the nature of state institutions. Anderson dispels the myth that Arab 
regimes are unique and portrays them “as a reflection of their country’s political 
economy and its integration into the world economy” (1998: 78). She blames the failure 
of the civil society endeavor in this region on governmental policies (Ibid: 83). 
Wiktorowicz (2000) argues that authoritarian regimes in the Arab world developed clever 
institutional and legal strategies to tighten their control over civil societies rather than 
allow them to serve as avenues of citizens’ empowerment. The authoritarian regimes of 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan immerse the civil society sector “in a web of bureaucratic 
practices and legal codes which allow those in power to monitor and regulate collective 
activities” (Ibid: 2). Albrecht and Schlumberger blame the elites of the Arab world for 
undermining one of the basic principles of civil society, its autonomy from political 
forces. Arab rulers have founded their own civil society that enabled them to feel 
“people’s pulse and manipulate their interests” (2004: 43; Anderson 2006: 196).  
This study thus reflects on the utility of NGOs in their role as political agents of 
change in the context of a weak state and a sectarian political system such as Lebanon’s. 
In particular, it focuses on the challenges that the women’s advocacy community faces 
regarding their political participation. This thesis therefore delves into the socio-political 
dynamics that constrain and determine the scope of action for the women’s advocacy 
community in Lebanon. The analysis of the strategies of the sectarian ruling elites vis-à-
vis women’s rights NGOs is necessary to understand how sectarian elites may silence, 
divide, co-opt and manipulate these associations to preserve their sectarian control or use 
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them to further their own political interests. This study complements the most recent 
approaches in studying the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world but moves 
away from them by focusing on the highly fragemented context of Lebanon where 
sectarian leaders developed strategies towards actors considered secondary in political 
and public life.  
On a broader level this study puts civil society at the intersecting point between 
state and society and, by doing so, helps us reflect on the nature of state-society relations 
in postwar Lebanon. State-society relations mediate the actions and operations of civil 
society. In the context of a plural society like Lebanon “political parties, interest groups, 
media communications, schools and voluntary organizations tend to be organized along 
the lines of segmental (sectarian) cleavages” (Lijphart 1977: 3). Moreover, Lebanon’s 
weak state is unable to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, 
and appropriate or use resources in determined ways (Migdal 1988). Strong sectarian 
leaders resist and fight state institutions through their own patron-client networks that 
enable them to provide survival strategies for their constituencies and extend their 
sectarian hegemony (Migdal 1988; Traboulsi 2007: viii; Salloukh 2007b). Hence, the 
combination of a society divided along confessional lines and a weak state promotes 
levels of social capital that are non-conducive to democracy. 
This study contributes to the scarce academic literature examining the utility of 
NGOs in postwar Lebanon. Scholars studying this period focused on the meaning of 
national reconciliation and the nature of postwar institutions (Maila 1991; Salloukh 
2007b), the causes and lessons from the civil war (Trabousli 2007; El Khazen 2002; Hanf 
1993), the war-to-peace transition and the Syrian role (Salloukh 2005; 2007a), the 
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demobilization of militias and their reintegration in the political system (Picard 2002), the 
renewal of sectarianism (Makdidisi 1994; Picard 2002; Salam and Hanf 2003), 
parliamentary elections and peacebuilding (Salloukh 2006; El Khazen 2003),  and 
political corruption and clientelism (Leenders 2004 a).  Civil society and its role in the 
political life received little attention. 
Few researchers are interested in shifting the focus from elites to non-elites to 
examine the state-society relations in postwar Lebanon. Paul Kingston published a series 
of articles (2002; 2000; 1999) focusing on the role of donor agencies in strengthening the 
power grip of the sectarian leaders and strategies devised by the latter to contain, co-opt 
and weaken environmentalists and handicapped advocacy NGOs. Karam Karam’s (2006) 
seminal work reviews the history and evolution of associational life in Lebanon to shed 
light on associations that are active in the environmental and human rights fields. This 
thesis will complement this limited yet rich literature.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Do low levels of civic engagement promote institutional ineffeciency or 
alternatively do inefficient institutions promote levels of civic engagement non conducive 
to democratic values and procedures? The weakness of the Lebanese state and the 
strength of clientelistic networks revolving around political Zu‘ama, warlords and 
tycoons, promote institutional inefficiency and high levels of political corruption. In this 
highly fragmented context, sectarian elites have only agreed to come together in the 
institutions of the state to divide spoils and distribute patronage to their constituencies in 
order to consolidate their power. Political power revolves around these patronage 
networks rather than state institutions (Hamzeh 2001; Kingston 2001). 
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Lebanese citizens have thus experienced their citizenship through access to 
sectarian leaders and their clientelistic networks. Moreover, in a country where 
citizenship is premised on sectarian membership, Lebanese citizens see themselves as 
members of their sectarian communities rather than citizens of their country. In this 
context, associational members realize that the representation of particular needs through 
clientelistic channels is the norm (Jamal 2007) and that sectarian leaders promote and 
supply representation to agendas that help them consolidate their patronage. Moreover, 
when associational leaders seek public institutions in a non-democratic context like 
Lebanon, they will be consolidating the authority of the clientelistic networks rather than 
state institutions (Ibid). 
In this clientelistic system, associational leaders will either adapt to the views of 
the ruling elites or feel marginalized from this system. This thesis adopts this view. It 
analyzes the weakness of state institutions and the development of patron-client networks 
in post-war Lebanon to show how this non-democratic context reproduces itself and 
hinders the ability of civic associations to achieve socio-political change. In particular, it 
shows how this system impedes women’s associations from amending gendered laws. 
Consequently, the pillars of political power in Lebanon, namely confessionalism and 
clientelism, are premised on patriarchy making it almost impossible for women to 
negotiate state-society relations towards more inclusive forms of citizenship. 
Another reseach question revolves around the effect of ethnic leaders on 
associational life in Lebanon and the way they impeded prospects for democratic 
consolidation and the emergence of an inter-sectarian identity. In Lebanon, sectarian 
leaders filled the vacuum of an absent state and have also perpetuated this void for sheer 
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survival in power. A strong state is their nemesis as is a secular civil society promoting 
an inter-sectarian identity. After invading state institutions, they have turned to civil 
society (Bray Collins 2003). In this regard, the state and civil society fail to provide 
mechanisms for democratic participation that enhance and consolidate democratic 
institutions and practices. In varying degrees, the sectarian elites blended “repression, co-
optation and the appropriation of NGO function to contain the deepening of civil 
societies and to erode their capacity to challenge political authority” (Heydemann 2007: 
9) and by doing so they successfully impeded the creation of horizontal interest-based 
identities. 
This thesis examines the direct and indirect elite strategies devised towards 
women NGOs aimed to obviate prospects for gender social policy reforms and 
democratic consolidation. This allows us to capture how the persistence of sectarianism 
and clientelism in Lebanon has “less to do with culture and tradition than with the 
political elite’s desire to preserve its rule and the nature of other power relations in the 
society” (Schwedler 1995: 9). 
Finally, what role do associations play in a context where political institutions do 
not support the types of civic participation associated with more effective democracy? 
What values and whose interests do they promote? In the absence of democratic 
institutions, the same patterns of civic engagement that pave the way for more democratic 
institutions in democratic settings may generate attitudes and behaviors in non 
democracies that either reinforce the sectarian and clientelistic status quo or alienate 
citizens from the political regime (Jamal 2007). The way organizations frame their issues 
and negotiate their relations with political leaders influences the way organizations affect 
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patterns of civic engagement and support for democratic values and institutions (Ibid). In 
this regard, this thesis considers the primary role that non-accountable state institutions 
play in shaping patterns and outcomes of civic engagement in Lebanon but it also pays 
critical attention to the way associational leaders constrain civic life through their 
interactions with power structures (Ibid). This thesis investigates this issue by examining 
the Lebanese women’s advocacy community. By doing so, I hilight how clientelistic and 
sectarian patterns trump civil society organizations and reproduce their own images. 
Hence, the extension of this hegemonic sectarian system does not only depend on 
sectarian elite strategies devised to silence subordinate classes but also on how 
subordinate groups cement this system through their participation in this system (Pratt 
2006).  
1.3 Case Study: The Women’s Advocacy Community 
The empirical part of this thesis sheds light on the efforts undertaken by sectors of 
Lebanon’s advocacy NGOs to promote gender social policy reforms. The case study 
examines the women’s advocacy community. This allows for the investigation of the 
factors that determine the utility of NGOs in postwar Lebanon. On the one hand, 
advocacy NGOs are relatively a new phenomena in the Arab world and Lebanon.2 They 
are involved in the operation of the political order (addressing human and women’s 
rights, the environment, transparency, political reform), they intervene in the arena that 
has been traditionally allocated to political parties and syndicates, and are led by 
proponents of secularism and democracy (Kingston 2008; Karam 2006) . The question in 
                                                
2In Lebanon, NGOs started to emerge in the early 1970s and were interrupted by the civil war only to 
resurge in the late 1980s with the adoption of universal values at the international level due to the alarming 
state of the environment and to international human rights.  Hence, advocacy NGOs in Lebanon constitute 
a new object of analysis (Karam 2006). 
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theoretical terms that Gramsci’s work raises is whether these women’s associations help 
create an alternative inter-sectarian and non-clientelistic women’s movement. In this 
regard, this thesis investigates whether these associations promote a counter-hegemonic 
civil society or are contained by the sectarian and clientelistic political order. 
This thesis argues that a comprehensive reform of the post-war gender order  
challenges the formal and informal pillars of political power in Lebanon, namely 
clientelism and confessionalism. This hegemonic system does not only undermine 
prospects for gender equality but it also weakens the emergence of a common civic 
identity and denies other oppressed and marginalized groups their rights. A civil code for 
family dismantles the clientelistic practices of the sectarian leaders and their ability to 
organize and mobilize people along sectarian lines. On another level, the nationality law 
plays a central role in sustaining the sectarian leaders’ political aspirations in a country 
where political representation is premised by the demographic weight of the confessional 
groups. Hence, women’s rights challenge the sectarian and clientelistic systems in 
Lebanon which makes the case study an interesting example to investigate how sectarian 
elites intervene to impede women’s advocacy community’s efforts to reform the gender 
order and seek a greater democratization of the system. 
Moreover, these associations cultivate a financial dependency on  international 
donors due to the absence of local funders. In this regard, international aid agencies are 
an important variable to consider when analyzing the impact of these associations on 
gender social policies and democratic outcomes. The central argument that this thesis 
makes is that the transformation of the post-war gender order is not induced by aid 
agencies but rather by local actors (Abirafeh 2009). However, aid agencies enable or 
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disable local actors from launching a Gramscian ‘war of position’ against the prevailing 
hegemonic structures through their projected policies and devised programs. In 
theoretical terms, the aim is to investigate whether donors focus on achieving whatever 
can be achieved in the sectarian context of Lebanon. 
1.4 Methodology 
A political economic approach to understand civil society in a sectarian context 
like Lebanon allows me to move away from political cultural arguments. As Bassel 
Salloukh has argued this school of thought dismisses the possibility of democratic 
consolidation in postwar Lebanon due to a Lebanese mentatlity supporting powerful 
primordial sectarian identities which mobilize people along vertical sectarian identities 
rather than horizontal interest-based one (Salloukh 2008: 3). The political economic 
approach shows how government institutions, a reflection of the country’s state formation 
and incorporation into the world, account for weak associational group formation 
(Anderson 1998; Abdelrahman 2004: 81). From this view, the persistence of the sectarian 
political system has less to do with primordialism than the “inherited Ottoman and later 
French colonial legacy and, subsequently, the institutional choices and strategies of 
sectarian elites bent on perpetuating their political prerogatives” (Salloukh 2008: 3). 
This thesis relies extensively on ethnographic fieldwork. In order to determine the factors 
that shape the utility of these associations and the challenges that they encounter, I rely 
on qualitative research tools: structured interviews and an analysis of associational 
documents, publications and newspaper articles. 
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Research undertaken for this thesis was based on 21 interviews (See Appendix A). The 
interviews were either taped based upon informants’ consent or written whenever the 
latter did not agree to have them tape-recorded.  
The interviewees included a lawyer, two journalists, civil society activists and a funder 
from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Italy is the only European country to support 
gender issues and the Italian Development Cooperation office is among the few 
organizations that have a gender-based strategy3 for Lebanon which made the interview 
interesting for this research. Other funders were approached but the researcher was never 
able to set up interviews with them. This reluctance urged me to rely more on their 
country strategy and online published documents. 
Moreover, sixteen in-depth individual interviews and informal discussions with 
associational leaders and activists from CRTD-A, CFUWI, KAFA, NCLW, LLWR, 
WWL, LWDG and Al Najdeh Association were made. The aim was to interview upper 
and middle management employees in these associations including executive directors, 
board members and campaign coordinators. However, some associational leaders were 
reluctant to sit for interviews. This affected data collection and analysis. The data 
gathered was an essential and useful tool to understand how associational leaders in these 
institutions made sense of their world and the issues they believe were important. It was 
thus an opportunity for the informants to describe the way in which they experience their 
ideology and the impact that the former has on their work, their views of the ruling cartel 
and the political system and their relationship with state institutions, their perception of 
Lebanese women’s rights, gender roles and the way they translate their beliefs into 
practice. On another level, these interviews helped assess to what extent women’s rights 
                                                
3
 UNDP Lebanon also developed a Gender-based Strategy for Lebanon in 2006. 
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associations are capable to get in touch with ordinary women and whether or not they are 
able to aggregate their interests.  
As Diane Watt notes in her article, qualitative research does not follow a specific 
“formula on how to proceed; it is highly flexible whereby the research design in itself is 
constantly subject to changes between theory and the real world” (Watt 2007: 93). The 
experience throughout this thesis provides fresh insight into the aforementioned 
argument. For instance, I sought to gather relevant materials concerning the 
aforementioned associations which proved to be impossible as some associations did not 
document their experience. Hence the extensive reliance on one-on-one interviews was a 
main tool to extract the necessary information. On another level, the initial project design 
entailed interviewing board members but this proved to be impossible in most of the 
cases as board members act as rubber stamp bodies in most associations. 
In a nutshell, reflexivity helped the researcher “to become aware of what allows 
me to see, as well as what might inhibit seeing” (Ibid: 82). This entailed careful 
consideration of the phenomenon under study and the ways a researcher’s own 
assumptions and behavior may impact the inquiry. To put reflexivity to test, this entailed 
keeping a record in which data, thoughts, ideas, reading responses, some observations 
from the field about the space and place were recorded. Most importantly, this “research 
journal” was the place where the researcher kept possible solutions for problems 
encountered. It was also a place by excellence where reflections about theory and practice 
occurred. 
To manage the collected data and find linkages between the research questions 
and information collected, I went through a process of data extrapolation for interview 
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transcripts. This entailed reading transcripts literally and retrieving from each the 
information that answered one of the major research questions addressed. The outcome of 
this process was materialized in a research question matrix. After making sure that all the 
issues were addressed, I proceeded to analyze the data. Transcript reading in this stage 
moved from literal to interpretive to deductive reading. Throughout this process, I 
identified ideas, tagged them, and labeled the information that lined up with these ideas 
elsewhere, defined and refined the emerging concepts. Hence, I drew the line between the 
information collected and the way to analyze it. Most importantly, this process helped me 
to move ahead with data analysis by finding concepts related to the general context for 
elite strategies and women’s movement. Hence, the interactions among women’s 
associations, the ruling cartel and ordinary women were disentangled. This process was 
instrumental to draw the line between analysis and research questions. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The next chapter presents a theoretical 
framework that guides the analysis of the impact of women NGOs on gender social 
policy and democratic outcomes in the sectarian context of Lebanon. Chapter three 
examines the status of women’s rights in the sectarian and clientelistic context of 
Lebanon. Chapter four analyzes women’s advocacy community in post-war Lebanon, and 
chapter five adresses the challenges that women face when they raise issues such as the 
nationality law, civil marriage bill and domestic violence. Special attention will be paid 
to the political dynamics that hinder prospects for change.The final chapter summarizes 
the lessons learnt and contributions of this study, and reflects on future prospects for the 
women’s movement in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN 
COMPARTIVE PERSPECTIVES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of the 
impact of women NGOs on gender social policies and democratic outcomes in the 
sectarian context of Lebanon. But first, the chapter reviews the literature that shaped the 
study of the utility of civil society in particular contexts. In this regard, a discussion of the 
hypotheses relating to the society-centric, state-centric and state-in-society approaches is 
in order. 
The theoretical framework presented combines Migdal’s (1988) model of state-
society relations in “weak states and strong societies” and Gramsci’s conceptualization of 
civil society. By doing so, this approach makes the point that associations “need to be 
explained and most importantly that the associative cure needs to be put into context” 
(RoBteutscher 2005: 6). As one scholar eloquently stated “whether associations 
reinvigorate or undermine democracy depends on the political system in which they exist, 
the structure of social relations which dominate a given society and the structural features 
of the associations themselves” (Ibid). 
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2.2 Civic Engagement and Democratic Outcomes in Comparative Perspectives 
2.2.1 The Society-Centric Approach 
Influenced by Alexis De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1863), scholars 
who adopt the society-centric approach to analyze the impact of associational life on 
democratic outcomes present different arguments (Diamond 1996; Huntington 1993; 
Putnam 1993). Some of them argue that associational life “makes democracy work” 
(Putnam 1993) in the sense that it makes “democratic institutions stronger and more 
effective” (Jamal 2007: 5). Such claims draw from the Latin American and Eastern 
European experiences where civil society was presented as the driving force leading to 
the downfall of authoritarian regimes. 
Proponents of the society-centric approach adopt the view that “civic 
organizations serve as agents of democratic socialization” and therefore promote 
democracy in different contexts (Jamal 2007: 20). This argument lends itself to De 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America in which he praises the high participation of 
American citizens in associational life. De Tocqueville makes an interesting argument 
when he attributes the virtues of American democracy to its prosperous associational 
sector which he defines as “the mother of all sciences” and the place par excellence 
where “feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged and the human mind is 
developed … by the reciprocal influence of men over each others” (1863: 117-118).  On 
this view, the civil society sector is an arena where citizens become exposed to 
democratic values and learn important skills that enable them to become efficient and 
active members of their societies. 
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This argument became the pillar of different hypotheses advanced by proponents 
of the society-centric approach (Diamond and Paltner 1996; Putnam 1993). Larry 
Diamond and Marc Paltner (1996) posit that civic engagement increases public 
awareness on political participation. When citizens, even the most marginalized come 
together in civil societies, they become enlightened about their political role and their 
views can be factored into policy making (Ibid: 232). 
In Making Democracy Work (1993), Robert Putnam argues that associational life 
increases levels of social capital and cooperative ventures among associational members 
thus strengthening cooperation and consolidating institutional democracy and efficiency. 
As Putnam argues “democratic government is strengthened not weakened when it faces a 
vigorous civil society” (Ibid: 182). 
In this regard, Putnam’s central hypothesis is that the interaction of civil society 
activists with the public sector strengthens public accountability and democratic 
participation which consolidates democratic institutions. He (1993) posits that the success 
of local governance in northern Italy is the result of civic activism and an associational 
culture that transcends primordial ties. 
To answer this puzzle, a classical political cultural argument is advanced “to 
investigate how traditions of associations and civic engagement affect political behavior” 
(Tarrow 1996: 390). Civic attitudes are the result of centuries of experience that are deep-
seated and unchangeable. Central to this conceptualization is the assumption that 
southern Italy’s monarchism lead to a lack of civility whereas northern Italy’s vibrant 
communal government strengthened its civic capacity (Levi 1996). 
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Although the society-centric approach influenced scholars interested in assessing 
the democratic outcomes of civic engagement, many scholars started to question whether 
it really serves as the most appropriate framework to analyze socio-political change in 
different contexts. Such criticism gave way to a state-centric approach for the study of 
civil society. 
Challenged by society-centric reductionism of political change to socioeconomic 
variables, statist theorists highlighted the “explanatory centrality of states as potent and 
autonomous organizational actors and agents of socio-economic change” (Sckopol 1985:  
6). On this view, “the state must be considered as more than the government. It is the 
continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only 
to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to 
structure many relationships within civil society as well” (Ibid: 7). Underlying this 
Weberian perception of the state is a paradigmatic shift. States are no longer perceived as 
dependent variables shaped by civil societies but independent variables that explain 
democratic outcomes and policy performance (Ibid).  Moreover, civil society is no longer 
an independent variable that explains the success or  failure of democratic institutions but 
a dependent variable that needs to be explained. 
2.2.2 The State-Centric Approach 
Scholars examining civil society from the state-centric approach have presented a 
number of hypotheses. Some shed light on the way states affect the institutional structure 
of civil societies thus leading to their increased or decreased political efficiency (Sckopol, 
Ganz and Munson 2000). Others argue that authoritarian states deploy clever institutional 
and legal strategies aimed at tightening social control over civil societies rather than 
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paving the way for them to serve as avenues to empower citizens and aggregate their 
interests (Abdelrahman 2004; Heydemann 2007; Wiktorowicz 2000). Still others have 
paid careful attention to the way states influence civic attitudes and norms (Jamal 2007; 
Levi 1996). 
For example, Sckopol agrees with Charles Tilly that “social-movement repertoires 
of collective action have always adapted to the structures and practices of a given state” 
(1985: 7). In a similar vein, Sckopol, Ganz and Munson (2000) argue that the structure of 
the American state determines the shape of the associational sector. Hence, the 
institutional structure of large American associations includes local, state and federal 
levels, which mirrors the structure of federal governments (Ibid). 
On the other hand, Levi (1996) criticizes the underlying assumptions of Putnam’s 
political cultural approach and his absolute neglect of the state’s influence over the shape 
and scope of associations as well as patterns of civic engagement.  Levi posits that 
governments “are the major source of social capital and policy performance can be a 
source of trust, not just a result” (1996: 50). On this view, associations alone can not 
produce trust among associational members; “state institutions under certain 
circumstances lay the basis for generalized trust... weak and ineffective states, as is the 
case in Lebanon and Yugoslavia, fail to promote generalized trust thus leading to a 
Hobesian state of nature of the war of all against all” (Ibid). 
In a similar vein, scholars analyzing the Arab World focus on how authoritarian 
states transform civil societies into social control mechanisms (Abdelrahman 2004; 
Heydemann 2007; Jamal 2007; Wiktorowicz 2000). 
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These scholars moved away from trying to find out why democracy did not take root in 
the Arab world towards analyzing what accounts for the resilience and persistence of 
authoritarianism in this region. This shift led some of them to focus on the robustness of 
state coercive apparatuses (Bellin 2004). Others were more interested in the “softer” 
elements aimed at enhancing the capacity of governments to regulate and control 
independent civil society organizations and maintaining their authoritarian rule. 
Underlying this school of thought is an assumption that coercive power comes at a cost 
that can expose Arab regimes to criticism. In this regard, authoritarian states resorted to a 
combination of institutional strategies “to exploit the rhetoric and organizational 
framework of civil society and generate political resources that can be appropriated and 
used to their own advantage” (Heydemann 2007: 8). 
 Quintam Wiktorowicz (2000) adopts a Foucaultian perception of power that sheds 
light on the way civil societies can be used to tighten states’ social control rather than 
empower citizens. Liberalization from above created opportunities for associations; 
however authoritarian states using order and visibility turned civil society organizations 
into arenas to extend social control. In this regard, Arab states shifted from using visible 
coercion and commands into a partition of “space into surveillable units that can be 
regulated and administered… dictating when and where individuals are present and even 
their relations with one another, the state enhances its social control” (Wiktorowicz 2000: 
7). For instance, the state in Jordan divided civil societies into discrete categories based 
on their field of intervention and regulated them by functionally differentiated 
government agencies that oversee their work. The state also enforced transparency on 
these organizations (reporting, declaring members and volunteers) thus serving its own 
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interests by making civil society actions visible to the authoritarian state. Hence, civil 
societies are therefore embedded in “a web of legal codes and bureaucratic regulations 
designed to enhance the regime’s ability to monitor collectivities” (Ibid: 1; Heydemann 
2007: 7-8). 
Jamal’s unique contribution in Barriers to Democracy (2006) moves away from 
institutional and political constraints imposed on civil societies to show how the latter 
patronized by their close relationship to the authoritarian regime in power reproduce non-
democratic norms, values and practices. While reviewing Occupied Palestinian 
Territories’ state-society relations in the post-Oslo period, Jamal highlights patterns of a 
strong associational life such as high levels of interpersonal trust especially among civic 
organizations enjoying a privileged relationship with Arafat. On another hand, 
associations opposed to the PNA, exhibit low levels of trust and high levels of 
institutional democracy. In this regard, the reinvigoration of Palestinian civil society 
challenges Putnam’s assumptions which stipulate that the act of coming together in civil 
societies increases levels of trust and consolidates democratic institutions. The 
proliferation of civil society in the OPT and high levels of civic engagement happened in 
ways that undermined prospects for real democratization. Jamal, argues that the nature of 
state institutions shapes the quality of civic engagement with deep implications on 
democratic outcomes. In the highly centralized and clientelistic context of the PNA, civil 
society groups can cater to their target groups only if they enjoy strong ties with the 
ruling elites. Whenever associations challenged the PNA, they were not only deprived of 
resource allocation but they were also subject to coercive measures that weakened their 
bargaining power and reduced their popular support. In this regard, Jamal challenges the 
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society-centric assumptions in general. Whereas Putnam adopts a political cultural 
approach to explain civic attitudes and democratic outcomes and downplays the 
important role of the state, Jamal argues that “the nature of state institutions trumps civic 
cultures and reproduces their own images” (Heydemann 2008: 358). Hence, “the clear 
implication that challenges the society-centric approach is that the path to democracy in 
the Arab world leads not through civil societies, but through the reform of Arab states” 
(Ibid). 
2.2.3 The State-in-Society approach 
A revisionist statist argument emerged to challenge the aforementioned 
approaches. Influenced by the Weberian tradition, scholars of the “state-in-society” 
approach argue that strong and efficient states are the ones to maintain a close 
relationship with society. On this view, the relationship between states and social actors 
yields to empowerment (Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994). 
On the one hand, society-centrists argued that socio-cultural systems affect the 
efficiency of civil societies and downplayed the important role that states play in molding 
civil societies and patterns of civic engagements. On the other hand, statists overstated 
the state’s autonomy from society to conclude that state institutions are the most 
significant actors influencing associational life. Proponents of the state-in-society 
approach argue that states in third world countries are embedded in their societies. In this 
regard, state-in-society theorists disentangle the inexorable relationship between states 
and social actors to shed light on how transformations in one of them affects the other. 
One of the benefits a state-in-society approach claims to offer is “to disaggregate 
the state” (Migdal 1994: 15).  This has the effect of moving away from statist perceptions 
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of the state as “an organic, undifferentiated actor towards shedding light on its 
contentious fragments … constituted of numerous societal variables influencing the 
processes of social change in low-income countries” (Ibid: 2, 18, and 308).  Moreover 
and despite the fact that societies influence states, they are themselves molded by the 
confrontations in which they exist. Hence and arguing contra-statist theorists, state-in-
society theorists argue that strong states are not totally autonomous from social actors 
rather strong states are the ones capable to work with social actors. Therefore a state’s 
disconnectivity from social groups is associated with weakness rather than strength.  On 
this view, state-in-society theorists claim that states are dependent on social actors to 
achieve their objectives (Kohli and Shue 1994: 309) and that the empowerment of social 
forces does not necessarily weaken the power of the state to rule society. Furthermore, 
state-in-society theorists argue that the mutually reinforcing interaction between state and 
society should not be taken for granted (Ibid: 235). A few remarks are in order with 
respect to this theoretical framework. 
On the one hand, state-in-society theorists lapse into an anthropological study of 
states that fails to answer one of the most recurrent questions of this volume: the 
weakness of third world countries. Most importantly, it warns against taking this 
paradigm for granted but it fails to explain under which circumstances the interactions 
between states and societies yield to more empowerment for both. Hence, the authors 
bring these issues to mind but they fail to provide a convincing argument. 
In the context of Lebanon’s weak state and strong patron-client networks, the 
patterns that lead to mutual empowerement for states and societies are dramatically 
different from the ones envisioned by state-in-society theorists. Despite the fact that 
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cooperation between civil society actors and strong societal actors yield in some 
circumstances to policy changes, it only happens if it consolidates the power of sectarian 
leaders and tightens their clientislitic outreach with serious implications on democracy. 
The next section provides an analytical framework combining Migdal’s Strong 
Societies, Weak States (1988) and Gramsci’s notion of civil society.  While arguing that 
civil societies are dependent on states and societies, the emerging framework provides a 
corrective to the aforementioned paradigms as it sheds light on the imperfect and 
contradictory relationship between weak states and strong societies and the implications 
of this state-society model over civil societies and patterns of civic engagement. In such 
contexts, state-society relations mold the operations and actions of civil societies leading 
to patterns that neither consolidate democratic institutions nor to mutual empowerment 
and incremental social policy changes. Patterns of civic engagement are structured in 
ways that feeds up the interests of strong societal actors, strengthen the sectarian leaders’ 
patron-client networks and extend their hegemony. In particular, sectarian leaders blend 
repression, co-optation and appropriation to contain an emerging civil society sector that 
calls into question their sectarian hegemony. As Salloukh argues, “that this sectarian 
system has attained the level of – in Gramsci’s words – hegemony attests to the success 
of these strategies more than to the primordial character of the Lebanese” (Salloukh 2008 
: 6-7). 
In this regard, civil society (in this case the women’s movement) is a site where 
sectarian hegemony is either consolidated or challenged through a ‘war of position’ that 
the women’s advocacy community leads against the hegemonic sectarian and patriarchal 
power structures. In the particular case of Lebanon (and the Arab World), state formation 
 24 
is considered as the critical moment in this history that led to the creation of a sectarian 
patriarchal hegemony and a gendered citizenship.  In Lebanon, the pillars of this system, 
clientelism and sectarianism, depend largely on men’s control over women. In this 
regard, granting women equal rights upsets religious, patriarchal and political elites 
because it calls into question the entire system of political power. 
However before turning to this theoretical framework, the following section 
reviews some of the literature that analyzed civil society in Lebanon. 
2.3 Civil Society in Lebanon: The Emerging Theoretical Framework 
 
2.3.1 Lebanese Civil Society: A Review of the Literature 
Lebanon is an interesting case in which to examine the effectiveness of 
associational life in non-democratic sectarian contexts.  In Lebanon, the associational 
sector played an important role throughout history (Karam 2006) and developed 
tremendously in the post-civil war period (Kingston 2008: 1). As military actions settled, 
reconciliation and reconstruction commenced. Civil society was called upon to act 
immediately and to respond to huge needs with limited resources. More than 5,000 
associations are officially registered in Lebanon.4 These associations are active on the 
political and social levels. The Syrian tutelage worked to co-opt and divide many of 
Lebanon’s previously vibrant associational actors from political parties to labor unions; 
Lebanon’s associational sector thus played an important role to fill this vaccum. In 
particular, civil society actors engaged the state on different issues of social and political 
                                                
4
 A series of articles published by The Monthly, show that the number of associations in Lebanon 
considerably increased between 2004 and 2008. During the five years, 1878 associations were licensed. 
Among other regions, Beirut ranks first with 1170 NGOs of which 409 active. The North ranks second with 
707 NGOs and 390 active. In the South of Lebanon there are 457 NGOs and only 238 active. The Beqaa 
ranks last with 363 associations and 180 active. The Monthly issues 8, 9,49,57,70,71,72,73 respectively. 
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interest.  Others emerged as key actors providing social welfare services to the most 
underserved with the weakening of state institutions. 
These developments led Hawthorne to describe the associational sector in 
Lebanon as the “most diverse and active civil society in the region” (2005: 89). Others 
went beyond numbers to delve into the factors that enable and disable socio-political 
change in the sectarian context of Lebanon. The latter grappled between a revisionist 
version of political opportunity structure, patron-client networks and state-in-society 
paradigms. 
Proponents of the political opportunity structure approach, such as Karam (2004; 
2006) argue that the impact of civil society’s collective action is determined by political 
opportunities urging people to undertake collective action and deeply affecting 
expectations of success and failure. 
While analyzing the mobilizing structures and framing processes of the post-war 
advocacy associations, Karam’s thesis sheds light on their civility. By civic, Karam 
(2006) means that these associations adopt pacifist ways to promote their agendas and 
have thus refuted the milita logic as well as all types of violence (psychological and 
physical).5 By civil, Karam takes issue with their inter-sectarian identity and the nature of 
issues raised (civic rights and human rights, ecology, etc). The clear implication, 
according to Karam, is that these movements are durable forms of collective action due to 
their resilience to succumb to confessional and sectarian logic (Ibid :7). On this view, the 
post-war social movements’ success or failure should not only be evaluated in terms of 
                                                
5
 Karam’s post-war protest movements are categorized into reformist and revolutionary. Advocacy NGOs 
under scrutiny in his study fall under the first category because they seek to reform the sectarian system and  
consolidate the rule of law (Karam 2006) through pacifist ways. On the other hand, Subhi Tufayli’s attempt 
to Islamize the country is a revolutionary movement (Ibid).  
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their ability or lack thereof to democratize the political system but in their capacity “to 
regulate political conflicts through pacifist modes and encourage a bottom-top 
reconciliation which privileges national projects and transcends sectarian cleavages” 
(Ibid : 28, 330). In this regard, the 2005 Cedar Revolution is according to Karam the 
culmination of the post-war social movement’s efforts to create a public space where 
people claim their demands through pacifist channels that transcend sectarian loyalties 
and identities. 
Karam adopts a revisionist political oppportunity structure paradigm, one which 
assesses the impact of the aforementioned civil society movement by introducing a 
“socio-cultural” variable (Karam 2006: 214, 209). On this view, an analysis6 of the 
constitutional political system and an appreciation of the openness/closure of the system 
is defined in terms of  political reforms, the post-Ta’if constitutional and institutional 
framework, the post-war troika system and the problematic of dealing with different 
forms of oppposition under Syrian tutelage in Lebanon (Ibid : 194). However, “the dense 
and primoridal solidarities also inhbited collective action especially when the latter 
entered in a collision course with the interests of heads of confessions” (Ibid : 214). 
Karam’s insightful contribution is challenged by theortical pitfalls and emperical 
facts on the ground, however. In fact, the political opportunity structure paradigm 
emerges as a “sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). Although, Karam offers a revisionist paradigm, it fails 
to explain how state-society relations molded civil societies operations, actions and civic 
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 Despite the ambiguity of the term, Karam adopts Tarrow’s definition of political opportunity structure 
which is determined by five factors “the relative openness or closeness of the political system, the stability 
of a broad set of elite alignments that under-grid a polity, the presence of elite allies and the state’s capacity 
and propensity for repression” (Ibid: 9). 
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engagement. His focus on post-war politics states that political opportunities are subject 
to the manipulation and practices of the sectarian elites but does not explain the strategies 
that the sectarian ruling cartel devised towards civil society actors to deny them 
autonomy and impede their reformist agendas. 
Karam’s paradigm also treats confessional structures as static and primordial 
rather than determined and manipulated by state policies and state elites (2006: 214). It 
fails to account for the inexorable relationship linking sectarian elites to religious heads 
of confessions. The former won the support of heads of confessions in part by respecting 
their domain of power over the personal status laws and their control over a number of 
important social-service institutions. It was in the interest of the ruling elites to encourage 
social segmentation on a sectarian basis among the population, extend their sectarian 
hegemony and facilitate social control (Joseph 1991). For instance, Karam (Ibid) argues 
that a number of religious Islamic leaders and their faith based organizations overtly 
opposed the optional civil marriage bill and called for its rejection. A number of sit-ins in 
Beirut and Tripoli were organized by heads of confessions to build an opposition, 
blocking the transfer of the civil marriage bill to the Lebanese Parliament. By doing so, 
he obscures the important role of sectarian political leaders in initiating this counter-
movement in order to check the power of rivals among sectarian leaders7 and extend their 
sectarian hegemony. In the particular case of the civil marriage bill, the proposal turned 
into a showdown between a weak Maronite president and a powerful Sunni Prime 
Minister. Hrawi allied with the Shi’ite speaker of parliament to propose the civil marriage 
bill; Hariri saw it as challenging the power of the heads of confessions who emerged 
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 In particular, PM Rafiq Hariri played an important role in opposing the passage of the law for final 
endorsement by the parliament. 
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throughout history as an important ally for the sectarian ruling cartel mobilizing people 
along sectarian lines. Moreover, the adoption of the civil marriage bill risked 
overthrowing the myth of sectarian pluralism which legitimated sectarian leaders’ rule. 
At the time, it was PM Hariri who resorted to mobilizing popular opposition by calling 
“on the mufti of Lebanon (who was in a visit to Saudi Arabia) and asking him to return 
immediately to Beirut and stage demonstrations to protest the proposal” (Reinkowski and 
Saadeh 2007: 108). The history of Lebanon abounds with such examples whereby 
sectarian elites structure these opportunities in such a way as to determine the nature of 
cleavages within the society and extend their social control. 
Moreover, Karam’s contribution is confronted with empirical facts on the ground. 
His central argument which sheds light on the emergence of an inter-sectarian civil 
society holding a potential for a bottom-up reconciliation is challenged by less optimistic 
accounts. The post-war civil society has failed to launch a “preemptive strike” against 
Lebanon’s recurrent civil wars. Violence and short-term compromises remain the most 
salient tools to regulate political dissent. On this view, civil society has fallen short of 
ensuring civil peace and devising lasting solutions8 for political dissent. The May 2008 
clashes and the ensuing Doha agreement is testimony to this. 
On the other hand, less than optimistic accounts have challenged Karam’s vision 
of the durability of these social movements (i.e, their independence from the political and 
the confessional system). Lebanon’s weak state and strong patron client networks that 
revolve around the sectarian cartel have increasingly polarized civil and associational life 
into two camps: those who support the sectarian leaders and those who oppose them. 
With the Syrian withdrawal, this schism became more acute. In fact, some associations 
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 Salim Mouawwad, “Soukout Al Moujtama  Al Madani Al Loubnani” , al-Nahar, 30 May 2008. 
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under scrutiny in Karam’s study, such as LADE, have become subject to prey by the 
patronage networks of political leaders and have overtly lined up with one political 
faction against another.9 
Kingston’s (1999, 2001) relies on the patron-client networks and state-in-society 
approach to pay careful attention to sectarian elite strategies devised towards NGO 
politics in Lebanon. 
Writing about environmental politics in post-war Lebanon, Kingston argues that 
such an analysis is best captured from the patron-client rather than a state-society 
relations approach (2001). These networks,  regulate the socio-political order “in contexts 
of transitions in which the state is unable to emanacipate itself from society” (2001: 56). 
Patrons seek to maintain and consolidate their power grip by controling patronage 
ressources and by coercively limiting the degree to which they need to redistribute them 
back to their clients. 
While  tracing the roots of patron-client networks Kingston borrows from Hudson 
and Khalaf, proponents of the political cultural approach, to show how notables were able 
to take advantage of the forces of modernization to transform and strengthen their 
position (1999). On this view, Kingston agrees with Hudson that “this particularistic 
loyalty pattern is so deeply engrained that a century of westernization both material and 
intellectual have not worn them away” (Ibid:4). 
But Kingston’s framwork overstates patron-client networks’ material incentives 
and downplays the ideological and cultural dimensions. This focus leads him to the 
following conclusion: civil societies in such contexts either seek a “greater material share 
from the sectarian patrons or greater freedom of action outside the terms of the 
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 Interview with Nizar Sahgieh, lawyer and civil society activist, Beirut, 10 November 200 
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compliance agreements” (Kingston 2001: 57). What can be said about civil society 
organizations that challenge the underlying assumption of the sectarian hegemonic 
regime in power and seek a renegotiation of state-society relations outside the sectarian 
logic? 
To explain the limited incremental social policy changes in the disability sector, 
Kingston adopts Migdal’s state-in-society approach to shed light on the “patterns of 
growth of different parts of civil society that can have a determining effect on state-
society relations” (Kingston 1999: 31). Hence, in the sectarian context of Lebanon, 
NGOs might move away from the “civil society paradigm” towards an “acceptance and a 
willingness to work with these confessional structures” (Ibid: 2). Reiterating Migdal’s 
mutual empowerement theory, Kingston comes to the conclusion that cooperation 
between some sectarian elites and civil society actors promises incremental 
improvements in social policy. The “small , gradual and perhaps only partial ways, may 
help to break the historical immobilism of the Lebanese administrative and political 
system to allow it to nibble away at its longstanding problems of socio-economic 
inequality” (Ibid :31). 
Though these networks of cooperation between civil society actors and sectarian 
elites might yield in some circumstances to incremental policy change; they also tighten 
the clientislitic outreach and extend the sectarain hegemony of the sectarian leaders rather 
than state institutions with serious implications on democratic consolidation. On this 
view, it is difficult to perceive, as Kingston does, how these networks might break the 
“immobilism of Lebanon’s administrative and political system” (1999: 31)  at a time 
 31 
when sectarian leaders only promote and supply representation for the agendas that only 
help them preserve and extend  their rule. 
The following section argues that Migdal’s model of Strong Societies, Weak 
States (1988) best captures the mediating role of state-society relations in Lebanon over 
the operations, actions and impact of civil society and  patterns of democratic civic 
engagement and social policy reforms. 
 
2.3.2 Civic Engagement and Democratic Outcomes in Strong Societies and Weak States 
Migdal’s (1988) model for state-society relations sheds light on the imperfect and 
contradictory relationship between states and societies in an existing environment of 
conflict. Moreover, Migdal (Ibid) challenges statist perceptions that overstate the ability 
of the state to issue binding rule-making. On this view, states in third world countries are 
one among other social organizations locked in “an active struggle for social control of 
the population” (Ibid: 48). On the one hand, the state is resisted by traditional power 
structures to achieve a reordering of society and extend social control. On the other hand, 
social organizations (families, clans, tribes, sects, patron-client networks) control the 
available resources and manipulate the symbols that make up people’s strategies for 
survival. The importance of these strategies transcends the fact that they provide a basis 
for individual survival and link the “individual from the realm of personal identity and 
self-serving action to the sphere of group identity and collective action” (Ibid: 27). In 
order to force people to behave according to certain rules and norms, these social 
organizations devise their survival strategies taking myriad forms of sanctions, rewards 
and symbols. 
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In the context of a “web-like social structure” where autonomous social 
organizations compete to extend social control through their survival strategies, the state 
can wrest social control only if it provides alternative strategies (Ibid: 37). In this regard, 
it would be difficult to perceive in highly conflicting contexts the mutually empowering 
nature of states and societies. Hence, strong states are the ones capable of executing 
policies aimed at enforcing the state’s social control. Borrowing from statists, Migdal 
determines state capabilities in terms of their ability “to penetrate society, regulate social 
relationships, extract resources, and appropriate and use resources in a predetermined 
way” (Ibid: 55). In Third World countries, the state enters in a collusion course with 
strong societies who challenge state policies by manipulating incentives and rewards 
through their patronage networks. 
Lebanon’s sectarian political system institutionalized this pattern of state-society 
relations (Salloukh 2007b: 2). In post-war Lebanon, the state is more of a contested arena 
rather than an actor in these struggles. As Kingston eloquently notes “instead of having a 
weak state trying to protect its limited autonomy from strong sectarian leaders, the latter 
use these strategies to check the power of rivals among sectarian leaders, to challenge 
their dominant position and to deny cross-sectarian civil society actors autonomy” 
(Kingston 1999: 7). In this deeply fragmented political context, neither the state nor civil 
society serve as arenas where citizens can claim their rights or hold sectarian leaders 
accountable. 
Moreover, at a time when citizens’ political participation can only take place 
through ties to sectarian leaders, associational leaders learn that the latter are only willing 
to support and represent particular agendas that do not challenge their sectarian 
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hegemony and serve them to consolidate their patronage networks with deep implications 
on citizens’ interests and needs. On the other hand, associational leaders also learn that 
the representation of these interests in Lebanon only happens through clientelistic 
channels (Jamal 2007). Therefore, the patterns of civic engagement that pave the way for 
the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices strengthen clientelism and 
sectarianism, the pillars of political power in Lebanon. 
Moreover in this highly fragmented context, associations do not act as schools of 
civic virtue that strengthen democratic values but rather attitudes and behaviors promoted 
will differ leading to the reinforcement of the clientelistic and sectarian status quo or 
marginalization from the regime. 
The way associations frame their issues and negotiate their relationship with 
political institutions and the sectarian leaders around them, influences the way 
organizations affect their support for democratic values and practices. Therefore and in 
addition to the primary role that non-accountable state institutions play in mediating civic 
engagement, associational leaders constrain civic life through their interaction with 
power structures. The relationship between associational leaders and sectarian elites does 
not only guarantee freedom of action but also shapes visions, attitudes and beliefs 
inculcated within these association about the consolidation of democracy and patterns of 
political participation. Consequently, clientelistic and corporatist associations serve to 
consolidate the legitimacy of the sectarian leaders and disseminate non-democratic 
values. On the other hand, non-client associations try to affect policies and consolidate 
inter-sectarian consciousness but may not be successful in doing so. 
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It is to this important issue that a Gramscian conceptualization of women’s 
advocacy community becomes important. Women’s rights in Lebanon are elements of 
structural problems. In this regard, a research focused on women’s rights NGOs sheds 
light on whether these associations challenge the hegemonic system, paving the way for 
an alternative society, or are kept consistent with the parameters of the clientelistic and 
confessional political order which feeds up on gendered discrimination. 
 
2.3.3 Sectarianism and Women NGOs: Hegemony and the ‘War of Position’ 
Writing about civil society, Gramsci stresses that the only challenge to capitalist 
hegemony is brought by struggles of subordinate classes. This thesis extends Gramsci’s 
argument to investigate the potential that another subordinate group, namely women, 
holds in challenging the hegemony of sectarianism and enacting gender social policy 
reforms in Lebanon (Pratt 2006). 
From this perspective, the hegemony of sectarian identities should not be reduced 
to its socio-economic dimension; the ideological dimension is sometimes more important. 
Individuals may support the sectarian political system which is ideologically and 
materially based. Hence, hegemony does not only lead to the marginalization and 
oppression of subordinate groups by the powerful ruling elites but rather the subordinate 
groups cement rulers’ hegemony through their belief and support in these hegemonic 
structures (Ibid). 
In Gramsci’s civil society conceptualization, associations are places where 
consent to oppressive regimes is generated and disseminated in society at large. Hence, 
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civil society is a necessary instrument of political control for the ruling elites.10 For 
Gramsci, the powerful control the populace by force and coercion but this is usually 
temporary. Hence, the survival of the ruling elites in power depends on an agreement that 
perceives sectarianism as natural (Abedelrahman 2004; Pratt 2006). Civil societies are 
arenas where ideological “battles for the hearts and minds of the citizens are conducted” 
(Pratt 2006: 11). These struggles include thorny issues that serve to consolidate the 
hegemonic system “such as women’s rights, the construction of national identity and the 
way they are being negotiated and disseminated in society at large” (Ibid). Hence and in 
the clientelistic and sectarian context of Lebanon, civil society continues to exist but it 
fails to act as a counter-hegemonic society (Ibid). 
Gramsci’s counter-hegemonic society incorporates those channels where civil 
society actors launch their ‘war of position’ against the oppressive hegemonic order 
(Gramsci 1971: 229-238).  “This does not only entail attacking the ideological systems 
underlying these hegemonic systems but creating avenues where a contestation of 
dominant ideas paves the way for a counter–hegemony” (Pratt 2006: 12). Hence, the 
women’s ‘war of position’ in Lebanon does not only entail an embracement of liberal 
democratic values but a challenge of Lebanon’s hegemonic sectarian and clientelistic 
system. In this regard, it is important to investigate whether Lebanese women’s NGOs 
agendas and discourses promote an alternative counter-hegemonic society or remain 
compliant with the parameters of the hegemonic and patriarchal status quo (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998: 21). 
It is thus important to higlight how sectarian and patriarchal hegemony was 
created and consolidated. The following section sets out to prove how the process of state 
                                                
10
 In Gramsci’s conceptualization the state = civil society + political society (1971 : 263) 
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formation, the watershed in Lebanon’s history, lead  to the construction of a patriarchal 
and sectarian hegemony and consequently of a gendered sectarian-based citizenship that 
deprived women of their basic rights. 
2.3.4 State Formation and the Construction of a Sectarian Patriarchal Hegemony 
The resilience of patriarchy in the Arab world has intrigued many researchers. 
Proponents of the political cultural argument introduced a psychological dimension to the 
study of patriarchy. For example, Hisham Sharabi, posits that the neo-patriarchy which 
characterizes modern Arab states, “regardless of their legal and political forms and 
structures, are in many ways no more than a modernized version of the traditional 
patriarchal sultanate” (Sharabi 1988: 7). On this view, neo-patriarchy is consolidated in 
modern Arab societies due to the lack of “internal forces, organization and consciousness 
which truly characterize modern formations” (Ibid). Hence, proponents of the political 
cultural approach blame women’s marginalization on the psychological feature of Arab 
neo-patriarchal societies that puts “the ruler and the father at the pinnacle of power 
subordinating children and women to the former and citizens to the latter” (Ibid). 
They argue that Arab countries are exceptionally patriarchal and therefore ignore 
that patriarchy exists in every corner of the world, East and West. Some commonalities 
between the Arab world, China and India can be drawn in this respect (Storck 2003). 
Moreover, the political cultural school stipulates that patriarchy is static and natural thus 
obscuring the fact that states contribute to its creation and consolidation in modern times 
(Yuval Davis 1997). 
A structural historical approach provides a corrective to the political cultural one 
(Charrad 2000). It investigates how processes of state formation, especially “the 
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integration of strong societal groups who have the highest stakes in women’s 
subordination into nation-states, determine the development of state policies on women’s 
rights” (Ibid: 241). As Charrad argues, state formation and state intervention in the Arab 
world are not only responses to economic or class-based demands. Strong societal actors 
inherited from colonialism (ethnic, communal and tribes) “acted as corporate structures in 
the economic and political spheres” (Ibid: 234). The politicization of ethnic and tribal 
identities by colonizers influenced “the options and strategies available to the post-
independence leadership as it made alliances in seeking power” (Ibid: 238). These pacts 
were determined by the political and socio-economic interests of the elites in power and 
their desire to extend their political legitimacy over the populace. In this regard, women’s 
rights are an essential pillar to build the modern state.11As Charrad notes, “states are 
institutions of social control opting for laws and policies that would conform to their 
interests or at least not jeopardize them” (Ibid). 
In Lebanon, it was in the interest of the imperial powers and later of the sectarian 
ruling elites to encourage communal autonomy and foment social segmentation along 
sectarian lines.  Thus, “an alliance between the political leaders, religious leaders and key 
family patriarchs emerged in which key issues of relevance to women and family were 
fundamental” (Joseph 1991: 193). 
Through strategic bargaining with local religious and political elites, the 
Ottomans and later on the French entrenched a system that privileged family and 
religious patriarchs but at the same time secured French imperial ambitions (building a 
power base in the region and dismantling prospects for unity with Syria). On this view, a 
                                                
11
 In particular, the family law was an important state tool for the political leadership to define the future of 
the country and the obligations of “men and women in the family, community and society at large” 
(Charrad 2000:237-239). 
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colonial hierarchical system was supported by a precarious alliance linking the French 
colonial powers to patriarchal elites. As Elizabeth Thompson argues, “those privileges 
were awarded to intermediary male agents who wielded tribal, religious and household 
authority in Lebanon” (Thompson 2000: 3). 
In this regard, French colonial policies facilitated the construction and perpetuation of a 
gendered citizenship that persists in Lebanon (Ibid: 65). Under the French Mandate 
System, men from different confessional communities negotiated with the French and 
women were completely marginalized from this process. These pacts determined the 
post-independence gender order in Lebanon and defined the legal status of women in 
Lebanon (Thompson 2000).12 Thompson (Ibid) argues that through negotiation and 
compromise, the French sought to appease the rivalry among competing patriarchs and at 
the same time they extended their political legitimacy. By awarding them privileged 
power over subordinate groups, the French tamed factions that constituted avenues for 
state resource extraction. “The French fostered a neo-feudal landowning class in Lebanon 
with economic and political power that far surpassed that of the Ottoman era” (Ibid). 
Moreover, they built a clientele of religious patriarchs by delegating them absolute 
control over their communities. Through their hospitals and schools, religious courts and 
weekly sermons, heads of confessions wielded great influence over the populace. In this 
regard, French colonialism strengthened the influence of heads of confessions “by 
                                                
12
 For instance, when the French proposed a civil marriage code, Muslim heads of confessions opposed the 
bill because they viewed it at as essentially threatening their power and allowing women to marry non-
Muslim men. The French felt that this claim might encourage Muslim communities to mobilize and ask for 
unity with Syria, which has been one of the main concerns for the French. This has led the French to retreat 
and keep Personal Status Laws under the aegis of recognized sects. Moreover and despite women’s 
participation in the nationalist struggles they were surprised by nationalists joining the coalition with 
religious leaders against them. Religious leaders were instrumental for nationalist leaders in mobilizing 
people in the anti-colonial struggle. In this regard, Thompson argues that women’s politics were sacrificed 
for the politics of cooperation between nationalists and confessional leaders (2000: 152-153) and the 
secularists – nationalists joined the coalition with the religious heads of confessions (Ibid: 272-273).  
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channeling subsidies to the confessional-based social and religious institutions and by 
encouraging the organization of religious affairs autonomously from the state affairs” 
(Ibid: 150). 13 
In post-France Lebanon, women’s rights were held hostage to these gendered pacts that 
shaped the political choices of the post-independence political leadership in its quest to 
extend political legitimacy and maintain the precarious power sharing agreement. In this 
regard, the sectarian ruling elite engaged in political actions and policies that extended 
their sectarian hegemony and protected kinship and confessional ties that provided them 
with a basis of political power. Hence, these gendered pacts were maintained and 
extended. This has been achieved through the delegation of the family domain to the 
legally recognized sects. On the one hand, the religious-based personal status laws 
enabled heads of confessions to control family life and extend their power over their 
following leading to the subordination of women to patriarchal codes (Joseph 2002a: 
183). Hence, sectarian elites won the support of the religious sects and at the same time 
they legitimated social segmentation along sectarian lines which served them to extend 
sectarian hegemony. On the other hand, social segmentation was also achieved by the 
stubborn denial of the sectarian elites to build a responsive public system of social 
services that awards the citizenry access to social entitlements irrespective of their 
                                                
13
 It is worth noting that confessional-based organizations became the main sources of service providers for 
their communities under the Ottoman Empire. As Thompson notes, communities (mainly of the Muslim 
non-Sunni confession and Christian communities) that were not considered as important for the Ottoman 
Empire or were simply out of reach of the state, were left under the paternalistic control of their religious 
and confessional leaders. Mount Lebanon was an extreme case (Thompson 2000: 75). This millet system 
impacted the citizen-state relationship in modern Lebanon (Ibid).  The state did not cultivate direct relations 
with various communities thus leaving citizens under the aegis of their paternalistic leaders. In this regard, 
it consecrated religious sects as pillars of political identity and popular organization. Under the Ottoman 
Empire, religious leaders were proclaimed as the supreme religious and civil leaders and the representatives 
of their communities’ interests’ vis-à-vis the Ottoman government.  
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confessional backgrounds. To further win the support of heads of confessions, the 
sectarian elites delegated the process of social service delivery to religious-based 
institutions and channeled important amounts of public subsidies to them through state 
ministries. 
On the other hand, key family patriarchs in each sect emerged as another 
important party in this alliance. The weakness of state institutions and its failure to 
respond to basic needs strengthened kinsmen’s oversight in the political process. Political 
leadership is often passed through generations from father to son, with only rare cases 
from father to daughter or brother to sister and husband to wife. When women make it 
through family ties to decision-making positions, they become representatives of their 
confessional communities rather than women’s interests and needs. On the other hand, 
resource distribution is based on family relations with relatives obtaining resources 
through patron-client networks. Since, families are patriarchal institutions, the 
distribution of resources follows these patriarchal patterns and men are privileged in their 
acquisition and distribution. In this regard, women continue to be highly dependent on 
their male relatives to mediate for them, and men, as family “heads” are consulted on 
family matters while women are totally excluded (Ibid). 
In this regard, the construction of a gendered citizenship where the family, 
religion and state intertwine has been a “consequence of an inherited Ottoman and later 
French colonial legacy and the institutional choices and strategies of sectarian elites bent 
on perpetuating their political prerogatives” (Salloukh 2008: 6). Lebanese women are 
therefore shaped by this intricate intersection of identity which not only comprises gender 
and class but also religion and sect. “This paves the way for an understanding of the way 
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women in Lebanon live and struggle through these issues, day-by-day, issue-by-issue” 
(Joseph 2002b: 31). 
2.4 Women NGOs: Is there a Movement? 
The large body of research on women’s movements has focused on a number of 
questions such as: Why and under which circumstances do women organize as women? 
What forms do these forms of mobilization take? How do these movements enable or 
disable gender equity? 
 
2.4.1 Aims and Activities 
Some feminist theorists focus on gender discourse as a basis for equal rights, 
“especially as it takes the form of definition of feminity and sexuality in relation to men” 
(Mohanty 1991: 11). Underlying this assumption, is an image of women as a cohesive 
interest group aimed at defying patriarchal subordination. However, some scholars 
counter-argue by proving that identities are complex and comprise other variables such as 
class, race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality (Joseph 2000 b; Waylen 1994; 2007). Women 
do not simply act on the basis of gender considerations but also by the different 
components that make up their individual identities (Waylen 1994). 
For instance, scholars who study Arab women’s activism argue that “women take 
a more active role when they engaged in the public sphere as mothers and widows in 
performances of grief and mourning” (Owen 2004: 210-211). Lebanese women have 
used their bodily symbols to make particular statements such as opposition to war and 
violence or the fate of some of their relatives.  During the civil war, many women 
demanded an end to the war and return to normalcy (Shehadeh 1999: 149). Moreover, 
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The Friends of the Families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared was constituted 
exclusively of women who held a national campaign to investigate about the fate of their 
disappeared relatives. 
However, in the recent years feminism became labeled with women NGOs thus 
“bringing this movement to a broader political stage while closing the door for women’s 
participation outside the realm of ‘specialized and professionalized’ civil societies” 
(Alvarez 1998: 306). However, this professionalized associational sector has failed to 
link middle class women heading over these associations with ordinary women (Waylen 
1994; 2007). Employing notions of women’s empowerment and women in development, 
these NGOs are headed by educated bourgeois women who in most of the time adopt a 
normative discourse thus failing to address the structural problems of ordinary women in 
society (Waylen 2007). 
Hence and as is the case for the women’s movement in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, activists in Lebanon face the challenges of reconciling different class and 
sectarian identity interests. How these challenges are met depends partially on 
institutional and organizational structure as well as their relationship with funding 
agencies (Waylen 2007). 
 
2.4.2 The Institutional Structure of the Women’s NGOs 
Most studies of NGOs in the Arab world underscore their highly centralized and 
hierarchical structures. Scholars studying the internal management of Arab NGOs argue 
that a “one-man show” best captures the decision-making process (Abdelrahman 2004; 
Jad 2004).  Islah Jad  argues that within the women’s advocacy community, the decision-
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making is most often held hostage to NGO directors who gained increased power through 
their good connection with the international aid community (Jad 2004: 7). 
Many theories have been advanced to explain the low level of democracy among 
civil society organizations including women’s associations. Some (Hatem 2005) blame it 
on the nature of Arab states. In the context of deficient democracies and authoritarian 
states that have tightened their grip over advocacy community, many of these 
associations have emulated these hierarchical structures in the way they approached their 
clients and members” (Ibid: 30). Others have blamed the centralized styles of leadership 
on institutional deficiencies and the “inactive membership syndrome” (Abdelrahman 
2004: 162). On this view, many associational leaders have assumed leadership by default 
and not by design (Ibid). 
Of particular interest to this study is the profile of associational women leaders. 
Scholars who examine associational leadership in women’s NGOs argue that these 
leaders use their positions as platforms to enter mainstream politics rather than to 
represent the interests of ordinary women. In the Arab world, elitist women with strong 
ties to political leaders have colonized the civic space and derived benefits and privileges 
from the patriarchal clientelistic systems in power. This calls into question their ability 
and willingness to renegotiate the gender order towards more inclusive forms of 
citizenship for women. Assad Abou Khalil14 adopts this view and argues that Arab 
women’s movements focus on their inclusion into a male dominated political system 
rather than challenging the oppressive social and political structures in these systems. 
                                                
14
 Assad Abou Khalil, “Al Mar’aa al Arabia : Moulahazat fi Kadaya al Nasawiya”, al-Akhbar, 1 August 
2009.  
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This is most evident in the issues adopted (such as the quota system) that help them enter 
the parliament but leaves main areas of discrimination untouched.15 
While the majority of women’s associations follow the patterns outlined above, 
Al Ali (2005) argues that a handful number of women’s organizations have attempted to 
challenge the status quo and create more democratic structures. However, “these women 
are facing obstacles and challenges not only from their respective governments but also 
from activists within civil society, who follow more traditional patterns of political and 
social engagement” (Al Ali 2005 : 110). 
 
2.4.3 Women NGOs and International Aid Agencies 
One of the factors which helped in the rise of independent women’s organizations 
in some countries is the increased amounts of international aid for gender-based agendas. 
“The United Nations Decade For Women (1975-1985) constituted a watershed bringing 
the gender-based agendas to frontline and increasing the proliferation of women’s rights 
NGOs” (Ibid :109). 
However, by adopting the premise that these associations are voluntary-based and 
independent from the ruling elites, international organizations equated the existence of 
NGOs with the strength of civil society (Jamal 2007). In the Arab world, the underlying 
assumption of this paradigm is challenged by empirical facts. Arab regimes conquered 
and appropriated the NGO sector “to contain the deepening of civil societies and to erode 
their capacity to challenge political authority” (Heydemann 2007: 8). Arab women 
organizations are no exception as most of these non-governmental organizations are not 
as non-governmental as their names suggest (Al Ali 2005). In many countries, officially 
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registered NGOs are either “initiated by women with familial ties to the political 
leadership or are controlled by the state” (Ibid: 106) or in some cases are enjoying 
“protected status and benefit from privileged relations with powerful political actors” 
(Heydemann 2007: 13). A common pattern among the women’s advocacy community in 
the Arab world is the almost total colonization of these institutions by first ladies which 
deprives them of their bargaining power and their ability to play an autonomous political 
role (Ibid). By channeling important amounts of aid to these associations, funders 
strengthen the oversight of the same institutions that serve to silence grassroots women’s 
organizations and extend the authoritarian outreach of ruling elites. 
Lebanon’s civil society sector is an extreme case of the appropriation of the NGO 
system by confessional groups and sectarian leaders. Hariri Foundation, Mouawad 
Foundation, Amal Associations, Jihad al Binaa, Safadi Foundation and many more non-
governmental organizations are established by sectarian leaders to extend their hegemony 
by providing meaningful services to their confessional communities. By assuming that 
these associations are “civic minded” (Kingston 2002), international funders extend the 
sectarian outreach of the post-war sectarian elites rather than support grassroots and 
bottom up forms of collective action. As Leenders argues, international aid agencies 
overlook “the fact that NGOs are heavily politicized and often serve as vehicles for 
personal advancement which leads to a situation wherein EU supported politicians and 
perpetuated their clientelist tendencies” (Leenders and Goes 2006: 103). 
On the other hand, the funders’ strategy to engage the Lebanese state in the 
screening process further consolidates the sectarian and clientelistic outreach of political 
leaders. For instance, the EU engages the Lebanese government in choosing NGOs 
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benefiting from EU grants. This makes the screening committees subject to prey of 
clientelistic practices. Appointments to these committees are based on sectarian rather 
than merit affiliations and the choice of NGOs is shaped by the sectarian cartel’s 
preferences (Ibid). 
International funding impedes civic-minded associations from acting as 
mobilizing and organizing structures which withstands their classification as grassroots 
women’s movements. On the one hand, funders channel large amounts of aid to projects 
that would relieve constituencies of some of the rising poverty and social distress while 
always being keen to promote projects that reflect their political agendas with respect to 
women’s rights (Hatem 2005: 29). Technical quick-fix solutions are provided for 
complex political problems (Abirafeh 2009: 31) and “projects are usually short-lived and 
in response to fund availability rather than pressing local needs” (Al Ali 2005: 110). 
Funding does not only lead to a de-politicization of gender-based agendas but it 
also promotes a globalized trend of professional NGOs. Among other issues, this new 
trend of advocacy networks prohibits the women’s associations from acting as mobilizing 
structures that are backed by popular support for their agendas. In modern women’s 
associations, “professional experts find administrative jobs where they use modern tools 
to ‘advocate’ for certain topics, ‘train’ or ‘educate’ a target group usually defined for the 
period needed to ‘implement the project’” (Jad 2004: 8). These forms of mobilization are 
not only short-lived but they stand in stark contradiction to voluntary-based women’s 
movements that are usually headed by women who spend substantial time networking 
and coordinating with ordinary women, trying to listen to their problems and finding out 
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solutions. As Jad (2004) argues these efforts are the products of a group of volunteers 
motivated by their deep-seated political belief (Ibid). 
On the other hand, the international recognition of these associations has not successfully 
translated into local recognition and legitimacy. The lack of local funding16 solicited by 
associations and public feelings that foreign funding for NGOs is illegitimate has created 
serious problems of accountability. As one scholar eloquently puts it, “by not relying on 
local funding, advocacy organizations have no constituency to which they are 
accountable … when the government attempts to shut them down, these advocacy non-
governmental organizations find few supporters especially that public feeling see these 
associations as selling their countries out for personal benefit, a charge that carries weight 
when many associational leaders have enjoyed a significant improvement in their 
standard of living through nongovernmental work” (Langhor 2004: 199). 
International funding has created actors “with parallel powers based on their 
recognition at the international level, and easy access to important national and 
international figures” (Jad 2004: 10). This encouraged competition between NGO 
directors thus making it almost impossible to agree on common objectives (Ibid). When 
coordination takes place “a pronounced lack of democracy and consultation within these 
groups occurs and therefore withstands their ability to affect change” (Langhor 2004: 
198). Schisms within coalitions leading advocacy campaigns are usually the fruit of the 
stubborn refusal of one side to coordinate and consult with others concerning critical 
issues. 
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 For instance, Langhor (2004) argues that associations in Arab countries face the challenge that Arab 
societies are very poor which challenges the ability of these associations to become mass membership 
associations funding themselves through dues.  
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In a nutshell, women NGOs in the Arab world may allow women to freely 
associate and provide psycho-social support but their political efficiency remains a 
Herculean task. Groups seeking to challenge the status quo and the various areas and 
laws that oppress them and treat them as second class citizens (whether it be 
authoritarianism or sectarianism) require widespread popular support. However, 
“nongovernmental advocacy organizations, which are typically single issue groups 
lacking internal democracy, with small local constituencies dependent entirely on foreign 
largesse, are ill-equipped to lead the change” (Ibid). 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has been largely theoretical advancing a framework that will guide 
the analysis of the impact of post-war women’s movement in the sectarian context of 
Lebanon on social policies and democratic outcomes. In this regard, this chapter argued 
that the combination of a weak state and strong patron-client networks in Lebanon 
impede prospects for democratic civic engagement and gender social policy reforms. The 
chapter also portrayed Lebanon’s clientelistic and sectarian system as hegemonic. In this 
regard, a Gramscian conceptualization of women’s advocacy community becomes 
important to understanding whether the discourse of these associations paves the way for 
an alternative counter-hegemonic society, or are rather kept consistent with the 
parameters of the sectarian and clientelistic status quo. The chapter also argued that the 
institutional makeup of the women’s advocacy community impedes reforms. In this 
regard, women activists face the challenge of reconciling different class and sectarian 
identity interests. This struggle depends on the associations’ institutional and 
organizational structure as well as their relationship with funding agencies. With the 
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theoretical tools presented, the next chapter examines the status of women’s rights in the 
sectarian and clientelistic context of Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POST-WAR STATE-SOCIETY REALTIONS AND GENDERED 
LAWS IN A GRIDLOCK 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter sheds light on the post-war fragmented political context in Lebanon 
in which women’s associations exist and towards which women’s advocacy networks are 
targeted (Jamal 2007). In this regard, the dynamics of post-war clientelism and 
confessionalism are disentangled and their patriarchal nature is explained. Underpinning 
this power structure is an alliance between heads of confessions and family patriarchs 
who emerged as the strongest allies of the sectarian ruling cartel. As argued in the second 
chapter, this was the result of imperial strategies that politicized kinship structures and 
sectarian identities to further their own interests. In post-war Lebanon, the sectarian 
ruling elites engaged in political actions and policies that extended their sectarian 
hegemony while protecting kinship and confessional ties that provided them with the 
basis for political power. Gendered laws are part of this sectarian elite strategy. Hence, a 
comprehensive women's rights agenda would not only lead to gender equality but it 
would also challenge the underlying assumptions and coalitions that have cemented the 
sectarian elites’ clientelistic and confessional politics. 
This chapter opens with a discussion of post-war state-society relations and the 
construction of gendered citizenship in Lebanon. It then moves on to shed light on the 
origins and main areas of discrimination against women in personal status, nationality 
and penal codes. Finally, it highlights the limits of women’s organizing in the sectarian 
and clientelistic context of Lebanon. 
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3.2 Post-War Sectarian Elite Strategies for ‘State-Building’ 
 
3.2.1Elite Divisions and Post-war Politics of Confessionalism and Clientelism 
On 22 October 1989, the Ta’if Agreement was promulgated thus ending the 
Lebanese civil war and paving the way for political normalcy. However, as critics of this 
new power sharing agreement argue (Traboulsi 2007; Salloukh 2007 b), Ta’if avoided a 
renegotiation of state-society relations outside the iron cage of sectarianism. The post-war 
Lebanese system sanctioned communities as political entities. Hence, the confessional 
community, and its informal clusters, namely the extended family, became the pillars of 
the political system. Ta’if is therefore deemed as a return to and a restructure of the pre-
war confessional system “by giving a greater say to Muslim communities in political 
decision-making based on the demographic and political changes produced by the civil 
war” (Picard 2002: 156). 
Underpinning this confessional system is a new breed of political leadership, 
deeply divided and highly competitive, representing conflicting ideologies and visions of 
Lebanon. This new breed of Zu‘ama emulate traditional ones in the sense that they 
monopolize the political practice in the country making fortunes through government 
corruption. However, “they are also different from their predecessors in the sense that 
they have introduced a militia spirit which only sought victory for communal groups” 
(Picard 2002: 167). Thanks to a general clemency law, warlords were absolved of war-
crimes and “a mafia-like behavior was introduced in running state affairs and doling out 
the spoils of power” (Ibid). Hence, it can be said that the civil war disrupted clientelestic 
networks controlled by urban-based Zu‘ama to give birth to more complex and more 
dangerous forms of clientelism developed around militias (Ibid). Moreover, 
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“entrepreneurs” who made staggering fortunes during the war in the Gulf secured their 
entry in the parliament through their wealth. Most prominent among them was the late 
Rafiq Hariri, the father figure of Lebanon’s neo-liberalism. 
The quest by the divided sectarian elites for legitimacy relied on the extension of 
their clientelistic networks and the perpetuation of sectarian identities and affiliations at 
the expense of national ones. “This was achieved through an elaboration of political 
strategies and socio-economic programs where leaders maintained more direct control 
over their communities” (Joseph 1991: 193). The manipulation of the electoral laws and 
Lebanon’s liberal economy geared toward reconstruction and services, with a heavy 
reliance on foreign aid and immigrants’ remittances, consolidated the mafia-like 
clientelistic system. 
Sectarian leaders, like monarchs in other parts of the Arab world, are preoccupied 
with survival in power. In this regard, “they have successfully upgraded their rule by 
managing political contestation” (Heydemann 2007: 5). Hence, Lebanese parliamentary 
elections have had less to do with democratic contestation than with making the electoral 
process safe for the sectarian cartel (Ibid). This has been ensured by the manipulation of 
the “size of the electoral districts, the vote counting procedures, and the emphasis on 
ancestral city voting stations” (Salloukh 2008: 15). Thus the parliament was transformed 
into a gallery of drug barons, warlords and business tycoons. 
The sectarian ruling elites offer myriad forms of survival strategies and rewards 
for their followers in return for their clients’ support that is often called up on elections’ 
day or whenever the political patron requires popular support on particular issues.17 
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 The series of demonstrations that took place in the wake of Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon provide 
fresh insight into this argument.  
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These strategies take the form of political money to support the most underserved in 
accessing an increasingly expensive and privatized social system.18 Moreover, sectarian 
leaders have parachuted their men in public sector employment albeit this was in direct 
breach of the Ta’if constitution which eliminated all forms of political sectarianism in 
civil service positions below the rank of director-general.19 Not only did this process 
overburden state institutions with low salaried employees, it has also disrupted the 
possibility of merit-based employment (Leenders 2004 b). 
On the other hand, Ta’if’s overstated objective to achieve balanced economic 
development, an essential element for post-war national reconciliation and state building, 
gave way to a sectarian–based neo-liberal economy. As Ghassan Dibeh notes “regional 
and sectarian redistribution mechanisms came at the expense of the distribution along 
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 A research study conducted by CRTD-A investigates the role of faith-based organizations on public 
policies in Lebanon. Throughout the fieldwork, that I have taken part of, it became clear that MPs and their 
non governmental organizations are important actors on the scene assisting the needy in covering an 
increasingly expensive and privatized social-care system. Though the comparative report was not 
published, the researcher’s case study sheds light on the way political money was channeled to support 
needy patients to get the appropriate medical treatments. For instance, interviewees in the Saint George 
Hospital agree that on the eve of the 2009 parliamentary elections, sectarian politicians disbursed 
considerable amounts of patronage to tighten social control over their constituencies. Most prominent 
among these is the Hariri Foundation founded by the late Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri in 1997 first giving 
grants to young Lebanese students to study abroad and then moving to establish health centers in 
underserved regions throughout Lebanon. According to participants from the hospital’s administration, the 
Hariri foundation is accepting all applicants and contributing with significant amounts of money that can go 
up to 10.000.000 or 15.000.000 LBP. Patients who are advised to seek financial support from the Hariri 
Foundation usually get a letter addressing the hospital’s administration stating the amount of funds 
allocated per case.  Hariri’s successful experience encouraged other politicians to emulate the experience in 
order to win the support of the voters as parliamentary elections drew closer. Through these patron-client 
networks, the strongmen, the sectarian leaders, resist the state institutions and provide survival strategies 
for their confessional constituencies (Migdal 1988: 27). In this regard and in a similar vein, the tycoon 
Mohammad al Safadi provides considerable financial support that takes the form of checks to cover his 
clientele’s hospitalization fees. Moreover, Mouawad Foundation founded by the late Rene Mouawad and 
headed by Nayla Mouawad also adopted similar strategies in providing medical care for the poor. Of course 
other sectarian leaders and sectarian parties, namely Amal, PSSP and Hezbollah provided support for their 
confessional constituencies. However, these cases did not come to the fore due to the fact that the Saint 
George Hospital is mostly accessed by Christian and Sunni communities. This political money incurred 
parliamentarians political support on elections’ day and maintained the clientelistic networks, one of the 
main pillars of political power in Lebanon. 
19For a discussion on this issue see The Monthly issue 53 November 2006.  
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income groups” (2005: 10). Sectarian leaders colonized state institutions turning them 
into ATMs that channel patronage to their constituencies and funds for their confessional 
and regional developmental projects thus financing their neo-patrimonial relations with 
their sectarian constituencies. The late Prime Minister Rafiq el Hariri was the main 
architect of Lebanon’s post-war economic policy, which became synonymous with 
extreme neo-liberalism and the colonization of the public sector by the private (Makdissi 
1997: 693). This gave priority neither to public services nor to social infrastructure; it 
rather privileged banking, land and real estate. Hariri’s strategy was the biggest carrot for 
a deeply divided postwar ruling cartel “who were only united over the division of the 
entire domain of the state apparatus and recognized their different spheres of influence, 
granting each one of them autonomy in his domain” (Leenders 2004b: 6).  
 
3.2.2 The Hegemonic Patriarchal Coalition: The Prince, the Kinsman and the Clerk 
It is clear that the state is totally absent from the lived realities of Lebanese 
citizens whereas real power derives from patronage networks revolving around sectarian 
elites. In this context, patriarchs of major families within each sect form the basis of these 
patronage networks as they negotiate with the Za‘im access to public resources, control 
their distribution to their family members and recruit and mobilize the latter for their 
political patron. Political Za‘ims treat family patriarchs as mediators on political issues 
whereas women are marginalized in the process (Joseph 2000 a; 1991). The family also 
plays an important role in reproducing political leadership along pure sectarian lines. In 
Lebanon, this process is dubbed as ‘political inheritance’ whereby sectarian leaders 
recruit their sons (grandsons, son-in-law, grandsons, etc) and in few cases their female 
relatives (grand-daughters, wives, sisters) as political heirs (Joseph 1991). Hence, 
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families in Lebanon are one of the major pillars in accessing and distributing political 
patronage and determining the patterns of political leadership. Since families are 
patriarchal institutions, men are privileged over women in bargaining with political 
patrons which cements men’s control over their kin and keeps women in a subordinate 
position (Joseph 1991: 193). 20 
These patronage networks are not only rooted in kinship structures but are also 
heavily reliant on sectarian structures. As Joseph noted, “political legitimacy spoke 
loudest when they are being sanctioned by religious leaders” (Ibid). The past five years in 
Lebanon’s history provide fresh insight into this argument. With Hariri’s assassination 
and Syria’s withdrawal, an intense struggle over who rules Lebanon became the hallmark 
of Lebanese politics. Throughout this period, religious leaders were protagonists 
instigating sectarian resentment. The Friday and Sunday sermons were politicized and 
turned into platforms to instruct community members on how to respond to political 
events and to mobilize them in favor of one faction or the other.21 
Through strategic bargaining and mediation with local religious leaders, the post-
war sectarian cartel entrenched a patriarchal system of privileges that helped them 
maintain, upgrade and extend their rule. To win the support of heads of confessions, the 
post-war cartel delegated the family domain to the legally recognized sects and postponed 
indefinitely the adoption of a unified civil code (a discussion of Personal status laws will 
follow in section 3.2.2.1). The legal pluralism encoded in the personal status laws 
                                                
20
 One example that elucidates how this process took place was during the parliamentary elections.  One of 
my interviewees who monitored parliamentary elections confirmed that women’s political choice is 
determined by the choice of the family patriarch. Divorce occurred whenever women refused to comply 
with their husbands’ choice and opted instead for their fathers’ or brothers’ choices (Interview with 
Joumana Merhi, LWDG president, Beirut, 10 January 2010).  
21
 Nisrine Zahreddine, “Al Sir'a Al Mazhabi: Abtaluhu Rijal al-Din”, al-Akhbar, 23 June 2008 and Nader 
Fouz “Harb Al Marjaiyat” , al-Akhbar, 19 June 2009.  
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underpins the ideological and material basis of political power in Lebanon. On the one 
hand, religious codes are mobilized to sanctify kinship structures that are central for the 
reproduction of patron-client networks and by extension sectarian leaders’ political 
control over their constituencies. Moreover, personal status laws predicate Lebanese 
citizenship on sectarian membership, thus hardening the ideological hegemony of 
sectarian identities and loyalties at the expense of national ones. This is underpinned by 
the myth of sectarian pluralism which deems sects as “natural communities characterized 
by cultural dynamics so fundamentally different from each other that only members of 
the sect can adequately represent the views and interests of the sectarian community” 
(Joseph 2000 a: 111). 
Sectarian pluralism as a legitimating myth for political representation has been 
utilized in other areas, namely access to social services (Ibid). The ruling elites won the 
sympathy of heads of confessions by channeling subsidies to confessional-based social 
institutions rather than building a public social welfare system.22 Schools, universities, 
hospitals and other social institutions (dispensaries and orphanages) that are operated by 
confessional institutions cater to the needs of a good number of beneficiaries (CRTDA 
2008 b). Whereas most of these institutions are well-organized and receive state funding, 
the public sector remains weak and unable to meet basic needs. One critic has described 
the Lebanese state as being a welfare state for its sectarian communities.23 This elite 
                                                
22This pattern is rooted in French colonialism. In fact it was after the massacres of 1860 that missionaries 
started to established schools and hospitals in Mount Lebanon (Thompson 2000: 75). These social 
organizations catered to the social needs of the Christian community residing in Mount Lebanon. However, 
this pattern encouraged Ottomans to start supporting and building schools for Muslim communities. 
According to Thompson (2000) and Davie (1996) this was a reaction to an increased European intervention 
in the Ottoman Empire. Whereas Ottomans closed French missionary schools in Lebanon during the First 
World War, the French Mandate authorities reinvigorated missionary schools. This substituted for the lack 
of resources of the French government devastated by the First World War (Ibid: 60-61).  
23
 Interview with Bassam al Quntar, journalist in al-Akhbar, Beirut, 22 January 2010. 
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strategy is sanctioned by the Lebanese Constitution. Article 37 of Decree 60 LR confers 
on confessional-based social institutions the status of “corporate body” (Zalzal 2009), and 
“Article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution allows confessional communities to establish 
their own social institutions” (Joseph 2000 a: 129). 
Moreover, and with their almost complete monopoly over social service delivery, 
these confessional institutions have become the principle actors in shaping social policies 
in Lebanon. This steers the decision-making process towards strengthening their role as 
the ultimate social welfare providers and further marginalizes the public and cross-
confessional institutions. No matter how divided heads of confessions are over the 
ideology and the vision of what Lebanon should be, they all agree on how to divide the 
sectarian pie. As one journalist eloquently stated: 
Mohamad Barakat , the president of Dar al Aytam al Islamia, told me that the 
Minister of Social affairs does not dare to present his budget before consulting 
"me". Barakat runs and operates a network of associations that brings together: 
priests and sheikhs from all confessions, etc. They are all one hand, if the ministry 
dares to diminish our share then god knows what will happen.24 
 
In Lebanon these confessional-based institutions work and operate under a system 
of confessional male patriarchy that highly discriminates against women but also 
contributes to foment social divisions along pure sectarian lines (Joseph 1991). 25 Most of 
these institutions have been established to cater for the social needs of their confessional 
communities. This becomes most evident in their targeting strategy, their geographical 
                                                
24
 Ibid.  
25The author of this thesis took part in CRTD-A’s field work research “FBOs and Social policies in 
Lebanon”. The information presented is based on my field work on social institutions operated by the 
Greek Orthodox Church and the information provided by other researchers who examined the institutions 
of the Maronite, Catholic, the Shi’ite and Sunni confessions in Lebanon. Throughout this research, it 
became clear that recruitment of staff in these confessional-based organizations follows a sect. For 
instance, the upper management positions are all filled with people from the institution’s confessional 
background. Moreover, the head of confession or the sectarian leader play a decisive role in recruiting these 
people. 
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outreach,26 and the facilities they provide for their confessional communities. Social 
fragmentation also occurs in service delivery since confessional identity shapes the type 
of services provided. For instance, and with the reluctance of the state to implement a 
unified school curriculum, private (confessional) schools in Lebanon enjoy absolute 
freedom in choosing which version of Lebanese history to teach and offer religious 
classes based on their confessional background. Each version of Lebanese history favors 
a particular leader leading to the creation of different realities that directly affected 
students’ political knowledge thus hindering prospects for national integration (CRTDA 
2007 b). 
Moreover and since these institutions operate under a system of religious 
patriarchy, discernible patterns of gendered discrimination have been noted. For instance, 
women have been precluded from achieving key decision-making positions and have 
been confined to fulfill traditional roles that are only an extension of their domestic roles. 
When it comes to service delivery, these institutions have turned a blind eye on issues 
that are of particular interest for women.27 For instance, access to reproductive health 
services is deemed taboo, while abortion in FBO-run hospitals is not practiced even if the 
women’s life is in danger.28 This has been presented as a breach of religious belief, but in 
                                                
26One of the indicators that clearly elucidate this argument is the one related to the geographical outreach of 
these FBO-based social institutions. In Lebanon, these confessional organizations work and operate in areas 
that are heavily populated by their own confessional communities. This attests to the fact that these 
associations do not move  and the type of services/facilities that they provide to help the most underserved 
in their confessional community in paying the hospital bill or educational fees, etc. for instance, these 
institutions support the underserved of the raieh or millet (the confessional community) and for other 
confessions they advise them to seek the support of their co-confessionals(whether political leaders or 
religious institutions).  
27
 Despite the fact that the comparative report did not come out, CRTD-A organized a conference in June 
2009 where they shared the findings from the different case studies. The above stated conclusion was 
common to almost all reports presented by the researchers. 
28
 For a discussion see Khattab Lara (2009).  
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fact it is also underpinned by sectarian considerations which deem women’s reproductive 
functions as essential to maintain confessional demographics. 
To sum up, sectarian elites extend their legitimacy materially and ideologically 
“based on their representation of particular sectarian identities and interests” (Joseph 
1991: 193). In this regard, the confessional and the familial institutions are vital for the 
reproduction of the confessional and clientelistic ties. The ruling elite thus supported 
patriarchal and sectarian control over issues related to women to maintain the balance in 
the precarious confessional system and extend their sectarian hegemony. Gendered laws 
are part and parcel of these sectarian elite strategies. Through these laws, the ruling cartel 
protects kinship and confessional structures but also controls women’s reproductive 
functions and children. The following section examines how this operates in gendered 
laws. 
3.3 Gendered Laws and the Legal Status of Lebanese Women 
Scholars who study women’s rights in Lebanon argue that Lebanese women 
continue to be caught in a contradiction between the constitutional principle of equality 
and commitment to implement international treaties and the wills of the patriarchal 
leaders as encoded in the gendered family, nationality and penal laws (Thompson 2000).  
Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution reads that “all Lebanese are equal before the Law, 
have equal civil and political rights and are liable and responsible for their general duties 
without discrimination” (The Monthly, August 2003: 2).  Moreover, the same constitution 
stipulates Lebanon’s compliance with United Nations treaties and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Most importantly, Lebanon signed a number of 
international treaties including the convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) though with reservations which maintained 
specific forms of gender discrimination. “In particular, Lebanon voiced reservation for 
Paragraph 2 of Article 9 dealing with equality in matters of citizenship laws as well as 
Paragraphs c, d, f, and g of Article 16 dealing with equality in family laws” (Khalifeh 
2005: 15). 
This section sheds light on the status of Lebanese women and the gendered laws 
that shape their lives. In fact, Lebanese women are thought to enjoy relative freedom of 
action, high levels of education and visibility in the public sphere. This stigma is however 
challenged by empirical realities. 
Most women receive good education in Lebanon. Adult female illiteracy has 
fallen from 37% in 1980 to 19.7% in 2000, whereas half of all university students are 
women.29 Moreover, working women tend to be more educated than their male 
counterparts, as education tends to be a prerequisite for women entering the labor force 
(Ibid). However, these improvements in Lebanese women’s educational attainments have 
not translated into an increased participation in the labor force in Lebanon and in public 
decision-making positions. 
The labor market presents discernible patterns of gender discrimination and 
occupational segregation. Despite the “adoption of an ‘equal pay for equal work’ policy, 
including the applicability of the minimum wage, women’s wages are inferior to men’s” 
(CRTD-A 2006 b: 22). Moreover, women are predominantly active in the service sector; 
their involvement in commerce is lower than men’s and only 5% are formally employed 
in the agricultural sector (IDC 2007: 10). Women are also almost totally absent from 
positions of responsibility and decision-making (Ibid).  Figures on women’s economic 
                                                
29
 Information from the UNDP-POGAR website : http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=4&cid=9 
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participation exclude totally women’s participation in the informal sector (namely 
domestic work and agriculture), which is the main source of income and activity for 
underserved women. Though these activities pass as invisible, they are attributed a 
market value when they are performed by a third party (such as a domestic worker). 
Obviously, the difference does not lie in the nature of the activity performed, but in 
socially constructed norms attached to it. Indeed, most of the goods produced and 
services provided by women are family-based (care work, domestic, work on family land, 
etc). Falling within the category of unpaid work, they do not receive a market value and 
thus remain unaccounted for in the national accounts system. It is precisely from this bias 
that the undervaluation and underestimation of women’s participation into economic 
activities originates. Despite the persistently low rates of women’s participation in the 
formal economic sphere, women are nevertheless economically active agents (CRTD-A 
2006 b). 
On the other hand, women’s access to decision-making positions in politics and 
high-ranking public administration remains scant despite the fact that women acquired 
political rights in 1953; constitute more than half the number of total voters (LADE 2006: 
15), and have acted as main actors in national struggles, armed conflicts and political 
demonstrations, rallies and sit-ins ever since Lebanon acquired its independence 
(Thompson 2000). In the 2009 parliamentary elections, only four women made it to the 
parliament whereas in more conservative and Islamic countries such as Iraq, Djibouti and 
Mauritania women occupy 25%, 13.8% and 22.1% of the parliamentary seats 
respectively (Al Chahria June 2009). 
 62 
The low level of women’s political participation is due to the patriarchal nature of 
the confessional and clientelistic political system rooted in kinship structures and 
manipulated by sectarian male elites. Men monopolize decision-making and law-making 
thus making it almost impossible for women to make it to the parliament except through 
familial ties. These women have been calling for their “temporary” inclusion into a male-
dominated system rather than supporting and advancing a women’s rights agenda.30 For 
these women, challenging the status-quo, by criticizing for example the personal status 
laws would ultimately jeopardize their positions. 
On the other hand, confessional based electoral laws and alliances have denied 
independent groups political representation and participation in the sectarian system 
(Salloukh 2008: 1). This is compound by the fact that women’s participation in sectarian 
political parties remains minimal if not totally absent (CFUWI 2007 a: 15). 
As for ministerial positions, women first accessed these posts only in 2004, when 
two women were appointed ministers. Today the ratio has been kept the same. There are 
only five women occupying high-ranking posts among grade one public servants, which 
constitutes only 3.5% of the available positions (The Monthly, November 2006). Even in 
these appointments, women have made it based on a sectarian quota rather than merit. 
In the professional syndicates, women’s representation remains low (Charani 
2009: 23) which challenges one of the basic pillars of civil society, namely that it should 
be accessible to everyone disregarding their race, religious beliefs, sectarian affiliations 
and gender. Hence, patriarchy in Lebanon “has woven through the various sites in which 
nationhood has been constructed systematically biasing the state, the nation, civil society, 
and the very dynamics of citizenship in favor of males and elders” (Joseph 2002a: 183). 
                                                
30
 Interview with Marie Debs, LLWR Vice President, 24 February 2010. 
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With patriarchy dominating the state and society women are precluded from achieving 
equal rights. 
In Lebanon, women’s educational attainments and visibility has did not lead to 
real empowerment. Women’s political participation continues to be held hostage to the 
whims of sectarian patriarchal leaders who monopolize the rules of the political game 
thus making it almost impossible for non-sectarian and non-clientelistic women to 
overcome these barriers. However these are not the only challenges that ordinary women 
face in Lebanon. The main area of discrimination against women are the gendered 
personal status, nationality and penal codes which all privilege men over women and 
deeply affect women’s social and economic attainments as well as political participation. 
The following sections pay close attention to these laws. By shedding light on their 
imperial origins, I disentangle the political cultural myth which blames women’s 
marginalization on the psychological feature of Arab neo-patriarchal societies and tends 
to portray patriarchy as static and natural, thus obscuring the fact that states contribute to 
its consolidation. I rather argue that these gendered codes are rooted in colonial policies 
and are preserved in modern times. Moreover, and instead of ensuring justice and 
equality for women, these laws are transformed into a major instrument of social control 
(Warrick 2005) that serves to protect kinship structures and heads of confessions. 
Consequently, this maintained the formal and informal pillars of political power, namely 
confessionalism and clientelism. 
 
3.3.1 The Personal Status Laws: Legal Framework and Practices 
In Lebanon, confessions acquired the legal status of “corporate bodies” (Zalzal 
2007), enjoying absolute autonomy and sovereignty in running their community’s affairs.  
 64 
They are entitled to devise, amend and disseminate31 bylaws that regulate their internal 
affairs as well as personal status laws that shape the private life of their communities. 
This legal status is the inheritor of an Ottoman and later French legacy. 
It was under Ottoman rule that the status of various communities as millet and its 
actual implementation as a coherent mode of administration was institutionalized (Joseph 
2000 a). With French colonialism, these millet systems and their underlying sects were 
guaranteed “constitutional freedom of religious practice and right to observe their 
personal status laws” (Joseph 2000 a: 129). This was translated in Article 9 of the 
Lebanese Constitution and the promulgation of decree 60 LR by French high 
commissioner De Martel. It was through this decree that “sects were awarded the right to 
establish their sectarian courts to administer family law” (Ibid). In post-Ta’if Lebanon, 
heads of confessions were also entitled representation in the constitutional council (Zalzal 
2009) which awards them veto power when their “rights” are threatened. 
The official recognition of confessional autonomy conveys benefits such as tax-
exemption and other state-monitoring exemptions which increase the sovereignty of sects 
in running their own affairs. This has led to fifteen “mini-states” within Lebanon.32 
Confessions and their social institutions are only subject to self-monitoring procedures 
and religious endowments fall under the jurisdiction of heads of confessions (Zalzal 
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 In this regard, confessional groups are not obliged to publish their internal bylaws or any related legal 
amendments (Zalzal 2009). For instance, the Greek Orthodox Church only recently published its bylaws 
(November 2009). 
32
 In the Lebanese law, there are no prosecution mechanisms for Heads of Confessions. The latter are 
elected for life and can not be held accountable for their acts (The Monthly May 2002). In this regard, the 
letter addressed by former Prime Minister Salim el Hoss to the Sunni Mufti Mohammad Rashid Qabani is a 
milestone in Lebanon’s history. For the first time in Lebanon’s history, a former Sunni prime minister 
dared to challenge the Sunni Mufti. The alleged accusations against Qabani revolve mainly around the fact 
that he sold out waqf (immovable) lands of Dar al Fatwa to Solidere and had also been using public means 
for private ends. Qabani’s son who owns a consultancy company, was commissioned to provide its services 
concerning the construction of a hospital funded by Dar al Fatwa. See Fida Itani, “Al Fasad Matloub wa al 
Hader Mazmoum”, al-Akhbar, 2 February  2010; also Fida Itani, “Dawla bi Rajol Wahad”, al-Akhbar, 5 
February  2010.   
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2009). Moreover, most of these sects rely on regional and international religious 
references rather than national ones on issues related to religious jurisdiction. This 
increases the likelihood of foreign intervention and meddling in local issues (Zalzal 2007; 
2009). 
Of particular interest is the fact that the 15 personal-status codes regulate the 
family life of the 18 legally recognized religious sects. Marriage, divorce, child custody 
and inheritance issues belong to religious sects. However, personal status laws also serve 
as a major source of income generation. In fact, the state pays dues to Muslim and 
Christian confessions. Islamic courts and Muslim religious men receive allowances, 
compensations and salaries from the government distributed among the four Islamic 
sects. This pattern, which is rooted in the Ottoman tradition, has been institutionalized as 
Muslim religious courts and men became part of the state and followed the Sunni prime 
minister thus receiving salaries, allowances and expenses from the government (The 
Monthly, April 2008: 28).33 Heads of Christian confessions do not receive allowances and 
wages from the government but rather contributions through the ministry of justice and 
the presidency.34 
Despite the diversity of these codes, they have all institutionalized patriarchy thus 
highly suppressing, controlling and discriminating against women (Shehadeh 1998; 
Joseph 1991). In almost all sects, religious exogamy in marriages is prohibited. 
“Christian communities apply this rule for men and women; Muslims sects recognized 
                                                
33
 The Monthly (April 2008) states that the Lebanese government pays each head of confession 4.2 million 
LBP with an increase of 7% every two years. Judges of religious courts also receive salaries as stipulated in 
Law no. 716 of November 5 1998 and their monthly salaries start at 1,900.000 LBP and reach 5,050.000 
LBP. In 2006, 27 million LBP were spent to furnish the conference room of the members of the higher 
Islamic religious council in Dar al Fatwa. Another 413 million LBP were spent to furnish and equip the 
headquarters of the Higher Islamic Shi’te Council in Hazmieh.  
34In 2007, this amount reached 27% of the amount received by the Islamic courts or approximately a 
quarter the value as grants to Christian courts (Ibid).  
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the right for men to marry women from different religions but strictly forbidden Muslim 
women to do so unless the husband converts to Islam. This is underpinned by the premise 
that religious exogamy of women leads to the loss of children for the father’s religious 
sect” (Joseph 2000 a: 131). 
Moreover, the confirmation of paternal line awards fathers absolute tutelage over 
children (Ibid). This has deeply affected the issue of guardianship which is not considered 
as a natural right for mothers. In cases of divorce, women have to forfeit their legal, 
social and material rights to avoid losing child custody.  If the mother decides to remarry, 
custody of her children reverts to the first husband (Zalzal 2007; Shehadeh 1998). 
Other forms of gendered discrimination are clear in divorce and inheritance laws. 
It is worth noting that for Christian communities a civil law regulating inheritance 
matters was promulgated in 1959 stipulating that men and women receive an equal share. 
The discrimination is more blatant among Sunni Muslims. For instance, if a couple has 
only female children, they are entitled to only half of the inheritance and the extended 
male kin is entitled to the other half. Shiites allocate the entire share to the children 
irrespective of gender. Consequently, former Prime Ministers Riad al Solh and Salim al 
Hoss converted to the Shiite sect in order to pass on their share fully to their daughters.35 
In Muslim communities, men may divorce their wives without their consent or 
knowledge but this obliges the husband to pay alimony. On the other hand, divorce is 
illegal for almost all Christian communities except for the Greek Orthodox confession 
where men can divorce their wives if the latter were not virgins upon marriage or if they 
refused to live with their husbands. 
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 Interview with Marie Debs, LLWR vice president, Beirut, 24 February 2010. 
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In conclusion, the delegation of family law to the religious sects, and the stubborn 
denial of the political leadership to implement fully the Lebanese Constitution and 
Decree No.60 LR should be seen in light of sectarian elites’ politics of avoidance. In fact, 
a civil code for personal status laws paves the way for the “renegotiation of state-society 
relations in the direction of a non-sectarian form of citizenship. This in turn would 
demystify and consequently weaken the edifice and loyalties anchoring Lebanese society 
and the Lebanese political system” (Salloukh 2007b: 31). The deepest impact of this 
pattern of state-society relations is on the most vulnerable forces in society: women. In 
this regard, women live under the mercy of immutable ‘divine’ laws that regulate their 
private lives by denying them full and equal rights with their male counterparts. 
Lebanese citizens, men and women, will continue to be divided over their legal 
status while waiting for a civil code that awards them equal constitutional rights. For 
those who wish to marry someone of another religion they either have to submit to the 
laws of one of the recognized sects, a practice many women accept thus forfeiting the 
freedom of religious belief, or seek a civil marriage abroad. 
 
3.3.2 The Penal Code 
Despite the common perception that Lebanese women are emancipated, Lebanon 
has a penal code that comes at the expense of women’s rights.  This is materialized in 
cases of rape, honor crimes and domestic violence. The gendering of “these laws 
disadvantages women as victims of crime and violence in order to serve a broader socio-
cultural purpose” (Warrick 2005: 319), namely family cohesion, which is central to the 
functioning of the sectarian political system. Penal codes in Lebanon preserve a legal 
tradition that mitigates the punishments for male criminals accused of honor crimes, 
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domestic violence and rape, and transforms women victims of these crimes into a way to 
solve social problems (Ibid). 
In Lebanon, both Christian and Muslim girls and women are victims of honor 
crimes. Whereas, the western media associates this practice with Islamic culture, 
evidence shows that similar practices are found among Christian communities (Beydoun 
2008: 52). Article 562 of the Lebanese penal code mitigates circumstances for the man 
who catches his female relative in an unlawful sexual relationship and who harms or kills 
one or both protagonists.36 This article is the product of the 1858 Ottoman laws and 
Article 324 of the 1810 French Penal Code. Laure Mughayzil (1985) notes that during the 
process of state formation and at a time when the 1926 constitution was being drafted, the 
Ottoman municipal law disappeared except for Law 188 dealing with honor 
crimes.Whereas the Ottoman law mitigates penalty for the perpetrator in cases of honor 
crimes, the French penal code of 1810 deals with “passion crimes” which allow men to 
kill their female relatives if the latter were caught in an adulterous position.  In 1996 
minor amendments were introduced that mitigated punishments for perpetrators. 
However, Beydoun’s study (2008) shows that few crimes meet the conditions which 
relate to apprehending women in an adulterous position, and in most cases women’s 
death is portrayed as the only way to restore family’s honor. 
Rapists escape criminal prosecution if they are already married to the victim or if 
they marry her after the rape takes place.  For instance, Article 522 of the penal code 
gives the rapist impunity if marriage takes place after the rape is committed (McCracken 
2005: 45). In this regard, “the law privileges the protection of the social order, namely the 
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 For details concerning the penal code see Alia Berti Zein (2005): 20-21. 
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honor of the victim’s family, over the provision of individual criminal justice” (Warrick 
2005: 321). 
A similar situation transpires with domestic violence which might lead to the 
death of women victims of gender-based violence.37 Cases of domestic violence are 
regulated by the general articles of the penal code, namely Articles 554-559. In most of 
the cases, women victims of domestic violence drop the charges and consequently 
penalties are no longer applicable. 
Reliable statistics assessing the magnitude of this phenomenon are not available, 
however. On the one hand, this is because families tend to make recourse to informal 
processes of negotiation before taking a dispute to a court. On the other hand, seeking 
justice on these issues is very difficult for victims of domestic violence since these crimes 
take place at home and therefore cannot be easily proven as “they require special 
investigation mechanisms and procedures conducted by trained police officers and social 
workers” (McCracken 2005: 44). 
More worrisome is the fact that the legal context in Lebanon legalizes domestic 
violence against women.38 Though some observers deny a connection between religion 
and domestic violence, critics agree that personal status laws legalize domestic violence. 
Brand argues that “there is a moral violence underpinning these laws which legitimates 
violence against women (Brand 1998: 82), but there are also clear instructions in both 
Christian and Muslim sects that overlook male violence against women and defend the 
domination of women by their husbands.39 Moreover and as argued in the previous 
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 Interview with Zoya Rouhana, KAFA executive director, Beirut, 8 January 2010. 
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 Ibid and Interview with Ghida Anani, KAFA program coordinator, Beirut, 18 January 2010. 
39 See the following article “Violence against women and the role of religion” Marie Forger and Rabbi 
Enger :< http://new.vawnet.org/category/Main_Doc.php?docid=411>  
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section, religion has been mobilized to sanctify the family through immutable so-called 
god given personal status laws. This has extended the legitimacy of religious leaders in 
solving marriage problems. As one associational leader from CRTD-A stated: 
A civil code for domestic violence also threatens the power of religious leaders. 
You know when a man and a woman fight, the religious leader would intervene 
and tell her wash away the pain and come back to him.40 
 
While appearing as arbitrators religious leaders encourage women to overlook the 
violence of their husbands to maintain the cohesion of the family. Not only is this 
sanctioned by religious codes, it is also a central pillar of the reproduction of political 
power. Silence is the first and foremost obstacle to be overcome if violence against 
women is to be effectively eradicated. 
The marriage loophole, mitigated punishments and silence over domestic violence 
were created and are used for social purposes rather than to apply criminal justice. In this 
regard, these processes addressed the social practices surrounding raped women, victims 
of domestic violence and family honor rather than crimes against individual women. This 
is achieved by erasing the victim’s selfhood, to be replaced by a wife in the case of rape, 
by an adulterous woman in the case of honor crime, and a silent witness in the case of 
domestic violence. Most importantly, since these laws address the family domain, their 
amendment remains in gridlock due to the pivotal role that kinship structures play in 
maintaining the political order. 
 
3.3.3 Lebanese Women Give Birth but not their Nationality 
Nationality is either transferred through blood (jus sangui) or land (jus soli) 
linkages, thus revealing important aspects of political control. In Lebanon, the nationality 
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law falls under the first category but regards every male blood lines as legitimate thus 
blatantly discriminating against women in direct contravention of International Human 
rights treaties and the Lebanese Constitution (Article7). Moreover, Lebanon lags behind 
in terms of introducing any effective changes to the nationality law at a time when some 
Arab states amended their own.41 
The current law is the result of the French colonial legacy. In fact, under Ottoman 
rule, citizenship was premised by the principle of jus soli which enabled women to pass 
their nationality to their children (Joseph 2000 a). During the French mandate period, the 
transfer of nationality became restricted to the principle of paternal line. The 1925 
nationality law privileged men by awarding them the legal right to pass their Lebanese 
nationality to their children and non-national spouses.  At the same time, “naturalized” 
wives may pass on the Lebanese citizenship to their children if their husbands pass away. 
On the other hand, Lebanese women 42 married to non-nationals are denied this right 
except in few cases: if the child’s father is unknown or if the child’s father does not have 
a nationality (Joseph 2000 a).43 
Despite attempts to represent the reform of the nationality law as leading to the 
naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon, it is rather that the current nationality law plays 
a central role in sustaining the political aspirations of sectarian groups (Abou Habib 
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 As part of CRTD-A’s regional campaign that will be discussed shortly in the next chapter with a focus on 
Lebanon, the Lebanon-based association has been working with a number of Arab NGOs to amend the 
Nationality Law in different countries. This campaign “My nationality a Right for Me and My Family” has 
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that they have their father’s consent. The UAE nationality law of 2002 granted women the right to pass 
their nationality only to their underage children, provided they are widowed or divorced. 
42Lebanese women married to non-nationals were also deprived of their Lebanese nationality. However, 
activists managed to amend the law and bring back the right for women to keep her Lebanese nationality if 
she marries a non-national. 
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 For a detailed discussion about the Lebanese Nationality Law see Baroud (2003). 
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2003) in a country where political representation is premised on the demographic weight 
of the confessions. That the law saw the light before the refugee problem and that a 
Palestinian woman is naturalized whenever she marries a Lebanese man devoids this 
argument from its content. However this linkage between a women’s right to pass on her 
nationality and the Palestinian refugee problem attests to the fact that the alliance 
between patriarchy and sectarianism obviates the right of Lebanese women and 
Palestinians to live a decent life in the name of preserving the sectarian power sharing 
agreement. This destructive patriarchal and sectarian coalition confirms again that the 
Lebanese official policy is to punish those who do not have a state as they represent a 
“threat” to national security simply because they are the ones in dire need for a 
nationality.44Moreover, this law is utilized to depict women’s wombs as Trojan horses 
used by Palestinian refugees to circumvent anti-settlement policies. 
Hence, children and husbands of Lebanese women married to non-nationals 
continue to face a set of restricted policies that denies them access to democratic 
institutions, security and social rights. Lebanon’s gendered nationality law turned the 
lives of many women and their families into a living hell. Mixed couples are treated as 
foreigners in Lebanon. High fees for residency permits  and making children follow their 
fathers have complicated things for these families, Moreover, children of these mixed 
couples can not benefit from public services such as enrolling in public schools or 
benefiting from public health financing schemes.  Their life becomes even more 
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 Nizar Saghieh, “Hina Yousbouhou al Hourman min Dawla Jourman”, al-Akhbar, 23 June 2007. The 
MOI Baroud used the same racist wordings mentioned in the law regulating the foreigners’ right to own 
property and justified it saying that the Constitutional Council adopted the law in 2001. According to 
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dealing with foreigners in Lebanon. 
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complicated when they decide to enter the job market in Lebanon. As they are denied 
working for the public sector and the private sector imposes many rules which makes it 
hard to hire them. Palestinians continue to suffer the most as they are also denied the 
right to own property which consequently forfeits children’s right to inherit from their 
Lebanese mothers (Ibid). 
 
3.4 The Limits of Women’s Organizing in Lebanon 
In the deeply fragmented political context of Lebanon where sectarianism and 
clientelism permeate every aspect of social and political life, interest-based actors are 
debarred from the possibility of becoming part of the political decision-making process. 
This deeply affects the ability of women’s organizations in amending the gendered laws 
and reaching gendered equity. Moreover the survival of sectarian leaders in power is 
ensured through the existence of a common consensus that sees the sectarian system as 
natural. The legal pluralism encoded in the personal status laws, the social segmentation 
in social policies, and the sectarian leaders’ patronage networks have successfully 
strengthened sectarian loyalties, identities and clientelism at the expense of a trans-
sectarian citizenship and rights-based norms. The results of the last parliamentary 
elections, the rallies and demonstrations as well as the continuous civil strife attest to the 
fact that sectarian leaders have succeeded in making “sectarian identities the sole markers 
of political action and organization” (Salloukh 2008: 1). 
Post-war social movements, including women’s rights movements, have been 
unable to mobilize people for particular societal interests that transcend sectarian 
identities and interests. This is confirmed by many critics who argue that women in 
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Lebanon do not act on the basis of gender considerations but rather on the basis of 
sectarian loyalties that make up their individual identities in Lebanon. As one journalist 
noted: 
The problem is that even women are sectarian…During the nationality sit-in, each 
one of them sheers for her political patron: Hariri, Berri, Jumblat,etc and  they 
still vote for these sectarian political leaders.45 
 
Moreover, this hegemonic sectarian system though apparently open, in fact only 
allows social actors to mobilize in a way that does not challenge the pillars of political 
power. Hence, freedoms can only be extended if they do not threaten the hegemony of 
sectarian leaders and their power base namely kinship and sects. A salient feature of this 
inexorable alliance is the way it has encoded patriarchy and therefore privileged men 
over women. Clientelism, is therefore rooted in patriarchal kinship ties. Confessionalism, 
underpinned by a precarious sectarian demographic balance, is also dependent on 
controlling women and children whether through the personal status laws or the 
nationality law. In this regard, gender issues call into question socially-constructed power 
relations in Lebanon. Moreover, women’s rights intertwine with broader concepts of 
citizenship, human rights and the question of Palestinian refugees, all of which have been 
manipulated by the sectarian leaders to perpetuate their rule. Reforming gendered laws 
promises to yield to more democratic society, hence the difficulty of any such 
undertaking. 
Confessionalism and clientelism have also shaped patterns of women’s civic 
engagement. This issue will be the focus of the next chapter. However, it is worth noting 
that the socio-political context has led to the polarization of associational life in two 
different civic spaces: those who have political access to the sectarian ruling cartel and 
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those who do not. One observer explains the patronization of some associational leaders 
by the sectarian elite as follows: “sometimes people with good merit think that they 
cannot make it to decision-making positions if they remain outside the existing political 
divisions”.46 In the latter case, these associations become a showcase for associational 
leaders to expand their power base and hence secure their entry into the parliament, rather 
than serve as an arena to advance women’s rights and interests. Moreover, these 
associations impede the ability of the non-clientelistic associations to advance their 
claims thus proving Nadje Al Ali’s argument which stipulates that independent women’s 
organizations  “do not only face challenges from their respective governments but also 
from activists within civil society, who follow more traditional patterns of political and 
social engagement” (Al Ali 2005: 110). 
These associations have weakened considerably the ability of the women’s 
movement to launch a Gramscian ‘war of position’ against sectarian hegemony. These 
women’s associations participate in the domination of women through their participation 
in the clientelistic system rather than holding politicians accountable for their acts. 
This is not to say that the more independent women’s organization have been 
successful in launching a ‘war of position’. In fact, the post-war sectarian status quo and 
its limited openness for political debate have considerably de-radicalized independent 
women's rights organizations. This is mostly felt in the way they have sought to avoid 
addressing the personal status laws.47 Moreover, this context has led to feelings of 
paralysis and marginalization among some secular women’s rights associations.48  All of 
these factors have hindered women’s movements from launching a ‘war of position’ as 
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 Interview with Marie Debs, LLWR vice-president, Beirut, 24 February 2010. 
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 Interview with Zoya Rouhana, KAFA executive director, Beirut, 8 January 2010. 
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 Interview with Joumana Merhi, LWDG president, Beirut, 11 January 2010. 
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associational ideas and programs are either kept consistent with the parameters of the pre-
existing political order or are unable to launch a full-fledged reform due to schisms 
within the women’s movement as well as feelings of marginalization and incapacitation. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the issue of gendered laws and women’s rights was treated as an 
inherent part of post-war state reconstruction. The reform of these gendered laws entails 
the renegotiation of state-society relations and the “redefinition of rights and obligations 
for men and women in the family, community and by extension the society at large” 
(Charrad 2000: 234). Sectarian elites, preoccupied by upgrading their sectarian rule used 
these gendered laws to extend their sectarian hegemony over their followers. The 
sectarian ruling cartel thus chose policies that conform to its political and socio-economic 
interests. 
This chapter examined the alliances between sectarian elites and social groups, 
namely confessions and kin structures, who are involved in women’s subordination. 
These social organizations are vital for the reproduction of the pillars of political power 
in Lebanon namely confessionalism and clientelism. In this regard, the ruling cartel 
supported and legitimated patriarchal and sectarian control over issues related to women 
to maintain and upgrade their sectarian rule. 
With this background, the next chapter examines the women’s advocacy 
community in post-war Lebanon. The next chapter highlights the impact of confessional 
and clientelistic politics on women’s rights NGOs. It examines their class bias, 
ideological systems and their relationship with local and international organizations to 
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shed light on how these variables impact their organizational structures, targeting 
strategies, forms of social capital, agendas and their relationship with ordinary women. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 THE POLARIZATION OF POST-WAR WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many scholars have examined women’s participation and engagement in 
Lebanon’s political and nationalistic movements, and their engagement in the women’s 
movement (Thompson 2000; Charafeddine 2004). However, this long history of women’s 
activism has not translated into significant political and social gains. The Lebanese 
women’s movement faces the contemporary challenges of reconciling conflicting class, 
generational and ethnic interests and identities (Waylen 2007). How these challenges are 
met depends largely on women organizations’ institutional structure, as well as their 
relationships with each other, the ruling elite and funding agencies.  
This chapter opens with a brief overview of the main donors and their agendas 
with respect to gender issues in Lebanon. With the absence of local providers, 
international aid agencies emerged as the most important actors in supporting women’s 
advocacy community in Lebanon. This makes aid an important variable to consider when 
analyzing the impact of these associations on gender social policies and democratic 
outcomes. This section argues that the transformation of the post-war gendered order is 
not induced by aid agencies but rather by local actors. However, aid agencies enable or 
disable local actors from launching a Gramscian ‘war of position’ against the prevailing 
hegemonic structures through their projected policies or their programs (Abirafeh 2009).  
The chapter then turns to the post-war women’s movement. The aim is to 
disentangle the limitations that withstand the formation of a counter-hegemonic society. 
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Hence this chapter makes the point that in the particular case of the women’s movement 
in Lebanon, sectarian elite strategies impede legal reforms; however the institutional 
structure of the women’s movement also prevents it from acting as a strong and counter-
hegemonic force which requires a widespread popular support. This chapter traces the 
polarization of the women’s landscape into top-down corporatist forms of organizing 
(NCLW, LCW, CFUWI) with ties to the religious and political leadership, bottom-up 
grassroots leftist women’s organizing (LWDG, LLWR) and development-driven 
professional NGOs (CRTD-A, KAFA). Their class bias, ideological systems and their 
relationship with local and international organizations are examined to shed light on how 
these variables impact their organizational structures, targeting strategies, forms of social 
capital, agendas and their relationship with ordinary women.  
Consequently, the diversity of gender-based associations does not create a healthy 
movement able to renegotiate and transform the gendered order. Rather this collection of 
NGOs advocating for gender equality faces a serious problem of identity and lacks a clear 
oppositional stance which makes it very difficult to articulate a strategic posture against 
the post-war patriarchal structure.  
4.2 Funders, Fund Her: Donor Monies and Gender-based Agendas 
Aid assistance is political and becomes even more so when gender is added to the 
recipe (Abirafeh 2009).  In the following sections, I argue that the underlying neo-liberal 
ideology of international aid agencies based on the fragmentation of issues rather than 
seeking a reformist global agenda impedes rather than encourages the empowerment of 
women. This developmental paradigm does not lend itself to the renegotiation of the 
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gender order. Rather it seeks to mitigate women’s social distress by providing technical 
solutions to complex political problems (Ibid).  
Alain Touraine argues that “this process of disassociation is the main feature of capitalist 
modernity. It refers to a state in which social, political and economic structures no longer 
cohere together but are fractured by forms of disconnectivity. While hindering prospects 
of social cohesion, this paradigm yields to more fragmentation” (Hanafi and Tabari 2004: 
23). Moreover, it prohibits the advocacy community from renegotiating the gender order 
towards more inclusive forms of citizenship for women. As Margret Keck and Kathyrn 
Sikkinik (1998) argue, the advocacy networks succeed the most when focused on 
particular aspects of discrimination in total isolation from larger reformist agendas. 
Hence, ideas, discussions, and campaigns are framed in such a way that they address 
some features of the hegemonic system without attacking them entirely and directly. In 
this regard, they remain consistent with the parameters of the existing political order.  
For the old generation of Lebanon’s women’s movement this NGO-based 
advocacy system de-politicized what is essentially political. As Marie Debs, LLWR vice- 
president, argues: 
NGOs marginalized this system of political parties/political partisanship. The 
main argument of the international aid agencies goes as follows: Why get people 
to militate for big political issues? We make them busy with partial issues and 
then let them achieve change in these issues which does not lead to a radical 
societal change… This legitimizes donors’ viewpoint and at the same it creates 
some sort of self-seeking individuals.49 
 
Furthermore, this system led to a de-mobilization of social and political activism. 
According to Debs, the problem with advocacy networks is that they are not supported by 
popular movements that endorse their claims.  On this view, modern associations project 
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themselves as the ones advocating and speaking in the name of the popular masses 
instead of building the capacities of ordinary women and helping them to mobilize and 
lead their own struggle.50  
The following section examines policy formulation of the main funding agencies 
namely the UN, USAID and EU. By doing so, I shed light on how aid agencies frame the 
issue of gender inequality in Lebanon. The aim is to assess to what extent gender is not 
mainstreamed in policy texts (Abirafeh 2009). The discussion also focuses on the funding 
trends and fund recipients to show how aid policies strengthen sectarian hegemony and 
consequently impede the reform of the post-war gendered order. 
 
4.2.1 Gender Mainstreaming: Funders Policy Texts  
The first source of information highlighting how discourses about women shape 
international intervention in the gender-based field is funders’ strategic plans. Among 
other issues, these documents reveal an almost total absence of clear strategic objectives 
that address gender inequality (except for the IDC). In examining, the EU, USAID and 
the UN documents, I highlight the gender content to understand how the latter reflect 
their country’s views about gender in Lebanon. In fact what comes out is that gender is 
not treated in the documents as an analytical basis. Rather if gender is mentioned in the 
country strategy papers, it is always isolated in a small and separate section.  
Moreover, whenever donors raise issues of gender discrimination in Lebanon, technical 
solutions are provided for complex political problems. Typically as it will be shown, 
providing women with economic opportunities, quantitative increase of the number of 
women elected in parliamentary and municipal elections (without reforming the electoral 
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laws) and alleviating social distress for women victims of GBV are hot topics that 
channeled important amounts of funds for local actors. Despite their importance, these 
issues alone can not lead to the renegotiation of the post-war gender order towards more 
inclusive forms of citizenship.  
An examination of the funders’ strategic plans shows that all funders think that 
gender is mainstreamed whereas gender is practically nowhere.51 The first and most 
blatant example of the absence of gender mainstreaming is within the UN system where 
the multiplicity of funds dealing with the issue of women’s rights leads to project 
overlaps and competition over resource allocation. A group of feminist activist came to 
the conclusion that the current UN structure impedes, rather than advances women’s 
interests and needs. This culminated in a Gender Equality Architecture Reform Campaign 
(GEAR) which is led “by a network of over 300 women’s, human rights and social 
justice groups around the world urging the UN Member States and the UN Secretariat to 
move swiftly forward to create a new UN gender equality entity.”52  
On the other hand, gender-based agendas suffered from a serious setback under 
Bush’s term.53 Studies show that under neo-conservative rule, Faith Based Organizations, 
who have the highest stakes in women’s subordination, have become increasingly the 
main recipients of US funds.54 In Lebanon, this has translated into support for 
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confessional-based and sectarian associations that operate under a system of male 
patriarchy and fail to meet basic women’s needs (CRTD-A 2007 b).55 Moreover, the 
USAID country strategy (2002-2007) for Lebanon explains in half a paragraph how the 
US seeks to address issues of gender inequality. The USAID gender strategy does not go 
beyond supporting the empowerment of women on the economic level through programs 
that promote women’s economic opportunities and increase the number of elected 
women in municipal councils (USAID 2002: 38).   
At the same time, the EC strategic plan does not consider the impact of projects 
and programs on women’s empowerment. For instance, the country strategy sets out 
objectives for the projected period without suggesting any special programs for the 
promotion of women’s rights and gender equality (EU 2007). Elena Zambelli from the 
Italian Development Cooperation Office, best captures this problem when she recognizes 
that the EU is one among other organizations that lack a specific gender mainstreaming 
strategy:  
Either they see ‘gender’ as a separate component or they say that it is 
mainstreamed across their projects. In the latter case, you will see some special 
provisions for women and children. However, gender is far from being 
understood as a sound analytical basis.56  
 
Hence, and among all EU member states (EU 2007: 38), only Italy57recently 
became involved in supporting gender-based programs in Lebanon. In fact Italy’s 
                                                                                                                                            
report, shows that USAID spent US$ 57 million from 2001 to 2005 (out of US$ 390 million allocated to 
NGOs) to fund projects run by FBOs in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Afghanistan.  Of the 260 FBOs that 
received funds from USAID in the past five years, only two are Muslim FBOs. The share of Christian 
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UNIFIL presence was the driving factor that encouraged the embassy to scale up its 
support for Lebanon. This attests to the fact that the political situation shapes aid agendas 
rather than real development motives. Zambelli best captures this argument: 
We are the ones injecting a lot of soldiers, so our office grew with an Emergency 
and Reconstruction program. In the first year the emergency program alone 
channeled 15 million Euros to support projects in war-affected areas.58 
 
In the IDC’s Gender Guidelines every paragraph is based on a gender-analysis of 
power, shedding light on the inexorable relationship between the social, political, legal 
and economic systems and the way they all yield to gendered discrimination. Italy seeks 
to mainstream gender throughout its overall framework of emergency and development 
intervention in Lebanon and to finance women’s economic, social and political 
empowerment (IDC 2007: 5).  
Hence, except for the IDC, gender is not a priority for international aid agencies 
which is illustrated in the narrow representation or total absence of gender issues in 
policy texts. The following section sheds light on the common trends among funding 
agencies with respect to gender-based programs. The aim is to investigate how donors 
seek to mitigate the social distress and increase women’s visibility without this leading to 
women’s empowerment. This is mainly due to the fact that funders avoid addressing a 
renegotiation of the gender order as it risks challenging the authority of the sectarian 
elites which remains a red line for all donors. The views of grassroots local actors among 
NGO leaders are taken into consideration concerning these emerging themes and trends.  
On another level, the profile of the fund recipients is also very indicative to which 
extent the international aid agencies strengthen the sectarian status quo. As it will become 
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clear, funding agencies diversified their fund recipients, yet they are still channeling 
important amounts of money to corporatist and elitist structures that either serve to 
silence grassroots women or do not seek to reform the post-war gendered order. 
 
4.2.2 Funding Trends and Grants Recipients 
A survey of funders’ websites and relevant documents59 shows that they focus 
more on issues that are deemed as relatively safe such as women’s health, political 
participation and economic empowerment; however issues of choice and consent are not 
addressed. Hence, most of the projects are designed to mitigate women’s social distress; 
to make them feel better but not more empowered. 
Almost all funders support income-generation projects for women. However these 
projects do not always take into consideration whether these women really want this type 
of work. This leads to futile investments and huge amounts of money being channeled 
with no efficiency. Zambelli admits that the IDC’s economic empowerment program for 
women was not very successful due to the fact that “women did not want to commit to 
the process of business formalization.”60   
Funding from the UNDP, USAID (through MEPI and NDI) and IDC was also 
allocated to boost women’s political participation in legislative and municipal elections.  
In particular, the USA and Italy showed increased interest in women’s participation in the 
municipal elections. For instance, the American-based National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) launched the “Participate in the 2010 Municipal Elections” campaign addressing 
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female candidates. NDI “supports women candidates through training workshops, 
consultative sessions and one-on-one mentorship and public forums.”61 In a similar vein, 
the IDC in cooperation with MOSA and the NCLW, launched a campaign that 
encourages women to take part in the electoral process. Zambelli explains that  
The program is not only about a quantitative increase of women in decision 
making positions, but it is also about women building ties and networking that 
transcend the borders of identities and belongings, etc… building the capacity of 
women to run on the basis of their own merit and their vision rather than their 
(primordial) belongings.62   
 
However, local actors and civil society activists argue that in the context of the 
current municipal law, it is useless to increase the number of women elected to municipal 
councils since final decision-making powers are manipulated by the president of the 
municipal council. Moreover, elected women are assigned small and marginal tasks. 
Hence, this practice might increase the presence of women in public life but it does not 
ensure empowerment. The following quote from a civil society activist at CRTD-A best 
captures this argument:   
If women are not elected as presidents, then any attempts to increase their 
participation will not lead to real empowerment. If elected as members of the 
municipal council, they will continue to be assigned symbolic tasks such as social 
work, etc. Moreover, these projects are usually assigned small budgets compared 
to infrastructure work and the latter area continues to be deemed as a male-
dominated arena.63 
 
Another associational leader from the LWDG argues that it is futile to talk about 
women’s increased participation if women’s rights in the domestic sphere are still subject 
to the wills of the family patriarch. This argument underscores the issue of the 
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fragmentation of women’s agendas. For proponents of this argument decision-making 
starts at home and extends to the political arena and not the other way around:  
How can women achieve change if they are deprived of their right in the domestic 
domain? If a woman presented her candidacy to the municipal elections and won 
there is a law that prohibits her from going out. We see that the problem is in the 
Personal Status Laws… What equality are we talking about if we do not address 
the issue of gender equality at the family level? Discrimination at the societal 
level is an extension of discrimination at the family level. To become a decision 
maker in public life you have to be a decision maker in the private life but that is 
not the case … How can they separate this from the struggle for gaining equal 
rights at home?64  
 
However there is another issue that none of the aforementioned critics or funders 
have paid attention to. As is the case for the parliamentary elections, the municipal 
elections also involve kinship, confessional and sectarian structures. In this regard, the 
campaign for the new municipal councils is a minefield, and the electoral process is a 
battlefield where all weapons should be used to win the blessing of the patriarchal 
leaders. Hence, the increased participation of women in municipal elections does not 
ensure the adoption of a women’s rights agenda as winners will continue to act on the 
basis of sectarian and kinship affiliations rather than interest-based considerations. In this 
regard, funders’ encouragement for women to take part in the same system that deprives 
them of their rights as equal citizens strengthens the ideological legitimacy of this 
patriarchal and sectarian system. 
At the legal level, the reform of the nationality law attracted many funders. 
Funding for research and a legal study were channeled through the UNDP-POGAR in 
2002 to CRTD-A.65 Few years later, UNDP Lebanon launched a parallel campaign. The 
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US$ 270,000 grant duplicated the work that had already been achieved by CRTD-A.66 
The multiplicity of funds for the same topic fomented the schism within the women’s 
movement and created competition over funding among the associations. On another 
level, questions arise concerning the extent to which local actors participated and were 
consulted in the elaboration of strategies and program implementation. While claiming 
that they are civil society’s partners in development, UNDP did not bother to answer 
some of the crucial questions raised by CRTD-A concerning the course of the project and 
the series of consultations that UNDP undertook to decide on the launching of this 
parallel campaign. It is clear from the email correspondence between UNDP and CRTD-
A that the former gave brief answers on CRTD-A’s various questions.67 Furthermore, 
they justified the delegation of project implementation to another association, the 
CFUWI, claiming that they are “experts in this field and the most capable to implement 
such a project.”68 These statements were made at a time when it was clear for the public 
that CFUWI participated in CRTD-A’s campaign “My nationality A Right for Me and 
My Family” launched in 2005. The lack of consultation with local actors involved in this 
issue resulted in a rushed program design that failed to add any value for women who 
continue to suffer from discriminatory nationality codes. The UNDP’s obsession with 
promoting themselves as the organization championing local reforms in Lebanon, and 
their rush to meet funding deadlines led to inefficient work and fomented the schism 
within an already divided women’s movement. 
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The other issue that attracted funders the most is fighting gender based violence 
(GBV). A recent study by AWID shows that the issue is a top priority at the local and 
international levels (AWID 2008). This “translated in the 2005 World Summit, where 
world leaders pledged to double efforts aimed at the elimination of gender-based 
violence. In addition to these efforts, some prominent international campaigns and 
funding initiatives on violence against women emerged” (Ibid: 45).  
To varying degrees, almost all funders have supported this issue in Lebanon. Among all 
UN agencies, the UNIFEM channeled considerable amounts of funds to support the local 
actors in their quest to fight GBV. At the same time, the EU and the IDC have both 
agreed that GBV is a pressing issue that needs to be addressed immediately (EU 2007; 
IDC 2007). For Zambelli, GBV is a crime that anyone can oppose as it might lead to 
women’s death. Moreover, it recalls the stigma of women being victims and needing 
protection. Besides support for KAFA’s advocacy work in this field, domestic violence is 
a hot topic for seminars, round tables and workshops all of which focused on the 
necessity of implementing the law and most recently engaging men as perpetrators in 
solving the problem.69  
For many associational leaders and local actors, however the reform of the 
domestic domain should have been implemented as part of a package deal including the 
reform of the personal status laws: 
GBV can not be eradicated if we do not look at it from a wider perspective and 
the central issue in Lebanon is the adoption of a civil code for PSL.70  
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In fact, all funders avoided addressing the personal status laws which is the main area of 
discrimination against women. Arguments advanced in favor of this approach were 
mainly premised on a political-cultural approach projecting the issue as being engrained 
in immutable cultural systems. This hyper-focus on supporting what “can be achieved 
instead of exhausting time, money and energy on the personal status laws”71 avoids a 
renegotiation of state-society relations towards more inclusive forms of citizenship for 
Lebanese men and women and consequently preserves the sectarian status quo as 
citizenship continues to be premised by sectarian membership. As Lina Abirafeh argues, 
“the battle is between a quick-fix mentality and the time and energy required to do the 
non-cosmetic changes” (2009: 67).  
The non-confrontational stance that the funding community adopted vis-à-vis the 
family law attests to the fact that international aid agencies supported issues that did not 
antagonize the rulers and therefore favored the sectarian elites. The LWDG’s experience 
in this field best captures this argument. Recently the LWDG presented to the EC a 
project proposal to reform the personal status laws which was refused since “the topic 
contravenes Lebanese politics and will not be able to achieve its over-stated 
objectives.”72 
This is not the only way that the funding community has strengthened the 
sectarian status quo. As argued in the second chapter, aid agencies around the globe have 
equated the existence of NGOs with the strength of civil society. However, not all 
women’s associations follow bottom-up patterns of organizing. In particular, some 
associations (LCW, CFUWI and NCLW) do not fit bottom-up forms of organizing. 
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Corporatist, elitist and sectarian-based structures permeate and dominate the women’s 
associational landscape.  
The main sources of UN funding (UNFPA, UNIFEM, UNDP, UN Trust Fund) 
are channeled to the NCLW, CFUWI and LCW. In fact, the UNIFEM and UNDP 
(Lebanon) have been turned into exclusive funds for the LCW and the CFUWI (CFUWI 
2007). As it will be argued in the next section, the NCLW, CFUWI and LCW do not fit 
the associations’ developmental paradigm rather they are corporatist and elitist structures 
that fail to address and meet ordinary women’s needs. By channeling important amounts 
of money to these associations, international aid agencies strengthen corporatist rather 
than grassroots associations, contribute to marginalize women’s interests and needs and 
impede comprehensive reforms. 
This financial support has also been paralleled by overt calls from the funding 
community to strengthen the capacities of corporatist structures like the NCLW. This is 
best epitomized by the amounts of funds and support that the IDC channels to the 
NCLW.73 Moreover, the UNDP made it a point in its country strategy that the NCLW’s 
oversight needs to be strengthened through the support of UN agencies namely the 
UNFPA, UNIFEM and the UNDP (UNDP 2006). 
Aid agencies also supported the same organizations that have the highest stake in 
keeping women in a subordinate position, namely the sectarian organizations. Much as 
USAID channeled substantial support to Faith Based organizations, the World Bank’s 
US$ 1,200,000 grant to empower women was awarded to the Hariri foundation for the 
execution of a project entitled “Towards the Empowerment of Women in the Media.”74 
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Besides the dissemination of a report that sheds light on women’s role in the media, a 
legal review on the status of Lebanese women in Lebanese legislation and a media 
campaign, the grant did little to really empower women. By addressing the issue of 
women’s visibility in the media, the project raises important questions about women from 
a certain class while forgetting the harsh conditions that ordinary women continue to face 
in domestic and public life. Moreover, the biased WB funding policy raised the ire of 
grass-root ones who have repeatedly expressed their frustration with the fact that 
sectarian-based institutions compete with grassroots “Is it not a pity that Hariri 
Foundation, which is also a funder, to receive a WB grant?”75  
Hence, funding agencies’ focus on achieving whatever can be achieved in the 
sectarian context of Lebanon, mainly by mitigating women’s social distress or increasing 
their political participation without making them more powerful. Funders avoid 
supporting the renegotiation of the post-war gendered order towards more inclusive 
forms of citizenship for women. Hence, technical quick-fix solutions are provided for 
complex political problems. Moreover, projects are sometimes short-lived complying 
with international aid agencies standards rather than being a response to local needs.  
Through their funding strategy as well as their belief in the sectarian system, aid agencies 
strengthened the ideological legitimacy of the sectarian system. Their continued support 
for top-down forms of organizing, corporatist, elitist and sectarian organizations impedes 
rather than enacts reforms. It is against this background that the next section examines the 
Lebanese women’s movement. 
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4.3 Post-War Women’s Advocacy  
The women’s movement in Lebanon is one of the oldest social movements in the 
country (Al Khatib 1984; Charafeddine 2004; Thompson 2000). In this regard, an 
examination of the women’s associational sector requires a detour shedding light on 
particular junctures that influenced and shaped the structure of the current movement.  
Lebanese women actively took part in independence movements through various 
means that expanded their participation in civil society. In addition to their support for 
independence movements, women also organized to bring about reforms that improved 
their status whether with respect to equal political rights or extended work and education 
for their uneducated counterparts (Thompson 2000). At the time, women were used for 
their numbers and their symbolic value by male nationalists (Ibid). The latter opened up 
new possibilities for women’s public participation that only served to advance their 
interests. However, the sectarian ruling cartel, as argued in Chapter 3, promoted gendered 
discrimination on all levels as a mean to assert their sectarian hegemony and extend their 
rule.  
It is against this background that the LCW was created. In fact, the post-
independence ruling elite promoted their project for women’s emancipation by paving the 
way for the creation of this women’s council. Though the LCW claimed to advance 
women’s rights, its function did not go beyond providing some social services for women 
(Charafeddine 2004). Hence, the council “emerged as a corporatist umbrella structure 
sponsored by the state which limited women’s rights agenda to one enabling women to 
participate in the social and economic spheres and increase their political participation” 
(Pratt 2006: 82). 
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LCW elitism led independent and leftist women to create the League for Lebanese 
Women’s Rights.76 Emerging from the communist party, the league was influenced by 
Marxist thought, and therefore prioritized class struggle at the expense of a gender-based 
agenda (Pratt 2006; Charafeddine 2004). The schism within the communist party led to 
the creation of another leftist women’s organization: The Lebanese Women Democratic 
Gathering (LWDG) (Charafeddine 2004). Despite this schism, the two grass-roots leftist 
organizations assiduously worked together during the war years, stressing the need to 
work with and for other oppressed groups. Their agenda was focused on relief work 
whenever the fighting intensified without ever relinquishing their main objectives: the 
adoption of a civil marriage bill, the de-confessionalization of Lebanese politics, and 
strengthening the provision of public service especially in catering to the social services 
of all citizens disregarding confessional backgrounds.77 Despite the fact that these 
associations advanced reformist agendas and challenged the sectarian status quo, their 
institutional makeup failed to attract young leaders in the post-war period. In particular, 
they were increasingly controlled by a group of women who were involved in every 
aspect of the associational work but refused to delegate power to the newer generation.  
In this regard, the Beijing78 summit provided an opportunity for women who did 
not find their place in any of the aforementioned structures to organize around particular 
issues and advance their agendas. Influenced by the importance of the discourse on rights 
and citizenship, these associations were specialized in particular fields of gendered 
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discrimination such as domestic violence, economic empowerment and nationality, and 
have increasingly benefited from the support of international organizations, international 
non-governmental organizations and women’s funds for their projects. This is 
particularly the case for KAFA and CRTD-A. KAFA is a non-profit, non-political, non-
confessional, civil society organization that “seeks to mitigate the causes and effects of 
violence and exploitation of women and children … while focusing primarily on the 
trafficking of women and children, child sexual abuse, and gender based 
violence”(KAFA 2009 a: 1). On the other hand, CRTD-A’s mission “is to contribute to 
social justice and gender equality in the Machreq/Maghreb region…Active in Lebanon 
and in several other countries of the region, CRTD-A’s work focuses on issues related to 
gender and economic justice, gender and citizenship, women’s leadership for change and 
Knowledge for Social Development” (CRTD-A 2009: 1).  
Interestingly CRTD-A and KAFA refused to join the LCW or to be labeled as 
women’s associations despite the fact that they have emerged as the main actors leading 
post-war women’s advocacy and include in their official documents and statements clear 
commitments to achieve gender equality (CRTD-A 2008 a; KAFA 2006). This is partly 
due to the public stigma that women’s organizations are elitist, ineffectual and void of 
real content.79   
Hence, CRTD-A and KAFA project themselves as NGOs addressing social 
development issues with a gender focus at the local and regional level (CRTD-A 2006 a: 
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5).80 It is against this brief historical background that the following section discusses the 
constituent elements of the women’s advocacy community in post-war Lebanon. 
 
4.3.1 Ideology and Class: Associational Structures, Agendas and Social Capital 
As argued in the first chapter, women’s rights in Lebanon challenge pillars of 
political power namely sectarianism and clientelism. In this regard, research focused on 
women’s rights-based NGOs should take into consideration whether these associations 
challenge the hegemonic system and pave the way for an alternative society, or whether 
they are consistent with the parameters of the clientelistic and confessional political order 
which feeds up on gender discrimination. In particular the discussion sheds light on the 
LCW, CFUWI, NCLW, LLWR, LWDG, KAFA and CRTD-A. Class and ideological 
backgrounds are investigated to assess their impact on associational institutional makeup, 
strategies, issues raised and values promoted. By doing so, we may judge whether these 
associations provide an alternative to mainstream sectarian and clientelistic politics, 
whether they work with the poor and the underserved, and whether they are able to 
provide an alternative method to empower ordinary women and respond to their greatest 
needs.  
 
Corporatist, Sectarian and Elitist Structures 
The LCW is the oldest and the largest women’s association in Lebanon. Starting 
in 1952, LCW’s founders participated in Lebanon’s nationalistic struggle and its quest to 
gain independence from the French authorities and contributed during the war years to 
bring back normalcy to Lebanon. The LCW is projected as one of the confessionaly 
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diverse associations that survived the war years and continued its activity in the post-war 
era. However, this picture is challenged by empirical facts on the ground. The long 
history of this association has not translated into efficient legislative amendments that 
lead to women’s empowerment.81 As it will be argued, the institutional makeup of the 
LCW hinders its ability to act as a counter-hegemonic society that challenges the pillars 
of political power, namely confessionalism and clientelism. In fact, associations within 
the LCW expressed their desire and will to belong to post-independence Lebanon which 
gained independence in 1943 rather than push for women’s rights and consequently 
challenge the post-independence sectarian and patriarchal hegemony (Charafeddine 
2004). Hence, the LCW has played a crucial role in the normalization of the post-
independence sectarian system through its support of the aims of this post-independence 
hegemonic order (Pratt 2006). 
That the LCW is part of the establishment is clearly mirrored in its associational 
structure and bylaws. On the one hand, the LCW is an umbrella organization that brings 
together more than 170 NGOs that are spread geographically over Lebanon’s six 
governates. However, there is a regional discrepancy in the associational distribution with 
the majority (47%) being located and operating in the capital. The North (28%) receives 
the second largest portion followed by Mount Lebanon (14%). The Bekaa (7%), South 
Lebanon (3%) and Nabatieh (1%) are clearly underrepresented in the council’s general 
assembly (Charani 1996).  
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The General Assembly, the decision-making body which is also responsible for 
the election of a new administrative committee, is almost totally colonized by 
confessional and sectarian associations. Hence, the same council which sets for itself the 
goal to empower women brings together the largest number of associations that have the 
highest stakes in alienating women. Most of these associations are headed by a religious 
or a sectarian leader, are oriented towards service provision for their narrow confessional 
communities operating under a system of religious patriarchy.82To name but a few: Al 
Makassed Association, the Druze Charity Association, Islamic Charity Association, 
Friends of Dar al-Ajaza al Islamiya, the Islamic Martyr Charity Association, Zahrat al 
Ihsan,83 Al Zahra’a Charity Association, Amal Handicapped Association, Relief Maronite 
Association for the Poor and Women, the Greek Orthodox Association, the Cross 
Association to support Armenians, Al Sader Association, Al Hariri Alumni Foundation 
and many more are all represented in the LCW general assembly.84 The other category is 
a set of associations that are not labeled as confessional-based organizations yet they 
clearly operate in certain geographical areas and consequently serve narrow confessional 
communities. In post-war Lebanon, territorial segregation is maintained through a 
confessional stratification which affected the outreach of these associations.85 Though not 
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necessarily led by a religious or a confessional leader, these organizations cater to the 
needs of specific confessional communities.86  
These associations stand in stark opposition to associations that are spread 
throughout Lebanon, transcending confessional identities and addressing women’s social, 
political and economic needs. This is the case of the LWDG, LLWR, KAFA and CRTD-
A that will be discussed in the next sections.87 In fact, these few organizations working 
with and for women are barely represented in the LCW (Charani 1996). For KAFA and 
CRTD-A, it was a decision taken by the associational leaders themselves not to become 
part of the LCW due to its corporatist and elitist structure. On the other hand, the LLWR 
and LWDG, who joined the council before the war years and were active members 
between the early 1990s and 2000, have decided to step aside due to LCW’s institutional 
inefficiency and inability to meet basic women’s needs. 88 
It is also interesting to note that when the LCW board members were invited to 
describe the organizational structure of the council, grassroots advocacy women’s rights 
organizations that have set for themselves the objective to challenge the sectarian status 
quo are not only the fewest in numbers89 but also the last to be mentioned. This attests to 
the fact that the council does not set for itself the priority to amend the gendered laws or 
call into question the power of the sectarian leaders.  
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Moreover, “most of the sectarian political parties have entered the LCW under the 
pretext of their women’s committees.”90Amal, Hezbollah, Phalangists, PSP, SSNP 
women’s committees are active members in the LCW and have gained decision-making 
powers and some of them are represented in the LCW’s administrative committee.  
Hence, the LCW’s institutional structure which is infiltrated by sectarian and 
confessional-based organizations impedes the council from acting as a bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the state (Salloukh 2008) to defend the interests of women and to bring about 
positive change for them.  
On the other hand, the sectarian bylaws of the LCW also prohibit the council from 
acting as a counter-hegemonic society. As is the case for laws governing political 
representation, the electoral law in the LCW is underpinned by a quasi-sectarian system. 
Every four years, the presidency goes alternatively between Christians and Muslims 
(Osseiran 2006: 18). In this regard, confessional identity rather than merit is the main 
factor that determines electoral outcomes. Sometimes, the electoral process is subject to 
intrusion by sectarian leaders. Some argue that when Iqbal Doughan presented her 
candidacy in 2000, Bahia al Hariri, who had doubts concerning Doughan’s political 
stances, worked hard to support Doughan’s competitor Najwa Chaar, an issue that 
Doughan denies now that she is the staunchest defender and supporter of Hariri’s Future 
Movement.91 
The LCW structure increasingly led to the muting of the very few leftist, 
grassroots and progressive voices such as the LLWR and LWDG. The LCW presidency 
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became totally controlled by right-wing elitist women of Hariri’s Future movement92 or 
the Phalangists and consequently the 14 March93 alliance. As many argue, the 
aforementioned regional discrepancy debarred the 8 March alliance from making it to the 
presidency. 94   
However, the LCW tried to compensate for this by creating an administrative committee 
gathering 19 women from different confessional and political backgrounds. The current 
administrative committee includes representatives close to Hariri’s Future Movement, as 
well as representatives from Jumblat’s PSP and Hezbollah.95 Despite the political 
tensions that might ensue from this political diversity, these women made it a point that 
in cases of discord the administrative committee “democratically” decides based on a 
majority.  
These women adopt a non-confrontational stance vis-à-vis the political and 
confessional leadership. Hence, they have avoided raising the thorny issues whether 
through the administrative committee or their own associations. 96 
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This is clearly reflected in their project design, discourse towards the sectarian 
leaders and heads of confessions97, and articulation and perception of women’s rights in 
Lebanon. For instance, one of the administrative committee members insisted that the 
LCW’s success is mainly due to the fact that “women’s rights are apolitical!”98 Others 
pointed out that the most important challenge facing Lebanese women today is their 
underrepresentation in decision making positions, which is the main struggle for the 
LCW. 99 At the same time, the main issues of gendered discrimination are totally absent 
in the LCW’s discourse. Whenever the issue of the personal status laws is raised, the 
LCW administrative committee members argue that the LCW can not support this agenda 
as it risks dividing the council irreparably.100 Moreover, when public debate concerning 
the nationality law or domestic violence reached unprecedented heights, the LCW’s voice 
was totally muted.101 Thus, these women avoid antagonizing the sectarian leaders to 
preserve the hope of reaching decision making positions. Consequently, these women 
reinforce clientelism and sectarianism. 
Hence, the LCW is not a place where alternative forms of political mobilization 
take place rather the council is turned to a bourgeois women meeting place. The latter 
come together to organize a fundraising dinner and praise their social and professional 
achievements for sheer personal and political interests.102 In this regard, the council is 
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more of a showcase for many of these women who try to promote their “social work” for 
their underserved fellow women, and win their support on elections’ day. Almost all 
LCW presidents103 run for parliamentary elections. The current president, Aman Charani, 
ran for the elections in 2005 as a “representative of women’s organizations, unions and 
syndicates and the civil society at large”. Charani’s decision was influenced by “the 14th 
of March movement that called for equal opportunities” (CFUWI 2005: 3).  In this 
regard, these elitist women transformed the LCW into a rubber stamp body and ensured 
its compliance with their personal interests and those of their patrons, the heads of 
confessions and the sectarian ruling cartel.  
On the other hand, reformist associational leaders decided to step aside in the 
wake of Hariri’s assassination. According to Marie Debs, every aspect of the Lebanese 
political life was politicized including associational life. This discouraged reformists such 
as Linda Matar to run for LCW elections. According to Marie Debs: “this confessional 
schism makes it impossible for you to work and achieve something.”104 Moreover, 
Joumana Merhi, from the LWDG, explains that her association decided to withdraw its 
membership from the LCW administrative committee due to the fact that the council is 
unable to lead the change for Lebanese women.105  
The LCW case suggests that in the context of confessional and clientelistic 
politics, associations do not necessarily act as schools of civic virtue but rather attitudes 
and behaviors promoted by associational leaders will differ leading either to the 
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strengthening of the clientelistic and sectarian status quo or intensifying feelings of 
marginalization from the political regime.   
The National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) is another corporatist 
structure that warrants special attention. The Commission was established in compliance 
with the 1995 Beijing Conference resolution. However, it included in its membership a 
large body of women affiliated to the civil society sector (many of whom were active in 
the LCW). While setting for itself the objective of monitoring the implementation of 
CEDAW, the committee enjoys leeway in influencing public policy making and 
legislative amendments. In the NCLW a “troika” system was established whereby the 
first lady acts as the president of the commission, the wife of the speaker of the 
parliament and the wife of the prime minister act as vice-presidents. The appearance of 
the wives of presidents in this body cannot be translated as willingness to reform but 
rather an elite strategy to colonize the commission and obviate prospects for effective 
civic engagement that will call into question the power of the sectarian leaders.  
One associational leader in CRTD-A stated that this committee basically does 
nothing besides “presenting flowery reports to the UN on the developments achieved 
since Beijing.”106 Since its creation in 1996, the NCLW engaged in a project to train and 
place “gender focal points in every ministry. The latter have the right to inquire on 
specific issues related to women’s rights in the relevant ministries and to interact with the 
employees pointing to weaknesses and strengths with respect to gender issues.”107 
However, many argue that this project is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
gender mainstreaming. For instance, the UNDP suggests that work should become more 
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focused on training “heads of institutions, including ministers, general directors and 
heads of departments on the role that gender focal points play in promoting gender 
equality and development” (UNDP 2006: 53). 
This semi-official body also fails to fulfill its main objective, namely the “integration of 
the decisions that have been adopted by the CEDAW”108 into state policies.  Besides, a 
recent campaign for the adoption of a quota in the municipal elections and supporting 
women candidates as well as increasing women’s representation in the council of 
ministers109, this committee is almost totally absent from the advocacy scene.110  
When asked about the activities that they undertake to fulfill their overstated 
objective, NCLW’s executive director, Joumana Moufareg, makes the point that it has 
recently engaged in supporting KAFA’s domestic violence campaign. Even in this case, it 
remains of question whether support for the Domestic Violence law reflects an increased 
gender-sensitivity or pressure from the international funding community.111  
As for the nationality issue, the NCLW claims to work according to the CEDAW  
which stipulates that women should be awarded the right to pass on their 
nationality to their children. This is the background of our work. Lebanon voiced 
its reservations concerning the article which reads that Lebanese women should 
be awarded the right to pass on their nationality to their children and therefore 
there is no mention of husbands. It is against this background that we are working. 
We are saying that the law that applies to women should be the same one that 
applies to men... If there are particular concerns related to state policies then they 
should apply to both men and women. 112 
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As the aforementioned quote illustrates, NCLW leaders try to present their agenda 
as being in harmony with international conventions. However, this committee, which is 
appropriated by a sectarian troika, does not raise the nationality issue premised by the 
principle of full equality rather seeks to preserve the narrow interests of the sectarian 
ruling cartel. This has deep repercussions on families of mixed marriages as husbands are 
perpetually facing the threat of being expelled from the country.  At the same time, the 
NCLW repeated claims for their support for the civil code option remains in rhetoric. 
This is best epitomized by Moufareg who stated that the “the NCLW supports civil 
marriage but it has not yet proposed a new family law.”113 Consequently, the 
appropriation of the NCLW by the sectarian ruling cartel prevents the emergence of 
autonomous institutions and helps the sectarian elites to insulate themselves from any 
meaningful public accountability.114   
It is clear from the discussion that these corporatist and elitist structures are 
dominated by a small clique of women with strong family and ideological ties to the 
sectarian leadership and heads of confessions. Hence, these associations do not fit the 
counter-hegemonic Gramscian paradigm of civil society and have to a great extent 
mirrored the sectarian male-dominated political arena. Moreover, these structures act as 
rubber stamp bodies rather than accomplishing their stated objective namely empowering 
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voices of ordinary women and avoided to address issues such as domestic violence and personal status that 
called into question the power of the sectarian leaders (Bray Collins 2003).  
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women. While trying to project to the international community their adoption of a rights-
based discourse, these elitist women played an influential role in pushing ahead safe 
agendas, silencing grassroots women’s organizations and dividing the women’s 
movement.  
As it will be argued in the next sections and chapter, these women strengthened 
the hegemony of the sectarian leaders through their belief and support in the sectarian 
system. Instead of seeking political representation through a non-confessional electoral 
law, the aforementioned women lobbied for their inclusion into a sectarian system that 
feeds up on gendered discrimination. Driven by their sheer personal interests, these 
women made sure that whenever gender issues are raised, they do not antagonize or 
challenge their patrons namely heads of confessions and the sectarian ruling cartel.115 
 
Grassroots NGOs: Ageism, Personalism and Professionalism 
Grassroots women’s organizations are divided among those that are voluntary-
based and the modern professional associations with a small paid staff operating the daily 
routine of the association. Even in these grassroots associations, elements of authoritarian 
forms of power exist. 
The LLWR and LWDG fall under the first category, both established before the 
Lebanese civil war by leftist women. These associations are membership organizations 
with a general assembly and an administrative committee. Membership in these 
associations transcends confessional identities; however the general assemblies act as 
safety valves for the main leaders (usually the president and the vice president) who 
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sometimes hold their position in power for a lifetime. In fact, these associational leaders 
who devoted their lifetime for these issues have become involved in every aspect of their 
associations’ work. Linda Matar has been controlling the LLWR for more than thirty 
years; the late Waddad Chakhtoura headed the LWDG from the late 1980s until her death 
in 2009. 
An important discernible pattern in both organizations is the almost total absence 
of young women leaders.116 Young women are frustrated by the ageism that dominates 
the aforementioned women’s associations. They argue that the inclusion of young women 
has not been seen as a priority for the majority of these leaders despite the many benefits 
that this strategy brings to a marginalized group like women.117 “If feminist organizing is 
to be consistent with its principles of democracy, transformation and inclusion, then the 
inclusion of young women leaders should become a priority”(AWID 2005: 1). In the 
particular case of Lebanon this becomes even more important knowing that women face 
strong right-wing confessional forces that obstruct the advancement of women’s rights.  
Professional women’s organizations are quite different in their structures. 
However, personalistic styles of leadership also permeate these associations leading to 
rough battles over who heads the association and sometimes to deep schisms and the 
creation of parallel associations working in the same field of intervention. This is the 
particular case of LCRVAW where internal struggles forced a former president, Zoya 
Rouhana, to leave the association and establish KAFA. Ghida Anani, KAFA program 
coordinator, argues that the manipulation of the electoral process by some associational 
leaders marginalized Rouhana and brought Laura Spheir : 
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The LCRVAW, had two branches, they used one of the two branches, the one in 
Tripoli to recruit people and all of a sudden you had people from Tripoli filling 
the General Assembly, it was a clear tactic that she wanted to marginalize 
Zoya.118  
 
Instead of serving to consolidate institutional democracy, the elections are 
manipulated by associational leaders to consolidate their power and reproduce 
authoritarian forms of internal governance. This has encouraged KAFA to register itself 
as a CSO headed by a permanent executive director, Zoya Rouhana. By doing so, KAFA 
leaders avoided replicating the NGO model whereby rough battles emerge every now and 
then with the election of a new administrative committee. Although, this system 
consolidates authoritarian elements of power whereby one person will be leading the 
association for a lifetime, KAFA leaders argue that this strengthens institutional 
efficiency as they have all agreed “to continue with their work for their mission 
disregarding who is the president.”119 
Hence, in the newly formed professional NGOs, the real power lies in the hands 
of the executive director. This is particularly the case of KAFA and CRTD-A. They are 
both headed by two professional women who fit Hanafi’s globalized elites paradigm. 
These women “are informed by global agendas and are closely aligned with 
internationally endorsed development paradigms. They move within the space occupied 
by INGOs, and International women funds, attending global conferences and forming 
their own relations with international organizations” (Hanafi and Tabari 2004: 27). 
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Moreover and in both associations, young professional men120 and women are 
hired as full time staff to follow up the daily routine. These young professionals have 
found in these associations a place where they can pursue their struggles for equal rights 
but at the same time they can earn their living. In this regard, the NGO system mitigated 
a destabilizing economic-political situation for vulnerable sections of the working classes 
by providing new opportunities for the young generation, especially young women 
(Hatem 2005). These working women are usually professionals who received the 
appropriate training whether in their associations or elsewhere to carry the advocacy 
work by getting in contact with grassroots women, responding to their needs, building 
their capacities and mobilizing them for their cause, working extensively with the media, 
bringing the issue to public debate and monitoring the legal amendments with respect to 
their field of intervention. Although, this NGO system contributes to the mitigation of 
social distress felt by many women, it “also reinforced the historical pattern in which 
middle-class women maintained their power over working-class women, whom they 
were supposed to serve” (Ibid: 7). 
4.3.2 Empowering Women: Agendas, Beneficiaries and Donor Monies  
As argued in the sections above, women’s associations are almost totally 
dominated by middle class women. The question in theoretical terms would be whether 
these associations claiming to speak in the name of ordinary women are able to bridge the 
class gap and to link and aggregate poor women’s needs and interests (Waylen 1994; 
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2007). Hence, the challenge of reconciling different interests faces women NGOs in 
Lebanon.  
 
Top-down Forms of Organizing, Top-down Agendas  
Corporatist and elitist women have yet to address issues that are of particular 
interest to disadvantaged women. Elitist women in the LCW adopt a non-confrontational 
approach vis-à-vis the political leadership which is clearly reflected in their articulated 
stances and agendas. These elitist women are totally disconnected from the lives of 
underserved poor women, only address issues that award them prestige or allow them to 
enter the political arena. Hence, grassroots work is inexistent and mechanisms that 
empower women are absent. When asked about the main issues that they address to 
respond to women’s needs, the only issue that came to the fore was the organization of a 
“book fair” on International Women’s Day and their campaign for the adoption of the 
quota system in the parliamentary and municipal elections.121 Hence, these women 
campaigned for their inclusion into the sectarian system that feeds on gender 
discrimination.  
Not only the quota demand is elitist and is far from being a concern for 
underserved women who continue to suffer from gendered laws and socio-economic 
distress, but the way LCW and CFUWI raised these issues did not challenge the sectarian 
status quo. The rather worked to preserve it to access power positions.122 Two campaigns 
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clearly elucidate how these women strengthen the hegemony of the sectarian leaders 
through their belief and support in this sectarian system. 
The first was when the LCW headed by Charani launched a campaign asking the 
parliamentarians to appoint women from the “civil society sector” to ministerial positions 
in the 2009 cabinet. This raised the ire of many critics who argued that Charani was 
“asking to be appointed as a minister based on a sectarian quota and not even a gendered 
quota. Every sect will get its own share of the sectarian pie.”123  
The other example was when women’s organizations, corporatist (LCW) and 
grassroots women’s organizations (LLWR and LWDG), launched a campaign to award 
30% of the parliamentary seats for women based on proportional representation.124 In the 
wake of the Doha agreement, the LCW replaced the aforementioned law without 
consulting with other groups by a new one which stipulates that women would be 
awarded 10% of the lists based on the 1960 confessional law.  Hence women would be 
given 14 seats: 7 for Christians and 7 for Muslims and the distribution of the seats would 
be premised by narrow sectarian calculations which entailed studying the size of each 
electoral district to see whether or not they can ask for a women’s quota. This eventually 
leads to an overrepresentation of women in some electoral districts and among certain 
confessional communities and an underrepresentation among others. As Marie Debs 
notes “what do 10% do for you in a place like Koura where you have three seats? Since 
you can not give 10% in this district then they will tell you why are you represented here 
and not there?”125  
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Hence, the LLWR withdrew from the coalition and criticized the LCW waiver 
which did not only compromise the 30% quota awarded to women in all international 
agreements but most importantly it dropped the demand for proportional representation 
which “could not be compromised” for LLWR activists. This led one of the critics to 
argue that “civil society (LCW) is consolidating the legitimacy of the sectarian 
system.”126  
Moreover, women who make it to decision-making positions through a sectarian 
law have made it to the parliament through familial ties. This system contributes to 
women’s marginalization rather than empowerment. According to Joumana Merhi, 
LWDG president, women who will be able to make it through this sectarian-based law  
are representatives of their confessions and are going to be elected by their 
confessions, in this regard they will never support any reforms that challenge the 
authority of those who brought them to power. This is why in the context of a 
confessional law; gender-based agendas will never reach the parliament.127  
 
However that is not the only area where corporatist and elitist structures 
contributed to consolidate the status quo. In fact, whenever elitist structures raised issues 
that are of particular interest for ordinary women, these projects were not devised by 
local actors on a needs-based assessment rather they were parachuted by international aid 
agencies and executed by elitist organizations. 
By channeling funds to these elitist associations to train some women, publish 
few reports, organize few sessions in the villages, without ever challenging the sectarian 
status quo, funding agencies have contributed to drawing these elitist associations 
ideologically closer to the establishment. Through piecemeal achievements that are being 
applauded and supported by international aid agencies, these elitist associations are 
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further encouraged to avoid challenging the parameters of the pre-existing sectarian 
political order. 
 The structure of the projects implemented by the CFUWI provides valuable and 
fresh insight to this argument. While reviewing the CFUWI annual reports, one can not 
trace a particular strategy or a set of objectives that the association seeks to achieve; 
rather, donor priorities shape the CFUWI project strategy. The main concern of CFUWI 
is to sustain its “business” by securing funds for donors’ fashionable trends ranging from 
“the elimination of all forms of legal discrimination against women”, to “awareness 
raising among women on HIV” to “women’s political participation” to “awareness 
raising among young women leaders on political issues” to “making school curriculum 
and school teachers more gender sensitive” to “reforming the nationality law” to 
“fighting domestic violence” (CFUWI 2007 b). Among all NGOs examined, the CFUWI 
is the only one to receive conditioned funds from the Amideast/USAID (CFUWI 2007 b). 
However, the multitude of projects and aid assistance did not lead to women’s 
empowerment.  
The most blatant and recent example was when the UNDP channeled USD$ 
270.000 to the CFUWI to launch a campaign for the amendment of the nationality law. 
The grant was confined to a publication of a report to disseminate findings on “The 
Status of Lebanese Women Married to non-Nationals”,128 organizing seminars and 
meetings in the regions to teach “local civil society actors” the “ABCs of networking to 
amend the nationality law” and launching a media campaign with billboards and TV 
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spots costing a fortune.129 At the same time, in none of the demonstrations organized by 
the LLWR and CRTD-A, the CFUWI showed presence and in none of the cases the 
CFUWI engaged in the ongoing political debate concerning the nationality law. Even in 
the most intricate cases, when political leaders directly attacked them and described the 
campaign as a “foreign plot” aiming to tip the demographic balance in favor of the 
Muslim community, the CFUWI was keen to keep their mouth shut.130 Hence and while 
trying to project to the public opinion their preoccupation with research and training, the 
CFUWI avoided to engage in the political debate which is part and parcel of their non-
confrontational strategy towards sectarian leaders.131  
Moreover, these organizations are totally disaggregated from grassroots work. In 
fact, whenever they reached out to ordinary women, it was usually defined for the period 
needed to finalize the project implementation. Once the research, seminars and training 
sessions were executed, the CFUWI did not follow up with the constituencies and never 
saw back their workshop participants. Nayla al Masri, describes how these short-lived 
projects affected follow up with the communities and training recipients. She argues that 
she lost her job as the program manager for the CFUWI-UNDP nationality campaign due 
to the fact that the project was designed to extend over two years only:  
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I was working as a UNDP staff and now they terminated the contract. There is not 
any possibility for a follow up with those who received the training.132 
 
These workshops did little to bring community members together, in a forum that 
sustained the day-to-day interactions and provided space where citizens could learn from 
and work with one another. This is best captured in Nayla al Masri’s statement in which 
she declares that those who received the trainings on advocacy work have not met again 
and did not take part in any activity to promote the reform of the law in their villages.133  
On the other, the only contact that the CFUWI had with women married to non-nationals 
was when they were trying to use them as “test cases” to retrieve data concerning the 
CFUWI research study on the “Status of Women Married to Non-Nationals”.  
In this regard, the temporality of the projects and this short contact with the 
constituencies begs the question whether these associations are working to empower 
women and build the capacities of ordinary women or adopt certain agendas because they 
channel good money134 and award associational leaders’ prestige at the local and 
international levels. 
 
Grassroots Agendas: Limits of Social Justice and Gendered Equality  
On the other hand, grassroots organizations such as CRTD-A, LWDG, KAFA and 
LLWR provided platforms for civic engagement. These associations are managed and 
operated by middle-class women who exhibit a deep-seated belief in empowering 
women. In fact, these organizations target a wide variety of individuals in the immediate 
proximity of the association and in different regions throughout the country. Hence, their 
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targeting strategy transcends geographical, socio-economic and confessional boundaries. 
They also establish strong links with ordinary and underserved women. This is usually 
done either through their local centers that are spread in the most underserved regions and 
cater for the special needs of poor women or through the MOSA social development 
centers. In particular, KAFA, LWDG and CRTD-A have cooperated with the MOSA 
providing training sessions for social worker and equipped MOSA centers.135 For KAFA, 
this strategy helped them to reach out to the largest number of women by building the 
capacities of the MOSA centers thus creating sister teams that replicated KAFA’s 
methodology. At the same time, it spares KAFA administrative hurdles that might ensue 
from establishing and directly running different centers throughout the country.136  
These associations work towards social justice and gender equality which entails 
creating and sustaining spaces for direct field level action and grassroots interventions 
with women, action-oriented feminist research, debate, analysis, exchange and 
collaboration on issues of gender and development. Almost all of these organizations 
sought to achieve the over-stated objectives by designing and implementing training and 
capacity building programs, conducting research-based projects, building individual and 
organizational capacity, advocating for gender specific issues as well as working directly 
with the community level in project interventions that respond to the challenges of 
achieving gender equality. Hence, these associations seek to bring about positive change 
and transformation in gender relations within the household, the community as well as 
within the institutions of the state.   
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In this regard, the work is also informed by action-oriented research on a range of 
critical issues related to women’s rights to work on the ground helping women’s groups 
increase their opportunities and their participation in decisions that affect their lives. 
CRTD-A is a pioneer in the research field investigating hotly debated yet unaddressed 
issues such as women’s access to social entitlements (health, education and social safety) 
and the role of FBOs in shaping social policies in Lebanon and its impact on gender and 
citizenship. KAFA investigated an issue that continues to be deemed taboo, honor crimes 
in Lebanon. LWDG conducted research on women’s work and another one on domestic 
violence, whereas LLWR studied the problems of inter-confessional marriages, youth 
marriages, and assessed the illiteracy rate in the southern suburbs of Beirut.137 
All of these associations translate their commitment towards gender equality by 
focusing on lobbying and advocacy for the reform of the nationality law, domestic 
violence, adopting a civil marriage code (LLWR), reforming the penal codes and 
adopting a women’s quota in local elections. However it is worth noting that grassroots 
voluntary-based organizations and professional ones differ in their advocacy strategy. 
Whereas professional NGOs have focused more on enacting change in a particular area 
of discrimination, the others have sought to renegotiate the gendered order as a package 
deal (LLWR 2009).  
On another hand, the more professional organizations sought to get deeper into 
the particular cases of nationality law and domestic violence by creating special legal 
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units138 to get in touch with women affected by these laws. In these organizations the 
principle of service delivery also becomes tightly linked to the issue of empowerment. 
One good example is CRTD-A’s legal unit which aims to raise awareness among women 
affected by the nationality law. In addition to the provision of concrete solutions to a 
number of women whose citizenship rights have been denied, the legal unit investigates 
administrative hurdles facing women as a result of the violation of citizenship, establishes 
direct contacts with relevant authorities to communicate on critical issues and identifies 
mechanisms for accessing rights and mobilizes more women and men to take active part 
in the campaign providing testimonials for the media and for encounters with politicians 
(CRTD-A 2008 a: 11).  Hence, as Rola al Masri explains, “this legal service was more 
than just providing services; it was more of a raising awareness campaign among women 
on this issue: what does this law stipulate? What does it mean to marry a foreigner, 
etc?”139  Moreover and through this contact with specific cases, CRTD-A seeks to build 
the capacities of women affected by the law and support them in their struggle and public 
participation in the media.140  
On another level, KAFA sought to link the issue of advocacy with the psycho-social 
support that it provides for women victims of domestic violence. In this regard, KAFA 
headquarter operates a 24-hours hotline service and a listening and counseling center for 
victims of gender-based violence. The center “offers emergency case management, 
social, psychological and legal support services to the beneficiaries.  In addition to the 
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one-on-one support, KAFA conducts group therapy sessions to the beneficiaries of the 
center.”(KAFA 2009 b: 1) 
Moreover, these organizations also sought to address basic needs of underserved 
and poor women. CRTD-A, LWDG and LLWR worked to support poor women and 
therefore created jobs or alternative skills for members that helped generate income and 
empower them on the economic level. Moreover, through these programs; they created 
associational communities by forging common interests (CRTD-A 2007 a).  
CRTD-A’s “Gender, Economy and Trade” program is concerned with the 
structural causes of women’s poor participation in formal economies. In this regard, 
CRTD-A sought to generate money for redistributive purpose through marketing and 
selling produces by rural women cooperatives. In particular, CRTD-A is concerned with 
the invisibility, lack of recognition and poor value given to women’s household and 
reproductive work. CRTD-A seeks to promote local cooperatives’ produces through a 
shop in Beirut that facilitates access to sustainable local and regional markets; profiles 
and publicizes the work and products of the co-operatives; and mobilizes solidarity and 
support networks among women’s organizations to ensure their sustainability and 
promotes fair trade practices for women producers (Ibid).   
Through its six branches,141 LWDG reaches out to women and raises awareness 
on women’s rights, provides legal and psycho-social support to women victims of 
domestic violence, organizes sessions for adult literacy, and vocational training skills. 
However, skepticism looms large against LWDG activities due to the fact that they were 
labeled as communists who refused to submit to any sectarian political party. As Merhi 
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notes, “in each region we have an enemy because we are a civil organization, all of them 
are against us.”142 This is best epitomized by the fact that the LWDG, which used to 
provide vocational trainings, was fought in some areas by confessional factions who 
sought to provide similar services for cheaper prices to women (Bray Collins 2003). In a 
similar vein, the LLWR established centers in North and South Lebanon to provide 
vocational training services for women and has recently created a school in the Southern 
Suburbs of Beirut to eradicate illiteracy.   
Hence, these grassroots organizations fill the vacuum of an absent state and 
address the needs of the most underserved. These associations have become increasingly 
dependent on aid assistance except for the LLWR who took a clear position against the 
donor community. They accepted limited funds but the main work is operated on a 
voluntary-basis. According to LLWR associational leaders, the problem with the 
international aid is that it is spent everywhere with no efficiency: 
 
Every now and then you hear that there is a workshop here and seminar there. A 
lot of work being done through the EU or the USAID or UNDP; but I honestly 
prefer to establish real institutions with this huge amount of money. We are also 
not interested in taking the money that would tell you go do two-three workshops 
and then that is it. Get the high class women of the high society put them in a nice 
hotel.143  
  
However, that is not the only reason that the LLWR does not accept core funding 
for its projects. According to these associational leaders, money impacts activism and 
forms of mobilization. Hence the concept of mobilization for particular issues should not 
be underpinned by material rewards but rather by a real belief in the cause  
This money thing changes the way you perceive things. For instance when we 
mobilized women they often told us that they are being paid the transportation 
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fees to come to sit-ins. We told them you will come from Tripoli to Beirut and 
you will be paying because we do not have money! This is for you and not for us, 
we are happy to achieve equality. So you have to come and participate in the sit-
ins and pay the money. Last time, they said that they do not have money; we 
suggested to organize regional sit-ins … We do not want to transform people into 
beggars and we do not want their money as well.  
 
Others recognize that most of their work relies on funds from international aid 
agencies. The “fund hunt” is a common phenomenon among all grassroots women’s 
organizations whereby these associations engage in a perpetual fundraising quest to 
diversify their financial resources, pursue their projects, and run their administrative 
work. International NGOs (Oxfam Quebec, Oxfam GB, IDRC), Women funds (Global 
Fund for Women, Mama Cash, Kvina till Kvina), and embassies (Italian, Canadian, 
British) are among the main sources of funding for these associations. Some associational 
leaders had the courage to overtly state that their work is entirely based on external 
funding.144 Hence, the main impediment for these professionalized networks is the 
unpredictability of aid. This is mainly due to the fact that their advocacy work is led by 
paid staff rather than volunteers.  
As Zoya Rouhana, KAFA executive director, notes: 
We have a good funding status but if you reach a point where you can not pay the 
salaries of your employees who will do the follow up on a daily basis, 
communication, etc? Of course you will lag behind.145  
 
Moreover, these associational leaders recognize that their activism, which 
revolves around issues such as citizenship, women in development and women’s rights, 
discourses started to attract major funding. However they all claim to work with partners 
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who did not directly interfere with their own agendas and priorities and did not impose 
strict conditions on them.  
Interviewees from CRTD-A, KAFA, LWDG and the LLWR, expressed bitter 
feelings towards American funders come to the fore. KAFA recalls that at a time when 
the association was in a dire need for funds, associational leaders have turned down the 
US$ 60.000 grant because it imposed strict conditions with respect to beneficiaries.146  
On the other hand, CRTD-A’s al Masri recalls that one of the funders refused to support 
the economic empowerment program proposal which mentioned the word resistance: 
“You can see how the funding agencies intervene in the most intricate details of the 
program.”147 
Others, like Matar from the LLWR and Merhi from LWDG, viewed accepting US 
funding as akin to compliance with the American agenda and regional strategy:  
You have the MEPI with a project for the new Middle East. What Middle East are 
they talking about? They are steeling all its resources and then they come to make 
fun of us by giving us a US$ 5000 grant? Last year, we received a call for 
proposal from MEPI and we did not apply. The Americans have destroyed this 
region and stolen its resources and they propose a US$ 5000 grant? You also have 
this condition that grant recipients should not work with terrorist organizations. 
Explain to me, who is the terrorist?148 
 
Matar also recalls that Amideast’s Barbara Batlouni proposed a US$ 20.000 grant to 
LLWR. At that time, Matar did not know that the grant was a fund made by USAID. 
When print materials were finalized, Amideast imposed on LLWR to put the USAID 
logo. This raised the ire of Matar who immediately asked for the termination of the 
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contract and explained “the US was threatening to invade Iraq, an Arab country and Arab 
people and I take money from them, never.”149 
Associational leaders in KAFA and CRTD-A argue that they have accepted funds 
from different international foundations, NGOs, UN agencies and embassies yet their 
advocacy work is supported by small women organizations that help them pay the 
salaries for the campaigners.150 Associational leaders refer to this type of funding as 
being “core funding” or institutional support rather than being short-lived and project-
based. In fact, CRTD-A is keen to shield its work from big international aid agencies and 
embassies especially when it comes to the advocacy work. On the one hand, there are 
feelings among CRTD-A campaigners that whenever advocacy work is tied to big 
funders, it becomes immersed in the administrative work rather than real advocacy and 
lobbying. In this regard, the NGO becomes more of an executive agency for the funder. 
The funder wants to implement his agenda and therefore imposes on you to 
comply with certain deadlines, report regularly, organize activities, etc. This 
forces us to waist time and energy to fulfill his requirements.151 
 
This strategy is also underpinned by the fact that local actors are antagonized by the big 
funders who tend to project themselves as the ones triggering democratic transitions in 
this country rather than local actors.152   
They come as mentors to teach you how to work in your country, experts and etc. 
Perfect let it be , I will learn more from you but it does not have to be that you are 
taking our hands to teach us how to implement real development in our 
country.153 
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It is clear from the above discussion that grassroots organizations whether 
professional or voluntary-based have tried to create avenues to assess, reach out and 
address the basic needs of underserved women. Despite these praiseworthy efforts, they 
have failed to come together and act as a counter-hegemonic force against the sectarian 
status-quo. Hence, single-issue based associations with a limited constituency and 
number of supporters can not lead the change alone. 
On the one hand, these associations have tried to reach out to ordinary women yet 
they have not been successful in mobilizing women around interest-based agendas. In 
fact, these associations were not able to raise enough awareness among ordinary women 
on the inexorable relationship between sectarian politics and gendered discrimination. In 
this regard, women continue to be divided along sectarian lines.  
Two indicators elucidate this argument. On the one hand, the low number of 
participants who took part in the nationality demonstrations 154(CRTD-A 2007 a) 
compared to the relatively large numbers of women who took part in sectarian-based 
demonstrations. On the other hand, whenever these women participate in the nationality 
sit-ins, they will be sheering for their political patrons: Berri, Jumblat, Hariri, etc.155 
On another level, these associations were able to position themselves vis-à-vis the 
funding community. For those who rely on foreign funding there is a clear indication that 
not any type of foreign funding is acceptable and that funding supports the association in 
implementing its long-term objectives rather than the other way around. These 
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praiseworthy strategies stand in stark contradiction to elitist forms of organizing where 
some associations were formed due to the abundance of funding for gender-based 
agendas.  
However, funding structured the relationship between the grassroots women 
organizations to the extent that cooperation among these associations becomes almost 
impossible. This consequently impedes the formation of a counter-hegemonic non-
sectarian movement. In fact, international funding fomented competition between NGO 
directors especially between the professionalized sector and the old generation of 
women’s organizations. The former have successfully adopted the international advocacy 
and marketing trend and are therefore capable of making their voices heard by using 
modern tools. However, for some critics, these advocacy networks eclipsed grassroots 
leftist and voluntary-based associations.156 The latter relied more on direct contact and 
interaction with women and are driven by a political agenda which urged them to 
establish strong personal linkages with their constituencies. As one critic argues:  
Linda Matar does not know how to use modern tools despite the fact that none of 
them can beat her record in fighting for women’s rights. Nobody knows better 
than Linda Matar what women in Lebanon need to reach gender equity. 157  
 
On the other hand, professional associations criticize leftist grassroots 
organizations for their inability to update their leadership and their proclivity to project 
themselves as pioneers leading the change. Hence, grassroots leftist associations and 
professionalized NGOs failed to agree on common grounds and objectives, an issue that 
will be briefly discussed in the following section.  
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4.3.3 Social Capital: the Impossible Gramscian ‘War of Position’ 
It is clear from the discussion above that advocacy organizations are deeply 
divided and highly competitive representing conflicting ideologies and visions of 
women’s rights and forms of civic engagement. In this regard, prospects for successful 
cooperation among women’s associations are almost non-existent. Corporatism, ageism 
and personalism hindered the ability of women to form a counter-hegemonic society 
standing up against existing patriarchal and sectarian structures.  
On the one hand, grassroots leftist organizations entered into a collision course 
with corporatist structures whenever the issue of gendered quota was raised. The battle 
was mainly between those who seek to reform the electoral law and consequently the 
post-war hegemonic order (LLWR) and those who seek to preserve the status quo for 
sheer personal interests (LCW).  
On the other hand, the obsession of elitist leaders presiding over corporatist 
structures to promote themselves gained precedence over the issues addressed. For 
instance, when KAFA decided to organize the campaign “Lebanese Women against the 
Civil War”, which included all women NGOs, conflicts emerged when printing material 
for the campaign was being produced. As Anani from KAFA noted: 
Imagine that on the leaflet they did not want to put the name of the group 
“Lebanese Women against the Civil War”. They said we should have first the 
LCW which is the umbrella organization, then the CFUWI and then KAFA. 
Worst KAFA should come under the LCW and we are not even a member 
association in the LCW. 158 
 
Similarly, CRTD-A’s “My Nationality is a Right for me and my family” suffered from a 
deep schism mainly due to personalism and competition over funding. Albeit this case is 
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discussed in the next chapter, it is worth noting that donor’s agenda and the patronization 
of the CFUWI by donor’s money led to a duplication of work and deep schisms within 
the coalition. Moreover, the obsession of CFUWI to promote itself as the organization 
leading the reform of the nationality law divided the women’s movement irreparably. In 
fact, CRTD-A’s nationality campaign coordinator explains how this occurred when the 
Women’s Network, headed by Chakhtoura, launched the penal code campaign and the 
network fell apart mainly due to schisms within the nationality campaign.159  
At the same time, grassroots women’s organizations, namely the voluntary-based 
and the professional NGOs, could not agree over a common framework. The LLWR 
considers itself the oldest advocacy grassroots organization who does not accept to 
relinquish its position as the first one championing the reform of the gendered order. This 
became clear when Linda Matar and Marie Debs argued that LCRVAW’s and KAFA’s 
initiatives were born out of the LLWR. In fact the league has been among the first to 
launch the Arab Women’s Court in the 1990s in which women throughout the Arab 
world gathered to talk about forms of domestic violence that they have experienced at 
home. This initiative encouraged some activists to start their work on domestic violence 
by creating the LCRVAW (1997) and later on KAFA (2005). In this regard, the LLWR 
associational leaders argue that the initiative was born from the womb of the LLWR:  
We were the ones who started addressing the Domestic Violence issue and then 
some who worked with us left and are now managing their own associations. We 
are happy because they are doing a great job.160 
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Hence, LLWR associational leaders argue that their association was always the 
one to launch and advocate for these issues yet it was always eclipsed by professional 
organizations and even became a secondary actor on the scene.161  
In this regard, professional NGOs expressed their distress with the ageism and 
personalism of LLWR leaders “these women’s associations advocate for women’s rights 
but they are too old fashioned … they were not able to improve their work.”162 Whereas 
the latter argue that the NGOs professional structure impedes rather than leads to real 
reforms. Underpinning these statements are conflicting ideologies and visions of what 
civic engagement and advocacy work should look like. In fact, the associational leaders 
in the LLWR who rely extensively on voluntary-based work have clearly positioned 
themselves vis-à-vis the international lingo and the way it leads to the marginalization of 
political participation. As mentioned earlier, Marie Debs163 argued that the funding 
community altered democratic forms of civic participation by making people busy with 
narrow issues rather than engaging in a comprehensive socio-political agenda that leads 
to the renegotiation of the gendered order. According to Debs, these advocacy networks 
project themselves as the ones speaking for ordinary women which foments de-
mobilization and de-politicization: 
You can not fight for people’s rights; no one can. This is our principle. It is not 
through our political connections that they will be able to reach somewhere and 
gain their rights; but rather through their constant confrontation with the political 
leadership that they will be able to do so.164  
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Moreover, whenever cooperation between the like-minded professional sector 
(CRTD-A and KAFA) took place, it was almost ineffectual. The international lingo 
focused on “women’s empowerment” and the channeling of important amounts of funds 
to civil society turned these associations into professionalized institutions that are 
overwhelmed with the execution of projects that promoted their visibility and that of their 
funders with little or no efforts channeled towards coalition building and networking. As 
one critic eloquently stated: 
If these associations are working for the public good then they should and must 
engage with each others. However, the level of cooperation is very low. The main 
reason is that they are preoccupied with their own projects. When you come and 
propose to network with them, they will tell you, we are too busy. This is how 
civil society is fragmented and if this is the case then how you can go about 
change?  
 
This increased professionalism is reflected in the associational leaders’ discourse. 
In fact when asked about the other activities or programs that their associations undertake 
to empower women, KAFA and CRTD-A leaders made it a point that they are too 
consumed with their work whether on domestic violence or the nationality law.165  An 
associational leader from CRTD-A stated:  
At some point, even if you really believe in these issues and you feel that you 
want to provide support, the issue of how much time you can consecrate comes to 
the fore. So the first time you send a representative and the next time you send 
another one because the first one had probably left the association. That is not to 
forget about the fact that the work routine is so overwhelming.166 
 
Others argued that their association is keen to preserve their professional image in 
front of the funders and other civil society actors because they do not want to be labeled 
as those who work on everything:  
                                                
165
 Interview with Zoya Rouhana, Beirut, 8 January 2010. 
166
 Interview with Rola al Masri, Beirut, 22 January 2010. 
 131 
We do not say well this looks like violence so let us work on it, we do not work 
on political participation or economic empowerment. Our work should be focused 
on domestic violence only; we are part of the nationality campaign because we 
consider this as part of violence against women.167 
 
Among other issues, these quotes reflect to what extent these professionalized 
associations grasped and incorporated the process of “disassociation” in their work which 
hinders social cohesion and yields to fragmentation rather than movement formation.   
Hence, the experience of the Lebanese women’s movement is the anti-thesis of 
Putnam’s argument which stipulates that civil society activity leads to increased trust 
among individuals and enhances cooperative ventures in society at large. Distrust among 
women’s associations, especially between corporatist and grassroots organizations, looms 
large and low levels of social capital permeate all activities and projects that involve or 
address women in general. This has harmed the image of the women’s movement and 
reinforced the public stigma of Lebanese women being divided over their issues. 
Moreover, it fed into the interests of those who are most interested with women’s 
subordination namely confessional and sectarian elites. 
4.4 Women’s Associations, State institutions and the Sectarian Elites 
The following section investigates the relationship between women’s associations 
and state institutions in the clientelistic context of Lebanon. The way women leaders 
interact with their surrounding affects the patterns of civic engagement and support or 
lack thereof for democratic outcomes. Hence, the aim is to differentiate between, the 
patterns of civic engagement and the way this impacts their articulation of social policies 
and support or lack thereof for democratic outcomes.  
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4.4.1 Corporatist Structures: The Sectarian Cartel Clients 
Among all associations the LCW and the NCLW are the only ones to receive state 
funding. On the one hand, the NCLW, which is considered as a semi-official body 
receives yearly allowances from the council of ministers. Joumana Moufareg, NCLW 
executive director, states that “we are an official committee therefore we are linked to the 
council of ministers. The main operating budget is from the council of ministers and 
some agreements that we have with international funders.”168 In 1999, it was estimated 
that more than 500.000 USD are channeled from the council of ministers to the NCLW 
(CFUWI and LCW 1999:16).  
However if the NCLW is considered a semi-official institution entitled to state 
funds, it is quite unintelligible how an NGO like the LCW receives a yearly allowance 
from state ministries and a budget of 66.000 USD from the council of ministers.169 After 
all, LCW’s board of directors claims that the council is considered as the “national” 
umbrella association that warrants state support. In fact, the board of directors is keen to 
describe its relationship with state ministries as being a healthy and cooperative one.170 
“The LCW is considered as one of MOSA’s partners which are clearly translated in a 
symbolic yet yearly allowance provided to LCW. Moreover, the council received funds 
from the MOC in 2010 for the book fair.” 171  
However in the words of Sayyid (1993), civil society should be autonomous from the 
state and its arbitrary authority. As is the case for the rest of the Arab world, the Lebanese 
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government tightens its grip over the organizations that are supposed to provide space 
outside its reach (Abou Assi 2006). In the particular case of LCW, the state undermines 
the financial autonomy of the LCW by spending public monies on some associations 
dealing with educational, social and health fields.  
Whereas information concerning the beneficiaries of the council of ministers’ 
grant was not made available for the researcher, interviewees have made it a point that 
the LCW associations benefiting the most from these funds are the confessional-based 
associations enjoying good relationship with the sectarian elites.172 Hence and while 
receiving funds from state ministries, LCW associations have stood up against the state 
not to ask for the reform of the gendered laws but to oppose the state’s decision in cutting 
down their budgets.173 Only two years ago, former MOSA Mario Aoun decided to 
terminate the contracts between the MOSA and what he called “virtual associations” of 
which the LCW is one.174 However, LCW board members mobilized their political 
connections forcing Aoun to withdraw his proposition.  
Moreover, the LCW board of directors reiterates that the “only policy” that they 
would like to see changed is the introduction of a women’s quota in the parliament while 
forgetting about other laws that hinder prospects for real women’s empowerment.175 In 
this regard, these associations are not willing to serve as mechanisms of accountability 
and transparency, as a check on the ruling cartel, or even as a meaningful source of civic 
mobilization as it risks depriving them from state patronage.  
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 4.4.2 Grassroots: Between Pragmatism and Radicalism 
Associational leaders in KAFA, CRTD-A, and LWDG argued that the financial 
and human resources of the ministries (alluding mainly to the MOSA) fall short to meet 
basic women’s needs. Hence, NGOs emerged as the actors supporting the state ministries 
rather than the other way around. The lack of public funding for women’s rights issues 
forced associations to fill the gap of an absent state by training social workers in MOSA 
social development centers or by providing these centers with basic equipments. As one 
informant highlighted “there is no commitment from the state related to a gender-based 
violence budget. By the end of the day you feel that you are replacing the state. Whereas 
the state should make a plan and it should build centers and shelters for women victims of 
gender-based violence, this is something that they do not do. The state is becoming more 
of a burden to civil society.” 
This lack of public funding did not lead to a total independence from the sectarian 
cartel. In fact, these associational leaders were very much aware that their programs and 
agendas could not be implemented without the sectarian cartel’s consent. Hence, 
independent grassroots women NGOs were divided over this issue.  
Associational leaders in KAFA are pragmatically motivated. Despite the fact that 
they are not the staunchest supporters of the sectarian ruling cartel but, KAFA leaders 
realize that they were better off with the ruling cartel rather than being without them. In 
this regard, they have avoided antagonizing the sectarian elites and heads of confessions.  
On the other hand, the LWDG and CRTD-A refused to compromise their stances 
in order to facilitate the implementation of their programs, pass their laws or achieve 
material rewards. As Joumana Merhi recalls, the LWDG tried to initiate cooperation with 
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the MOE headed by former minister Bahia al Hariri. The program entailed raising 
awareness among public school students about early marriage, however Hariri refused. 
According to Merhi “this will be the case for every minister because we refuse to swear 
allegiance to anyone. We label ourselves as being part of an efficient opposition and not 
part of the 8 March popular opposition. Those who label themselves as being part of the 
opposition today are the other side of the same coin. They both have the same program 
for the country which is premised on sectarianism.”176  
CRTD-A campaigners are also among the staunchest critics of the sectarian ruling 
elites. As Rola al Masri explains, the guiding principle for CRTD-A is a rights-based 
discourse premised on the principle of full equality without reservations. This led CRTD-
A campaigners to launch a full-fledged war against sectarian leaders who could not 
translate their promises concerning the amendment of the nationality law.177 As Rola al 
Masri notes: 
On the political level, we expressed our distress towards the deceiving politicians 
no matter in which camp they were … we named the things by their names and 
accused the leaders of being liars. In June we issued a press release in which we 
stated that those were your political stands and now this is what you are saying. 
Most of them, with the exception of two, Na’mat Allah Abi Nasser and Fouad 
Saad bluntly expressed that they were against the law. 178 
 
On another level, the appointment of Ziad Baroud, former lawyer of CRTD-A’s 
nationality campaign, brought attention to the nationality issue. However, CRTD-A is 
keen to avoid being totally co-opted by the minister’s propositions whenever the latter 
did not reflect full-fledged equality. As Rola al Masri stated: “we supported whenever we 
felt that we should support and opposed whenever we felt that it was necessary… We 
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never fully agreed with him.”179 CRTD-A, as it will be argued in the next chapter, 
continues to adopt a rights-based discourse, one which refuses any law that is not 
premised on the principle of equality.  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter advanced a multi-level analysis of the failure of the women’s 
movement to launch a counter-hegemonic movement against the post-war gendered 
order. Confessionalism, clientelism and international aid hindered women's movement 
from launching its ‘war of position’ against the post-war hegemonic order.  
In particular this chapter investigated the impact of international aid agencies on 
women’s agendas. With the globalized trend of advocacy networks and the increased 
dependence of local actors on foreign funding, international agencies shaped gender-
based civic engagement, agendas and policy outcomes. By reviewing policy texts, this 
chapter proved that funding agencies focus on providing technical quick-fix solutions 
rather than negotiating the gender order towards inclusive forms of citizenship for 
women. Moreover, aid assistance strengthens sectarian and corporatist structures. The 
latter marginalized and silenced the grassroots women’s organizations.  
On the other hand, the political context polarized associational life into two 
different civic spaces: corporatist and elitist structures with strong political ties to the 
sectarian ruling cartel and grassroots women’s organizing who adopted different stances 
vis-à-vis the ruling cartel. The former are part and parcel of the establishment. Their 
structures are either permeated by sectarian and confessional based organizations (LCW) 
or headed by a troika of first ladies (NCLW). These associations adopted a non-
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confrontational approach towards the political leadership and failed to articulate ordinary 
women’s interests. Their belief in the sectarian and clientelistic system hindered the 
ability of the women’s movement to form a counter-hegemonic society. 
On another level, the more independent women’s organizations failed to launch a 
Gramscian ‘war of position’. In fact, the polarization of the grassroots sector between the 
voluntary-based associations and the professional NGOs impeded prospects for 
cooperative ventures and gender-based reforms. Despite the fact that these organizations 
addressed different women’s needs, they failed to unify their claims and demands due to 
personality conflicts and generational problems. Moreover, the transformation of 
advocacy work from one premised by voluntary-based work towards one led by 
professional staff, weakens cooperative ventures even among the like-minded. Funds 
transformed the civil society sector into professional organizations that are overwhelmed 
with the execution of projects with little stakes in movement formation. 
With this background, the next chapter analyzes the political debate around the 
Nationality campaign, the Personal status Laws and Child Custody, and The Campaign to 
eliminate all forms of violence against women. The discussion sheds light on the course 
of the political debate to show how law is transformed into a major instrument seeking 
social order that serves to protect the interests of the sectarian leaders and heads of 
confessions and consequently maintains the formal and informal pillars of political 
power. 
 138 
CHAPTER FIVE  
NEGOTIATING EQUAL CITIZENSHIP IN A SECTARIAN 
CONTEXT 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter sets out to prove how struggles for domination over state power play 
a key role in defining sectarian elite strategies and policies vis-à-vis women and their 
agendas (Charrad 2000). Hence, the focus of the chapter is on the way the sectarian 
context shapes patterns of civic engagement and gender social policy outcomes. In the 
highly fragmented context of Lebanon, citizens’ political participation can only take 
place through access to strongmen. In the context of weak state institutions, even the 
most independent NGOs need the sectarian cartel’s consent to their programs and 
agendas. 
As it will be argued, these patterns of civic engagement do not serve to 
consolidate democracy or yield to women’s empowerment. Rather they are turned into 
instruments to strengthen the patronage and sectarian hegemony of the ruling cartel. In 
particular, the course of the political debate over each agenda provides valuable insight 
on political contestation and prospects for legal reforms in a sectarian context. It will 
therefore become clear that these hotly debated topics are held hostage to conflicts of 
interests among a highly fragmented sectarian cartel and the broader politics of 
compromises and alliances between heads of confessions and the ruling cartel. In such 
contexts, legal reforms are prevented from ensuring social justice and equality for women 
and their families whenever they challenge the underlying assumptions of the precarious 
power sharing agreement and the patriarchal alliances that cement this hegemonic 
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system. Hence, through various means, the sectarian cartel compromise women’s rights 
to consolidate the formal and informal pillars of political power, namely confessionalism 
and clientelism. 
Grassroots demands are not only fought by sectarian elites and heads of 
confessions but elitist organizations also play a key role in obviating prospects for the 
renegotiation of the post-war gender order. The appropriation and co-optation of some 
women’s organization by the ruling cartel led to a situation where compromises over 
women’s issues take place in the same arena that is supposed to provide alternative forms 
of organizing to the sectarian system, namely civil society.  These associations’ support 
and belief in the sectarian system foments the subordination of women. Their non-
confrontational approach, the dissemination of non-democratic values strengthens the 
hegemony of the sectarian cartel rather than reflect women’s interests and needs. Their 
attempts to divide the women’s movement and to silence grassroots women are all 
indicative of their attempts to serve the interests of their patrons in undermining prospects 
for full-fledged reform of the post-war gendered order.  
At the same time, grassroots associations were not able to agree on a common 
framework. Ageism, personalistic styles of leadership, and conflicting ideologies over 
what constitutes civic engagement also impedes prospects for the emergence of a 
counter-hegemonic movement thus fomenting the image of women being divided. This 
fed into the interests of those who have the greatest interest in women’s subordination.  
This chapter examines the impact of each of the aforementioned factors on civic 
engagement and social policy outcomes for the Nationality Campaign, the Personal 
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Status Laws and Child Custody Campaign and the ‘National Campaign to eliminate all 
forms of violence against women’.  
5.2 Negotiating Equal Citizenship: Mission Impossible 
5.2.1 Sectarian Politics, a Divided Women’s Movement and a Nationality Law in a 
Gridlock 
The following section sheds light on the political debate that evolved around the 
nationality campaign. The course of the debate from its inception provides valuable 
insight on political contestation and law-making in Lebanon’s sectarian context. But first, 
the analysis opens with a discussion about the schisms in the women’s advocacy 
community leading the nationality campaign.  
 
Three Campaigns and the Impossible ‘War of Position’ 
Women’s right to pass their nationality became an issue of public debate in 
Lebanon due to the large attention that CRTD-A’s campaign, “My Nationality is a Right 
for Me and My Family” received in the media and in public discourse. In 2002, CRTD-A, 
supported by UNDP-POGAR, conducted a study on the aspects of gendered 
discrimination in Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen. The 
research findings led CRTD-A to the conclusion that the nationality issue was never 
formally addressed by women’s associations in the aforementioned countries. In 
Lebanon, besides a memorandum sent by Laure Moughayzel in 1994 to the parliament, 
the nationality issue never figured in associational programs and agendas. This compelled 
CRTD-A to address the gendered provisions of the nationality law. 180  
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Regional partners were invited to conduct a study to assess the status of women 
married to non-nationals and a legal review shedding light on the gendered provisions in 
the nationality laws. With the research and documentation phase drawing to an end, 
CRTD-A presented the findings to Lebanese women’s associations and invited them to 
reflect on prospects for their potential cooperation in the awareness raising and lobbying 
process.181   
Almost all of the Lebanese women’s associations agreed to join the CRTD-A 
coalition. The latter held meetings and followed a collective decision-making process.182  
However in June 2005, the League for Lebanese Women’s Rights broke away from the 
CRTD-A coalition and launched a parallel nationality campaign. The LLWR demand is 
consonant with Article 9 of CEDAW which stipulates that women should be awarded the 
right to pass their nationality to their children only. Linda Matar and Marie Debs, from 
LLWR, argue that their demand is easier to achieve since husbands need a naturalization 
decree whereas newborns are stateless and therefore in dire need for their mother’s 
nationality. 183 However, this radical feminism overlooks the fact that the 1925 nationality 
law gives Lebanese men the right to pass their nationality to their non-national spouses 
which devoid the LLWR argument from its content. On another level, the LLWR demand 
withstands prospects for maintaining family cohesion as men will continue to face the 
risk of being expelled from the country. For CRTD-A campaigners, the LLWR demand is 
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an unjustifiable compromise that seeks to achieve whatever can be achieved in the 
sectarian context of Lebanon.184 
Others explain the schism by personalistic styles of leadership that have been 
briefly discussed in the previous chapter. In this regard, conflicts over who started to 
address the nationality issue first and who claim the success for her own can come to the 
fore thus leading to rivalry, competition and duplication of work.185 Yet despite the 
schism, CRTD-A pursued the activities aimed at closing the gender gap by raising 
awareness on this issue, increasing effective communication with decision-makers and 
the media and gathering public and political support for the amendment of the nationality 
law.  
In April 2008, another schism occurred in the ranks of the same coalition. UNDP 
(Lebanon) invited women’s organizations for a meeting to study prospects of cooperation 
concerning its “newly” launched project: “Women's Right to Nationality in Lebanon.” 186 
The US$ 270,000 project did not complement CRTD-A’s work, it rather reiterated the 
same objectives that had been accomplished.187 Lina Abu Habib, CRTD-A’s executive 
director, argued that the new project fails to respond to pressing local needs which were 
focused on lobbying and advocacy rather than research and training on advocacy. 188    
Besides the work duplication, UNDP succeeded in fomenting the schism in the 
women’s movement. This has been ensured through the delegation of the coordination 
and execution of the project to the CFUWI at a time when it was clear that the CFUWI 
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was part and parcel of the CRTD-A campaign. This competition over funding provided 
fertile ground for the UNDP to spoil the divisions in the women’s movement and 
promote itself as the one championing the reform of the gendered laws. For Rola al 
Masri, this is not new for the UNDP who is trying to project itself as a mentor teaching 
local actors, state and civil society actors, the basic principles of local development in 
their country.189 The CFUWI was not only patronized by UNDP funds but it also 
managed to patronize other associations by channeling small amounts of funds. In this 
regard, the LWDG, the LWC and the LCRVAW have all left the CRTD-A coalition and 
joined the UNDP-CFUWI. This work duplication led to an awkward situation that 
confused public opinion and those who followed up on the campaign’s activities. At a 
time when the newspapers covered about a sit-in organized by CRTD-A or a press release 
issued in response to some politician’s statement concerning this issue, the CFUWI was 
holding a workshop on “how to partner with the media.” 190 
All of these factors challenged the ability of grassroots organizations to launch a 
Gramscian ‘war of position’ against the sectarian ruling cartel. This schism promoted the 
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image of the coalition as divided and strengthened the stigma of women’s associations as 
unable to cooperate together. Moreover, it fed into the interests of those who are most 
concerned with women’s subordination, namely sectarian leaders. 
However, this is not the only factor that hindered prospects for women to amend 
the nationality law. I argued in Chapter 3 that women’s right to nationality is a highly 
politicized issue. The declared position is that women will continue to be denied this 
basic human right to ward off prospects of Palestinian resettlement.  By doing so, the 
Lebanese state claims to defend the Palestinian right to return to their homeland. 
However, this policy plays a central role in sustaining the political aspirations of the 
sectarian leadership in a country where political representation is premised on the 
demographic weight of the legally recognized confessional groups. In particular, since 
the greatest majority of the Palestinians are Sunnis the denial of women’s right to 
nationality is thought to preserve the confessional demographic balance. However, these 
racist arguments do not only deny those who are most in need of the nationality, namely 
stateless people, from their basic human rights, it also harms the image of Lebanese 
women. In particular, it depicts women’s wombs as Trojan horses that can easily be 
abused by “stateless” people to circumvent the Lebanese constitution.  
The following section takes issue with the political debate that evolved around the 
amendment of the nationality law. The course of the political debate from its inception 
provides valuable insight on political contestation and law-making in a sectarian context.  
The political debate sheds light on the way “policies on women’s rights are held hostage 
to broader conflicts and alliances. They become the outcomes and sometimes a tool of 
struggle among social and political groups fighting over state power” (Charrad 2000: 
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241).  Hence, women’s rights agendas are used as an effective instrument by sectarian 
leaders to check the power of political rivals. In the particular case of the nationality, the 
issue was turned into a showdown between Muslim parliamentarians who supported this 
claim as they think it bolsters their demographic weight and therefore their claims for 
increased political representation in the sectarian political system and a Christian 
Maronite leadership who saw in the law a threat that would tip the balance in favor of the 
Sunni community and deprive them of equitable representation, thus fomenting post-war 
feelings of Maronite marginalization. Moreover, the analysis of the political debate over 
the nationality law and the judicial practices, privileges the interests of sectarian leaders 
and the “super-citizens”, the confessional communities, over women’s interests. 
 
Sectarian Myths, Confessional Demographics: The Nationality Law in a Gridlock  
The nationality case provides valuable insight on how the political system shapes 
patterns of civic engagement and social policy outcomes. In the highly fragmented 
context of Lebanon, citizens’ political participation can only take place through access to 
the strongmen. With the weakening of state institutions, the non-clientelistic grassroots 
NGOs needed the sectarian leaders’ consent to their proposed laws. In this regard, 
CRTD-A campaigners started to address heads of the main parliamentary blocs in order 
to gather their support for the amended nationality law.  
Muslim political blocs, namely Amal, Hezbollah, and the Future Movement, 
showed considerable support. For instance, Fouad al Seniora and Bahia al Hariri stated 
that they fully support what they called a “basic human right” and refused to present or 
even vote in favor of a law excluding Palestinians. Moreover, speaker of parliament 
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Nabih Berri, expressed full support and requested to put the issue on the parliament’s 
agenda. Even Hezbollah, which is stigmatized as holding a conservative stance vis-à-vis 
women, declared through his former minister Mohammad Fneish, its full support for this 
claim and refused any forms of discriminatory laws. Moreover, MP Walid Jumblat 
confirmed that all ministers and parliament members of the Progressive Socialist Party 
will vote in favor of the draft law (CRTD-A 2009). 191 
On the other hand, the Maronite leadership adopted a rights-based discourse, one 
that projected women’s right as apolitical on the eve of heated parliamentary elections. In 
this regard, some sectarian leaders started to project the issue of women’s right to 
nationality as a human right that should be disaggregated from the naturalization of 
Palestinians. The first statements made by MP Michel Aoun to the campaigners 
concerning this issue provide fresh insight on this argument: “we should differentiate 
between human and women’s rights and the ongoing political debate concerning the 
Palestinian refugees.”192 Aoun’s statements gave hope to the campaigners despite the fact 
that some FPM parliamentarians refused any law that paved the way for women married 
to Palestinians or other Arab nationals to pass their nationalities to their husbands and 
children. In February 2009, Gilberte Zouein heading the Women and Children 
parliamentary committee presented a law premised on: 1) the exclusion of Palestinians 
under the pretext that it would undermine their right to return to their homeland; 2) and 
the principle of “reciprocity” which predicates this right based on the nationality of the 
spouse (rather than women’s rights). Critics argue that if the “reciprocity” principle is 
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applied it would mostly affect women married to men from the developing world who are 
currently suffering the most from the discriminatory nationality law.193  
In a similar vein, the Lebanese Forces avoided to declare their real stances to the 
campaigners. According to Roula al Masri, Strida Jajjaa told them that the “LF is not 
against women’s rights but that the issue is politically charged.” 194 Furthermore, she 
referred them to Minister of Justice Ibrahim Najjar who was deemed more capable of 
expressing the LF’s stance knowing that he is an expert in this field and among the first 
veterans to work on the amendment of the nationality law. However, Najjar reiterated 
Jaajaa’s words and advised the campaigners to take Strida Jaajaa’s opinion again.195 The 
LF did not only avoid declaring its position but LF leaders also made up a sectarian myth 
to project themselves as the ones championing for women’s rights versus a Muslim 
(namely Shiite) bloc trying to keep women in a submissive position. These sectarian 
myths echo the 14 of March successful electoral campaign in which they accused 
conservative Muslims (alluding to Hezbollah) of trying to Islamize the country. For 
instance, one of the journalists asked Ibrahim Najjar about his reluctance to submit his 
own version of the law. The latter pretended that the conservatism of Muslim 
parliamentarians and ministers discouraged him to do so 
He said that Muslims are not with gender equality and therefore they do not want 
a law that gives women their equal rights. The reason that we all know is that the 
Christians oppose Palestinian resettlement. Christians pretend that the Muslims do 
not want to achieve gender equality just to avoid saying that the Christians do not 
want Muslims to outnumber them. Now, this is a big lie and we all know it.196  
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Attempts to present Lebanese women’s right to nationality as apolitical was an 
elite strategy used against campaigners to give the impression that they had won the 
ruling cartel’s consent. By doing so, the sectarian leaders avoided antagonizing the 
women’s electorate who constitute the majority of voters. The battle over who wins 
women’s vote on election’s day and its centrality for the highly competitive (especially 
Christian) leadership was clearly reflected in the billboard wars as elections drew 
closer.197  
CRTD-A campaigners were thus given the impression that the issue would be 
addressed during the last session of the post-Doha Seniora cabinet. However, Baroud 
presented two contradictory nationality laws to Seniora. The two versions carrying 
contradictory stances, discrimination and equality, reflected the ambiguity of Lebanese 
politics. The first version gave women their right to pass their nationality premised on the 
principle of constitutional equality (Article 7), whereas the second version deprived 
women married to stateless men (alluding to Palestinians in the first place) premised on 
Lebanon’s anti-settlement policies. Baroud thus left for the Council of Ministers the 
freedom of choice between the two versions. 
In this regard, Baroud who was part and parcel of CRTD-A’s “My Nationality” 
campaign did not push the reforms of the law forward. Rather he compromised his 
reformist stances for the sake of taming the fears of the sectarian (in this case Christian) 
communities in Lebanon. In fact, Ziad Baroud had drafted CRTD-A’s amended 
nationality law and a legal study. The co-optation of the MOI by the sectarian system de-
radicalized his stances and guaranteed his entrance once again in the Hariri cabinet, with 
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the blessing and the consent of the non-democratic forces in power. This proves that the 
sectarian system shapes values that do not yield to democratic consolidation but rather 
strengthen sectarian hegemony.  
In Baroud’s proposition, the racist stipulations encoded in the law received the 
constitutional legitimacy just like Palestinian anti-resettlement policies. More 
importantly, the two contradictory laws divided the women’s movement irreparably. 
Whereas CRTD-A expressed in a press release that “any nationality law that comes with 
exceptions is unconstitutional,”198 as it contravenes Article 7 of the Lebanese 
constitution, the CFUWI-UNDP led coalition did not react to the issue. However, Leila al 
Ali reveals that the latter supported what she calls negative discrimination, meaning 
discrimination against women married to Palestinian men: 
These associations were from the very beginning championing this issue even if 
they did not overtly declare it …The first draft law that they presented reflects this 
stance and if you enter in a debate with them they will immediately draw back to 
their initial positions.199 
 
Moreover Baroud’s bill dealt with all stateless cases as leading to the definite 
resettlement of Palestinians. What if the father is not a Palestinian, why would these 
people be deprived of their right to the nationality under the pretext of “naturalization”? 
Is it only because they are stateless? And if this is the case, are not stateless people the 
most in need for a nationality? Hence, the law confirms once again that the Lebanese 
official policy is to punish those who do not have a state as they represent a “threat” to 
national security simply because they are the ones in dire need for a nationality.200  
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  Baroud’s proposal was the biggest carrot for a deeply divided elite waiting for the 
ripe moment to start overtly expressing their instinctive fears concerning the confessional 
imbalance. The MOI thus opened a Pandora’s Box in front of the sectarian leaders and 
the latter shifted from soft opposition towards bolder and more radical stances. Hence, 
their rights-based discourse gave way to statements that depicted women as second class 
citizens and the nationality issue as leading to the “naturalization of Palestinians” which 
“overburdens a small limited resources country” with “non-Christian communities.” 201 
Moreover, Baroud’s unjustified move gave the best pretext for Seniora to 
disregard the issue on the eve of heated parliamentary elections. It was clear for Seniora 
that the amendment of the law needs to be traded with the FPM’s demand for the 
naturalization of Lebanese immigrants.202 Although Aoun did not declare it for CRTD-A 
campaigners, but it became clear that Aoun would only agree to amend the nationality 
law if Lebanese immigrants are naturalized “because he believes that the FPM has a good 
number of supporters among them.”203 While trying to run away from his responsibilities, 
Seniora denied receiving any law from the MOI; whereas the latter proved that he sent it 
and Seniora refused to endorse it.204 Hence, policies on women’s basic rights are held 
hostage to the broader political conflicts among the sectarian ruling cartel. 
This raised the ire of CRTD-A campaigners who held a press conference in which 
they launched a full-fledged war against the Janus-faced sectarian leaders who failed to 
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implement what they had promised concerning the amendment of the nationality law.205 
At the same time, they called Lebanese citizens and women to use their voting right 
appropriately. Unfortunately, Lebanese women who continue to be divided along 
confessional lines contributed to the reproduction of the same clientelistic and sectarian 
ruling cartel whose legitimacy hinges on the perpetuation of gendered discrimination.206 
This shows that women’s social movements have yet to successfully mobilize people for 
particular societal interests transcending sectarian identities and interests.207  
However, only one man, Judge John al Azzi made a politically conscious decision. 208 In 
fact, Azzi ruled in favor of a Lebanese widow, Samira Soueidan, thus giving her the right 
to confer the Lebanese nationality to her minor children. Azzi’s reading was based on 
Article 7 of the Lebanese constitution and Article 4 of the current nationality law which 
gives a non-national wife of a Lebanese man the right to pass the Lebanese nationality to 
her children if her husband passes away. It was illogical for Azzi to give this right for a 
“naturalized” woman and stubbornly deny it for Lebanese women. Azzi thus translated 
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the aspirations of the civil society campaigners at a time when political leadership failed 
to do so.  
Most importantly, Azzi’s decision challenged the traditional functions of the 
judicial system that serves the interests of the ruling cartel and consolidates their 
hegemony. In fact, the reactions of PM Fouad Saad and MOJ Ibrahim Najjar, prove the 
latter. Saad immediately deemed Azzi’s decision as illegal since it contravenes the 
Lebanese nationality law.209 Imbued with patriarchal and sexist connotations, Saad’s 
argument did not only refute Azzi’s rule as it contravenes the gendered Lebanese 
nationality law but it was also a warning to other judges who may follow Azzi’s lead by 
challenging their traditional positions as “servants” for the sectarian political system.   
These warnings were followed by coercive measures against Azzi, who 
considered himself to be part and parcel of CRTD-A’s nationality campaign.210 Azzi was 
referred to a disciplinary council because he defied the common perception of the judge 
as making decisions consonant with the wishes of the sectarian cartel. 
 Moreover, MOJ Ibrahim Najjar was quick to state that the judgments from the Mount 
Lebanon Court of First Instance should be appealed by the Cassation Court. This 
demonstrates how sectarian leaders politicize the judiciary to serve their narrow sectarian 
interests and obviate prospects for social justice.  
In the particular case of the Mount Lebanon Court, the Cassation Court left for the 
Court of First Instance the discretion to make binding judgments. This makes Azzi’s rule 
legal and final. Moreover in these cases, the only body that can appeal the rule is nothing 
but the Higher Legal Committee (hayat al kadaya) and the latter should seek the approval 
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of the specialized ministry. For cases involving the nationality law, the Higher Legal 
Committee (hayat al kadaya) must solicit approval from the ministry of interior and not 
the ministry of justice. In this regard, it was Baroud’s final decision on this issue that 
determined if Azzi’s rule should be appealed. The Minister of Interior declared that he 
supports Azzi, however he once again avoided confrontations with the sectarian cartel 
and kept his commitment to social justice only rhetorical. One journalist suggests that 
Baroud could have stopped the court’s appeal but he did not, claiming that the latter did 
not send him an official letter seeking his opinion on this matter.211 The Higher Legal 
Committee surrendered to Najjar’s pressure and ended up appealing the rule. Hence, state 
institutions and apparatuses thus failed to give Soueidan a basic right. 212 
The battle over the nationality law continued under the national unity government 
of Said al Hariri. Interior Minister Baroud disseminated information that within the 
council of ministers, which includes two women, only him and minister of information 
Tareq Mitiri acknowledged the need to amend the nationality law. The CRTD-A 
executive director also declared on a TV interview, that one of the female ministers 
confirmed that she supports the principle of reciprocity.213 When the ministerial statement 
came out, Minister Jebran Bassil overtly stated that the nationality issue and the 
resistance were the most hotly debated topics. Concerning the nationality issue, Bassil 
stated that “it is not the ripe moment to discuss it as it steers the debate towards 
Palestinian resettlement which is a red line.”214 Hence, the new cabinet was committed to 
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implement the UNSCR 1701, yet it failed to fully implement international conventions 
such as the CEDAW that guaranteed gender equality. 
Whereas Bassil closed the door for any discussion concerning the amendment of 
the nationality law, the publication of the UNDP parallel campaign turned the nationality 
issue into a showdown between Hariri and FPM (represented by Abi Nasser). Based on 
the UNDP study, eighteen thousand marriages were contracted between Lebanese women 
and non-Lebanese men between 1995 and 2008. The study shows that 8.2% of Muslim 
women married non-Lebanese men and 2% of Christian women married non-Lebanese 
men. Sunni women rank first with 51.5% of Sunni women married to non-nationals; 
whereas only 1% of Maronite women are married to non-nationals (Charafeddine 2009: 
17-18). Moreover, the statistics showed that Syrians, followed by Palestinians, constitute 
the majority of husbands married to Lebanese women (Ibid: 20).  Hence, the study was 
counter-productive in the sense that it confirmed the fears of the sectarian ruling cartel. 
Influenced by these findings, that favored the Sunni community, the Sunni prime minister 
declared from Paris in March 2010 his commitment to amend the nationality law.215 
Though Hariri was trying to present himself as a defender of women’s rights, the timing 
of the declaration confirms that it was motivated by narrow sectarian considerations. 
With the UNDP billboard invasion and statements made by Hariri, Abi Naser 
came out to express the instinctive fears of the Maronite leadership with respect to the 
nationailty issue. As a start, Abi Nasser accused the campaigners of compliying with the 
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west. Thus when the goals of the funding community are at odds with the sectarian ruling 
cartel, the latter accused the recipient organizations of complicity with external actors 
leading to logical discrepancy. That sectarian leaders accuse civil society organizations of 
complicity with the west is astounding given that the western countries finace through 
international aid and the renewal and consolidation of sectarian patronage networks.  
Abi Nasser also proposes a “Green card” and defended his project by invoking 
contradictory arguments. On the one hand, he argued that the country is small and 
overpopulated and that its limited resources can not meet the increasing needs of its 
growing population. This makes the amendment of the nationality law almost impossible. 
At the same time, he staunchly defended the right of Lebanese emigrants to reclaim their 
nationality by invoking a sexist argument, one that predicates this right on paternal blood 
linkage. Abi Nasser defends his argument saying that: “descendants of Lebanese origin 
are not granted Lebanese citizenship, but are restoring the nationality of their fathers and 
grandfathers, and this is a right that they should earn by virtue of paternal blood linkage. 
It is not a favor conferred to them by anyone.”216 Moreover, Abi Nasser overtly declared 
that any amendment to the nationality law tips the balance in favor of the Muslim 
communities.217  
These contradictory stances are clearly exhibited in Abi Nasser’s Green Card 
project. The so-called Green Card denies political rights for children and husbands, and 
awards them civil rights provided that Lebanese in the husband’s country of origin 
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receive similar treatment. These conditions are also impossible to meet in any other 
country around the world. Moreover, the proposed law imposes strict conditions on the 
married couple, thus alluding once again that women’s wombs can be used to circumvent 
the law.218 
Baroud, who used to be the staunchest proponent and an eloquent speaker on behalf of 
the nationality campaign, concluded that it is “a thorny issue and at the heart of political 
life” (CRTD-A, February 16 2010). He thus issued an amendment to ministerial decree 
No. 10/955 that awards a free three years residency permit for husbands and children. By 
doing so, Baroud tried to tame women and campaigners by overcoming the paralyzing 
elements of sectarian politics.219 However, without a law premised on the principle of full 
equality, women married to non-nationals continue to be punished for their choices in a 
country that claims to be a pioneer in the Arab world supporting freedom of choice and 
belief. Their children and husbands continue to be treated as strangers and face a set of 
restricted policies and administrative hurdles.220 In a country where political 
representation is premised on the demographic weight of confessions, the legal system 
does not serve to protect individual human rights. It is rather turned into a tool that 
privileges the interests of sectarian leaders and their confessional constituencies. 
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5.2.2 The Personal Status Laws and Child Custody 
Despite the blatant forms of discrimination encoded in the personal status laws, 
calls for reforming these gendered laws in the post-war period have not yet emanated 
from the women’s advocacy community. This stands in stark contradiction to the pre-war 
years, when leftist women’s organizations, namely the LWDG and the LLWR, advocated 
for a civil code of marriage, part and parcel of a wider political agenda that called for the 
establishment of a secular Lebanon. The current talk about the personal status law has 
been confined to rhetoric rather than anything else. In other words, LWDG and LLWR 
actions have yet to challenge decision-makers by mobilizing supporters among which is a 
large number of youth organizations who endorse the claim.221  
In the context of confessional and clientelistic politics, associations do not act as 
schools of civic virtue. Whenever associational leaders are not co-opted by the patronage 
networks of the ruling cartel, feelings of marginalization from the political regime 
dominate with deep implications to the democratizing potentials of civil society. These 
feelings of marginalization are best epitomized by Joumana Merhi, president of the 
LWDG : 
You can not abolish gendered laws in a confessional state without having a 
democratic social movement calling for the separation of “Church” and “State”. 
In my opinion, this is a great barrier; the democratic movement totally 
disappeared. It is immobile and unable to make any movement. As an association, 
we are part of this movement that is suffocated. We are seeing no possibility to 
change anything as long as the political system is premised by sectarianism. 
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In Lebanon’s modern history, it was the LNM (Lebanese National Movement) 
who first called for the adoption of an optional civil marriage code and in the post-war 
period, it was former president Elias al Hrawi who adopted the same agenda. Although, 
Hrawi’s proposal was supported by a coalition of intellectuals and civil society activists, 
women’s organizations were totally absent. In fact, the only time that women took to the 
streets for this issue, they were fought by the sectarian ruling cartel, the heads of 
confessions and corporatist organizations in the good graces of the government.  
In September 2000, the LECRVAW, emulating the Women’s World March, 
gathered women’s associations in a demonstration calling for the adoption of an optional 
civil marriage law (Bray Collins 2003: 112-113). Participating associations were all 
invited to discuss prospects for their cooperation. However, this approach did not work 
well for all NGOs. The current president of the LWDG recalls this event with dismay: 
“the LCW withdrew their participation at the last minute.”222 
In fact, on the day of the march, both the Hariri Foundation and the Lebanese 
Women Council withdrew claiming that “the march’s demands challenged the traditions 
of Lebanese society” (Bray Collins 2003: 113). Doughan, the LCW president at the time, 
claimed that the structure of the LCW, which includes confessional organizations and 
women’s committees from the sectarian political parties, impedes the adoption of a civil 
marriage proposal by the LCW as it risks dividing the “national umbrella” 
organization.223 Furthermore, she added that Islamists organizations (alluding to 
Hezbollah) within the LCW will never accept an optional civil marriage code. However, 
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this obscures how the Sunni Mufti and the Prime have both pressured her to withdraw 
from the march.  
In fact, some argue that Mufti Mohammad Qabani overtly instructed Doughan to 
withdraw, as if the council was only made of Sunni organizations (Bray Collins 2003: 
114). On the other hand, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, through his foundation, exerted 
pressure by withdrawing the Hariri Foundation’s participation on the last minute and 
divided the women’s movement thus reinforcing the public stigma of women NGOs as 
unable to form a women’s movement (Ibid).  
Few years later, Doughan came to the conclusion that women “are being tortured 
in the personal status laws.” 224 This made her launch the reform of the child custody law 
for the Sunni Community. However, it is worth noting that the campaign was launched 
by a Sunni women and a supporter of the Future movement. Moreover, the same woman 
wanted to run for the parliamentary elections with Hariri; she was not among the lucky 
ones to be nominated however.225 In this regard, the issue of child custody for the Sunni 
community is a showcase for the associational leader, who sought to expand her popular 
base thinking that this may serve her one day to secure her entrance to the political arena.  
When asked why she decided to address this issue, Doughan argues that:  
They (political and religious leaders) will not accept a civil code for marriages not 
even an optional one. Women are humiliated in the personal status laws. We said 
let us eliminate forms of gendered discrimination in these religious laws. So we 
started with the child custody.226  
 
Through her political ties to the Sunni leadership and her support for the Future 
Movement, her proposal won the support of the former Prime Minister Seniora as well as 
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Mufti Qabani. In February 2009, Mufti Qabani as well as the Supreme Judicial Council 
approved the amendment of Article 242 of the Sunni Code. The main stipulation of the 
amendment was to increase the age of child custody to 13 years for males and 15 years 
for females rather than 7 years for males, and 9 years for females. After much lobbying, 
the Higher Judicial Council as well as the Mufti sent the draft law to the council of 
ministers. The prime minister, who had failed to implement pressing women’s demands 
as outlined in the aforementioned sections, supported the only issue that served to bolster 
the interests of his Sunni community: 
Seniora helped us a lot to pursue our mission; he immediately issued a ministerial 
decree, sent it to Suleiman for signature and then back to the parliament.227  
 
However, when Berri sent the law to the Administration and Justice Committee, 
the law was put on hold by a Future Movement MP, Samir al Jesser. The latter blocked 
the bill for a whole year, only to present in March 2010 a draft bill that overturned the 
amendments proposed by the Working Women’s league.228 In fact, Jesser’s political 
legitimacy rested on his ability to represent the Salfi movement in the North. Hence, his 
opposition to the proposed law reflects a desire to co-opt the Sunni Salfi movement, an 
essential element for his sectarian legitimacy. “He is patriarchal and he mobilized the 
Salfi movement against us,” states Doughan.229 
Jesser’s position shows that sectarian leaders strengthen their hegemony and legitimacy 
through the perpetuation of a gendered discriminatory discourse that reflects their 
alliances with conservative forces in society who provide them with the basis of political 
power.  
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5.2.3 ‘Towards the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence’ 
The protection of women from domestic violence has always been a thorny issue 
as it touches to the private sphere, and the rights of state and religion to intervene in this 
domain. As argued in the third chapter, all issues related to the private family domain are 
delegated to religious courts in Lebanon. In this regard, domestic violence and personal 
status laws intertwine. In fact, a civil code for domestic violence calls into question the 
legitimacy that has been conferred on religious leaders to mitigate disputes at the family 
level. A civil code that criminalizes domestic violence raises the question concerning 
man’s control over his wife and family.230 It also might yield to legitimating woman’s 
right to divorce her husband in cases of blatant violence exerted on her, and to protect 
and win guardianship over her children in such extreme cases. 
In Lebanon, the debate over domestic violence gained momentum with Lebanon’s 
participation in the 1996 Beijing conference. Some argue that when domestic violence 
was tabled for discussion, there were voices within the Lebanese delegation seeking to 
avoid addressing this issue. At that time, the NCLW, which brought together first ladies 
of the republic, argued that “it was only a problem in the west” (Bray Collins 2003: 95). 
These statements reflected the pressure exerted by heads of confessions over the NCLW 
to drop this sensitive issue. Moreover, corporatist structures supported the stances of the 
women’s “troika”. Aman Charani, then president of the LCW and the head of the NGO 
committee (CFUWI), was quoted saying that both the NGO committee and the NCLW 
“did not want to put themselves in a position to offend or challenge confessional leaders” 
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(Ibid). Hence, this elitist non-confrontational approach silenced grassroots’ women 
demands. 
However, the issue of gender-based violence became a top priority for 
international aid agencies who pledged to double their support for anti-domestic violence 
campaigns and activities (AWID 2008). This signaled a shift in the stance of corporatist 
and elitist organizations vis-à-vis this issue. In fact, the NCLW is today among the 
staunchest supporters of the civil code to eliminate all forms of violence against 
women.231 This local and international interest was also compound with increased 
grassroots activism. In fact, many civil society activists who worked since Beijing to 
mitigate the effects of the domestic violence for victims started to move beyond service 
provision towards the legislation of a law to that protects women from family violence. 
This has been the focus of KAFA, a civil society organization founded by a number of 
activists who have been working through the LECRVAW on the issue of Gender Based 
Violence.  
In 2007, KAFA gathered a team of three judges (John al Azzi, Helene Eskandar, Joelle 
Fawwaz), two KAFA lawyers (Danielle Hoayeck and Layla Awada) and a representative 
from the internal security forces (Major General Elie Asmar) to draft the law. In March 
2008, the campaign “Towards the protection of women from domestic violence” was 
launched paving the way for a number of associations to come together under the 
umbrella of the “National Coalition for Legislating the protection of women from family 
violence”. The coalition, as the name indicates, brought together women’s organizations, 
Palestinian women’s rights associations (The Forum of Palestinian Women in Lebanon), 
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religious-based associations (the Sisters of Good Shepherd), sectarian-based associations 
(Hariri and Rene Mouawad Foundation), associations dealing with the Physical 
Handicapped (LPHU), youth associations and associations for Lesbians and Gays rights 
(Helem). In other words, it transcended confessional boundaries and included 
representatives not only from women’s organizations but also from other underserved 
groups in Lebanon such as Palestinian refugees, handicapped, youth, and homosexuals. It 
was hoped that the wider the framework, the wider the range of disadvantaged people 
being involved in the coalition and the greater the impact. A KAFA campaigner argues 
that this is one of the advantages of the domestic violence coalition: 
It was not purely feminist. There are youth, Palestinian, and development-driven 
associations, etc.  Domestic violence was not developed into a feminist issue. We 
are adamant to present it as a public development issue that touches on public 
health. That is what makes us successful and capable to convince the religious 
leaders.232 
 
KAFA organized a round table for partners in May 2008 whereby every 
participating association was invited to present remarks concerning the draft law. For the 
president of the LWDG, the issue of domestic violence should not have been 
disaggregated from the personal status laws since the latter governs the domestic sphere 
and sanctions man’s control over women. 
As much as the Domestic violence law is strong, what makes it stronger is that it 
can be supported by a civil code for personal status. This consecrates equality 
between men and women, husbands and wives. In this regard, we worked with the 
coalition but we warned them that at some point they will enter into a collision 
course with the personal status laws and this is what happened.233  
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In a similar vein, the director of Al Najdeh association, Leila al Ali, states that it 
is important to address the issue of domestic violence but what is more important is to 
address the violence practiced against women in the legal system:   
How can you talk about peace and security for women if by the end of the day 
there is clear violence exerted against them in the laws? GBV can not be 
eradicated if we do not look at it from a wider perspective and the central issue in 
Lebanon is the adoption of a civil code for personal status.234  
 
A lawyer and civil society activist also declared that it would have been more 
appropriate to present a family law that addresses the needs of women and their children 
all together rather than a law that protects women only.235 Despite these criticisms, 
KAFA’s choice was to focus on domestic violence alone. This attests to the fact that the 
sectarian politics shape civic engagement in a way that strengthens the legitimacy of the 
sectarian and confessional leaders at the expense of democracy and social justice. The de-
radicalization of an independent women’s rights organization, such as KAFA, is a 
consequence of the post-war sectarian politics and its limited openness to political debate. 
In fact, the aforementioned cases attest to the high levels of anxiety that women’s rights 
agendas trigger among sectarian and confessional leaders and how the latter impede 
reforms that undermine their sectarian hegemony or challenge confessional structures. 
All of these factors discouraged a secular independent organization such as KAFA to take 
into consideration the aforementioned remarks and address the domestic violence and 
personal status laws in a package deal. In this regard, KAFA’s ideas and discourse 
avoided promoting a counter-hegemonic society, one that challenges the parameters of 
the pre-existing socio-political order. Through their recognition of the confessional 
leaders’ prerogratives and their adoption of a non-confrontational approach, KAFA 
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indirectly strengthened the hegemony of the sectarian leaders and the heads of 
confessions. This is best captured by Zoya Rouhana who overtly declares that KAFA’s 
strategy was “to avoid challenging the prerogatives of the religious leaders with respect 
to religious and confessional courts.”236   
On the other hand, the KAFA case shows how citizens’ political participation in a 
sectarian context only takes place through sectarian elites. In the particular case of 
KAFA, it is quite interesting to see how the latter won support for their bill by building 
connections with the women’s committees in the sectarian political parties. In fact, 
among all campaigns KAFA was the only one to involve these committees in the 
lobbying and advocacy process. In this regard, KAFA’s strategy was to dissipate fears 
among sectarian leaders concerning domestic violence by training and raising awareness 
among women in sectarian political parties. By proving to these women, that the law does 
not challenge the personal status laws and consequently the hegemony of the sectarian 
cartel, KAFA built partnership with the sectarian political parties and won their support 
through these women’s committees.237 Moreover, these women committees acted as 
mobilizing structures in the sense that they drew popular support from their confessional 
communities to the domestic violence law: 
They were present in all popular events that we have organized with the 
parliamentarians and in all workshops, they came as representatives from their 
own parties, they were present and also brought people with them … We expect 
that the cooperation deepens. If this year we have a sit-in in front of the 
parliament or in front of the presidential palace and since the channels of 
communication are still open maybe we can feel their impact more. As a first step 
we sought to raise awareness on the issues of women’s rights and domestic 
violence because they are not so much aware of it.238 
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KAFA’s move proves that in a sectarian context,  a secular civil society sector 
underpinned by an interest-based agenda can not lead the change alone. The associational 
network that KAFA created became a representative mechanism that transmits the 
interests of the popular classes into the policy making arena. In this regard, this network 
might not have led to the consolidation of democracy per se but it has definetly led to less 
rigid inequality (Chamlers 1997). This combination of secular associational leaders from 
the civil society sector with representatives from the sectarian political parties “in an 
unstable, informal, yet salient network structure was therefore capable to promote 
incremental policy change within a context of a highly fragmented and exclusionary 
institutional context” (Kingston 2008: 11). However, the political success is conditioned 
by the principle of non-confrontational approach with the sectarian leaders. Hence, it is 
highly doubtful that these networks succeed in cases where the issues raised challenge the 
legitimacy of the ruling cartel, as is the case with the personal status laws and the 
nationality law. 
The disagragation of the domestic violence law from the personal status laws 
facilitated its approval by Hariri’s cabinet in April 2010, but it did not totally shield the 
law from political and religious intervention. In fact, during the last session of the Seniora 
Cabinet, the KAFA law was the first issue to be discussed yet it was not endorsed by the 
Parliament. Interestingly, the factions who opposed the amendement of the nationality 
law, the LF and FPM, emerged as the most avid supporters for the domestic violence bill. 
This shows how the imperative of competing for female votes in a parliamentarian 
system urges the sectarian leaders to endorse some gender agendas that do not challenge 
the interests of their sectarian communities as well as their sectarian hegemony. Their 
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moderation should be understood in light of their attempt to compete effectively for votes 
from the female electorate rather than an adoption of more progressive stances. In this 
regard the MOJ Ibrahim Najjar and MP Gilberte Zouein both played a key role in 
gathering support for the KAFA law. Heading the Women and Children Parliamentary 
Committee, Zouein adopted the law and discussed it thoroughly with her colleagues. 
Moreover, she overtly declared that the committee was ready to take the necessary action 
and present the law to the parliament if the cabinet fails to do so. 239 
On the other hand, Shiite ministers who supported the nationality campaign were 
slowing down the final ratification of the domestic violence law. For instance, 
Mohammad Fneish, stressed that the draft law “needs further discussion”. In a similar 
vein, Ibrahim Shams al-Din, stated that the law needs to be reviewed as it might 
contradict with some articles in the religious personal status laws and that it is 
“incomplete in its current form, and needs to be reformulated more precisely so that it 
does not contradict with other effective laws.”240  Rouhana and Anani argue that these 
ministers did not give KAFA campaigners appointments to discuss the law. According to 
Rouhana:  
One of the ministers who opposed the law was given the draft bill 8 months ahead 
of time and we could not get any appointments. Saying that they did not have 
enough time to study it is only a pretext to obviate its final ratification.241  
 
On the other hand, a journalist who investigated this issue suggests that it was 
KAFA who avoided visiting the aforementioned ministers because they were afraid from 
their reactions: 
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When I went to talk to the two ministers, they told me that they needed time to 
read the law because they received it two days before the council of ministers was 
convened and that they did not have enough time to read it…Nobody gave it to 
them.242  
 
In the mean time, victims of GBV continued to suffer. The Seniora cabinet 
decided to form a ministerial committee that “will take into account the views of the 
religious courts and re-draft the law so that it becomes more consonant with the religious 
codes’ terms of reference.”243 Ironically, the ministerial committee headed by 
Shamseddine, was made up of ministers visited by KAFA and who had declared their full 
support for the law including Ibrahim al-Najjar, Bahia Hariri, Khaled Qabbani and Mario 
Aoun.244 The committee presented the law to heads of confessions and recorded their 
remarks with respect to the law. When KAFA campaigners were asked about the main 
reservations that were voiced by heads of confessions, they refused to answer, as if 
KAFA was afraid to antagonize heads of confessions. Rouhana noted that she can not 
overtly talk about the issue publicly:245 
A religious leader, like everyone else, is part of this society. His stances depend 
on his background and the extent to which he carries with him this patriarchal 
mentality or on the other hand supports notions of human rights. In this regard, 
dealing with the issue of domestic violence becomes subject to the personal 
background. 
 
Despite the many attempts by KAFA leaders to present the remarks of the heads 
of confessions as “cosmetic”, these reservations underscore that gender policy in 
Lebanon is held hostage to the broader alliances linking political leaders to heads of 
confessions. As argued in the third chapter, the sectarian ruling cartel engaged in political 
actions and policies that extended their sectarian hegemony and protected confessional 
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structures that provided them with the basis of their political power. For instance, Article 
26 of the KAFA law was modified so that it reads “all terms and provisions contradicting 
this law shall be canceled except those that fall under the jurisdiction of the religious 
courts.”246Moreover, the phraseology was altered in some paragraphs of the law based on 
the advice of heads of confessions. Marital rape was omitted from the texts, to be 
replaced by marital coercion. Confessional leaders also objected to the article which 
stipulates that anyone who witnesses a case of DV is entitled to report without the 
consent of the victim. An associational leader argues that KAFA campaigners have 
fought to reinstate this clause:  
The philosophy of the DV law is to make the issue a concern for the whole family 
not just for women. If the woman is beaten she will not be conscious enough to 
pick up the phone and report. We also know that sometimes women under 
pressure might back up from reporting.247 
  
With the integration of these “cosmetic” amendments, the Hariri cabinet finally 
approved the domestic violence law in April 2010 and transferred it to the parliament for 
final ratification. In this regard, KAFA has made a breakthrough in mitigating the pain 
that a lot of Lebanese women from different confessional backgrounds continue to face in 
the domestic sphere. However, these praiseworthy efforts were not enough for many 
critics who continue to argue that this law “sooths the pain but it does not heal the 
disease. A religious-based law continues to haunt Lebanese women and without a civil 
code option, women will never feel fully empowered.” 248  
                                                
246
 Ibid 
247
 Interview with Ghida Anani, Beirut, 17 February 2010. 
248
 Linda Matar quoted in Faten Kobeissi, “Injaz lam Yasbak Mithlouhou Matheel”, al-Safir, 7 April 2010. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter argues that the struggles for the reform of the gendered order are 
compromised for the sake of extending the sectarian hegemony of the ruling cartel and 
preserving the interests of their allies namely the heads of confessions. In particular, the 
course of the political debate proves how law in a sectarian context, does not serve to 
protect individual human rights rather is turned into an instrument that protects the 
interests of the powerful sectarian leaders and the “super-citizens”, confessional 
communities.  
Moreover, the discussion in this chapter shows how state and civil society fail to 
act as platforms for citizens where they can claim their rights and hold sectarian leaders 
accountable. The chapter argued that compromises over women’s rights are taking place 
at the civil society level. Corporatist associations contributed to divide and silence the 
grassroots women’s movement in Lebanon. Moreover, citizens’ political participation 
takes place through sectarian leaders who are only willing to support and represent 
particular agendas that do not challenge their hegemony and their patronage networks 
with deep implications on democratic consolidation and women’s interests and needs. In 
this regard, women’s rights agenda continue to be held hostage of a system premised by 
patriarchal coalitions that bring together those who have the highest stakes in 
subordinating women. Hence, women’s rights are sometimes utilized to preserve the 
precarious sectarian system, protect the interest of heads of confessions and in most of 
the cases; they are compromised to achieve narrow sectarian interests.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 General Conclusions and Findings 
 
This thesis analyzed the impact of women’s advocacy organizations on patterns of 
civic engagement and gender social policy outcomes in Lebanon’s sectarian context.  
Four explanatory variables were advanced to study the utility of women NGOs in 
postwar Lebanon and their ability to reform the post-war gendered order: postwar state-
society relations, donor agendas and money, women’s advocacy community institutional 
makeup and their relationship with the sectarian elites, and the latter’s strategies towards 
women’s advocacy community and their agendas. 
One of the central questions was why some associations successfully engaged the 
state in gender-based reforms while others failed to do so. This thesis argued that the fate 
of gendered laws is shaped by the nature of state-society relations and the degree of 
autonomy or embeddedness of states in societies. In Lebanon, gendered laws are held 
hostage to the precarious power sharing agreement and the patriarchal coalitions linking 
sectarian elites to heads of confessions and kinsmen. The latter acted as mobilizing and 
legitimating forces and therefore provided ruling elites with a basis for political power. 
Gendered laws protected the interests of these patriarchal structures and were used by 
sectarian elites as an efficient instrument to extend their hegemony and legitimate their 
rule. In this regard, the issue of women’s rights in Lebanon is not only a feminist agenda. 
Rather it calls into question the power relations in Lebanon and intertwines with broader 
concepts of equality, citizenship and human rights all of which have been manipulated by 
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the sectarian elites in their quest for political legitimacy. Hence, the renegotiation of the 
gendered order leads to the democratization of the political system which makes gender-
based reforms a Herculean task.  
This centrality of the gender order to the reproduction of clientelistism and 
sectarianism raised the stakes for sectarian elites to neutralize prospects for gender social 
policy reforms.  In fact, the close examination of the women’s movement in Lebanon 
sheds light on the dynamics of sectarian upgrading. In this regard, this thesis debunks the 
political cultural myth stipulating that the Arab-Muslim culture and mindset is 
incompatible with democracy and that primordial sectarian identities fueled violence and 
instability, thus prohibiting prospects for democratization in Lebanon. Rather, this thesis 
shows that democracy’s failure in Lebanon is shaped by the nature of state-society 
relations. In particular, sectarian leaders who invaded state institutions engineered 
successful strategies to upgrade and maintain their rule and impede prospects for 
democratic consolidation and gender social policy reforms.  
This includes the appropriation of the NCLW and the co-optation of the LCW by 
the sectarian cartel and their confessional organizations. Moreover, the ruling elite 
channeled considerable amounts of money to these associations thus jeopardizing their 
financial autonomy. Through these strategies, the sectarian ruling elites insulated 
themselves from public accountability and transformed civil society into an arena where 
compromises over women’s rights take place and where sectarian hegemony is 
consolidated.  
Another elite strategy was to impede gender-based social policy reforms by 
mobilizing heads of confessions against women and their agendas. In this regard, this 
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thesis exposed the dynamic and inexorable relationship linking sectarian elites to 
religious heads of confessions. Confessional ties are therefore dynamic, structured, 
mobilized and influenced by the interests of the sectarian ruling elites rather than being 
static and primordial. This demonstrates how heads of confessions strengthen the 
sectarian hegemony of the ruling elites without leading to positive social policy changes 
for women. Mutual empowerment of the sectarian elites and heads of confessions 
happened in ways that were destructive for women. 
Gender social policies are also held hostage to the politics of sectarian 
fragmentation and contestation. In particular, gendered laws are turned into an efficient 
instrument used by sectarian leaders to check the power of rivals and bolster their 
position among their sectarian constituencies. Hence and whenever a sectarian political 
faction provided representation and support for the amendment of the gendered 
provisions in one area, it was usually perceived as a challenge to the power of other 
sectarian leaders and their confessional constituencies. In this regard, Saad al Hariri’s 
support for the nationality law can not be viewed as an increased commitment for gender 
equality rather an attempt to bolster the demographic weight of his Sunni community and 
their claims for political participation in the sectarian political system.  
Moreover, the civil marriage bill turned into a showdown between a weak Maronite 
president that epitomized feelings of “resentment” with respect to the post-war political 
order and a powerful Sunni Prime Minister. Thus, gender social policies are the outcome 
and sometimes a tool of struggle among social and political groups fighting over state 
power.  
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In this deeply fragmented context that rests on the perpetuation of a gendered 
sectarian discourse, civic groups seeking gender equality and a greater democratization of 
the system are only allowed to raise issues that consolidate or, at best, fail to challenge 
the hegemony of the sectarian ruling cartel and their allies. This explains the passing of 
the domestic violence law and the rejection of the personal status and nationality law. 
The domestic violence bill does not challenge the heads of confessions and the 
legitimating sectarian myth of the sectarian elites. On the other hand, the nationality law 
and personal status remain in a gridlock as long as these laws sustain the aspirations of 
the sectarian leaders. 
The broader implication is that the renegotiation of the post-war gender order in 
the sectarian context of Lebanon does not serve to protect individual human rights in 
general and women’s rights in particular. Rather it is turned into an instrument that serves 
the interests of the sectarian leaders and the “super citizens”, namely confessional 
communities. Hence, the persistence of non-democratic sectarian and clientelistic 
processes in Lebanon has less to do with culture and tradition than with the political 
elite’s desire to preserve its rule.  
This thesis also investigated the way institutions trump civil societies and 
reproduce their own images. Hence, the interactions of women’s organizations with the 
sectarian and clientelistic system influence associational leaders’ attitudes and shape 
patterns of democratic political participation. Subordinate classes and factions, as in the 
case of women, may support the maintenance of the political system. Hence, this system 
does not only foment the marginalization and oppression of a subordinate group like 
women, the latter also contribute to cement rulers’ hegemony through their belief and 
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participation in this oppressive system (Ibid). These patterns of civic engagement greatly 
influence the health of democracy. Attitudes generated through civic participation in a 
clientelistic and sectarian context like Lebanon consolidate rather than undermine the 
status quo. Hence, this thesis provides a broader perception of sectarian hegemony which 
moves beyond the socio-economic dimension to shed light on its ideological dimension. 
This precludes women’s movement from acting as a cohesive counter-hegemonic 
movement capable of launching a successful Gramscian ‘war of position’ against the 
sectarian elites. Civil society is no longer perceived as an arena where liberal democratic 
values take root but rather a place where sectarian and clientelistic hegemony is either 
contested or consolidated.  
The fieldwork showed that some women’s associations are part and parcel of the 
establishment. Their structures are either permeated by sectarian and confessional based 
organizations (LCW) or headed by a troika of first ladies (NCLW). Hence, elite women 
with strong familial and ideological ties to the sectarian ruling elites colonized the civic 
space and adopted a non-confrontational approach vis-à-vis the political leadership. This 
is reflected in their discourse, project design, issues raised and targeting strategy. In such 
cases, the associations either served as a showcase for their leaders to expand their power 
base (LCW) or were turned into rubber stamp bodies (NCLW) that addressed safe 
agendas. However, these associations also muffled the more radical voices and agendas. 
This has been achieved by dividing the women’s movement whenever the nationality, 
personal status and quota based on a non-confessional law were raised. This support, 
belief and participation in the hegemonic system prove that compromises over women’s 
agendas take place not only in the political arena but in the civil society sector.  
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Patronized by their close relationship with the sectarian elites, these associations 
reproduce non-democratic norms, values and practices and therefore consolidate the 
sectarian hegemony through their non-confrontational approach and participation in the 
sectarian and clientelistic system.  
On another hand, the post-war sectarian status quo and its limited openness for 
political debate de-radicalized grassroots women’s rights organizations and prohibited 
them from acting as a counter-hegemonic force.  In this regard, the associations that 
adopt a confrontational approach may try to affect public policy but their efforts may not 
bear fruit as they challenge the underlying assumptions of the hegemonic order. Those 
who seek welfarism and refuse to be co-opted by the sectarian cartel were not only 
deprived from sectarian leaders’ rewards but their ability to affect social policies and 
democratic outcomes were downsized.  
Hence, the polarization of the civil society sector between clientelistic and non-
clientelistic associations, confrontational and non-confrontational associations impedes 
the creation of a cohesive alternative civil society sector where the contestation of 
dominant ideas paves the way for a counter-hegemonic order. The sectarian and 
clientelistic system of Lebanon generates attitudes and behaviors that either reinforce the 
status quo or distance citizens from the political regime. Clientelistic and sectarian 
systems trump civil society organizations and reproduce their own images (Jamal 2007). 
In this regard, the extension of this hegemonic sectarian system is not only dependent on 
sectarian elite strategies devised to silence subordinate classes, the latter also cement this 
hegemony through their belief and support in this hegemonic system. 
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Furthermore, this thesis demonstrated that international aid agencies focus on 
achieving whatever can be achieved in the sectarian context of Lebanon. In this regard, 
women’s rights agendas are often presented as apolitical, and projects are designed to 
mitigate women’s social problems and to increase women’s public and political 
participation. This makes women more visible but not necessarily empowered. These 
quick-fix solutions for complex problems do not yield to a renegotiation of state-society 
relations towards more inclusive forms of citizenship for women. Funders’ projects are 
designed in a rush and are usually short-lived complying with international standards 
rather than being a response to local needs.  
Moreover, aid agencies strengthen the ideological legitimacy of the sectarian 
elites through their belief and support in this sectarian system. This is best captured in the 
way, international aid institutions avoided to address or support local actors in their quest 
to reform personal status laws. At the same time, the funding community channels 
important amount of aid to these corporatist structures and consequently strengthens the 
same organizations that have the highest stakes in marginalizing women and their issues.  
Furthermore, this thesis investigated the influence of international aid on the rise 
and proliferation of professionalized advocacy networks thus leading to a de-
politicization and de-radicalization of the women’s rights movement. This international 
trend polarized the grassroots sector between voluntary-based associations and 
professional NGOs thus impeding prospects for cooperation. Although these 
organizations have addressed different women’s needs, they failed to unite their claims 
and demands. On the one hand, professional NGOs expressed their disenchantment with 
the ageism and personalism of voluntary-based associations, whereas the latter argue that 
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the NGOs’ professional structure impedes real reforms. The focus on the transformation 
of advocacy work from one premised on voluntary-based work towards one led by a 
professionally paid staff has weakened cooperation even among like-minded associations. 
Moreover, the international lingo focusing on “women’s empowerment” turned these 
associations into professionalized institutions that are preoccupied by the execution of 
their projects with little stakes in movement formation. In this regard, advocacy NGOs 
have increasingly incorporated the neo-liberal trend of disassociation which leads to more 
fragmentation and prohibits the advocacy community from renegotiating the gender 
order.  
6.2 Theoretical Implications and Prospects for Gender Reforms  
The theoretical framework developed in this thesis calls attention to the impact of 
the process of state formation, the strategies of the sectarian elites, and the implications 
that these have over social policies and democratic procedures. In theoretical terms, the 
thesis argued that the integration of confessional and kin structures into the nation-state 
“as mediated by the political conflicts and alliances of the political leadership shaped the 
development of gendered laws” (Charrad 2000: 239). The questions raised are important 
for the analysis of state policies on women’s rights in different contexts, but can be best 
applying to countries where ethnic identities play an important role in political 
legitimization and mobilization.  
This thesis has also sought to bring the issue of gender politics back to Lebanese 
comparative politics. It therefore suggests contextualizing the study of states and their 
policies, and the examination of social structures that shape underserved groups and 
women’s rights in third world countries.  
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In the highly contested and fragmented context of Lebanon, it is interesting to ask 
whether women’s rights organizations hold any potential to move beyond mitigating 
social distress towards real empowerment of Lebanese women. One of the central 
implications suggested by this thesis is that the renegotiation of the gender order can only 
transpire through the reform of the sectarian system.  
In this regard, if the women’s advocacy community is willing to reform the post-
war gendered order rather than winning small battles, they should exhibit a real 
commitment to reform personal status laws, the sectarian-based social systems and 
electoral laws. In other words, grassroots women’s organizations should move beyond 
being issue-based towards engaging in a comprehensive yet long-term socio-political 
agenda that leads to the renegotiation of the post-war gender order.  
The reform of the personal status laws leads to positive change for women on 
different levels and it also promises a greater democratization of the political system. As 
long as women remain subject to the religious codes of their sect, and as long as this is 
the basis of their citizenship, women will be systematically excluded from political rights 
and individual rights constitutionally guaranteed to them.  
To achieve these long-term objectives, grassroots women’s organizations should 
move beyond their personalistic styles of leadership. Issues rather than personality 
problems should become the driving force for the women’s social movement. Schisms 
within the women’s organizations only feed the interests of the sectarian leaders who 
want to keep women in a subordinate position. Moreover, and since women’s rights 
intertwine with broader notions of citizenship and rights, women’s organizations should 
engage more with other civil society actors and marginalized groups such as Palestinians, 
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handicapped, youth, etc. These partnerships should not only be short-lived, serving the 
immediate implementation of particular projects, but should be accompanied by a long-
term strategic alliance among people affected by these gendered laws.  
Only by doing so, will the women’s movement be able to bring about positive 
change, not only for women but also for cross-confessional and non-clientelistic groups 
and movements. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: List of Interviews 
1. Informal interview with field manager at CRTD-A, Beirut, 3 March 2010 and 19 
November 2009. 
2. Informal interview with journalist in al-Akhbar, Beirut, 8 January 2010. 
3. Group interview with LCW board of directors, conducted by Dr Janine Clark, 
Beirut, 26 May 2010. 
4. Interview with Leila Al Ali, executive director of Al-Najdeh association, Beirut, 2 
April 2010. 
5. Interview with Rola al Masri, CRTDA My Nationality campaign coordinator, 
Beirut, 18 , 22 January and 10 March 2010. 
6. Interview with Bassam al Quntar, journalist in al-Akhbar, Beirut, 22 January 
2010. 
7. Interview with Ghida Anani, KAFA program coordinator, Beirut, 18 January and 
17 February 2010. 
8. Interview with Marie Debs, LLWR vice-president, Beirut, 24 February 2010. 
9. Interview with Iqbal Doughan, former president of LCW and president of the 
WWL and FN, Beirut, 30 March 2010. 
10. Interview with Nayla Madi Masri, CFUWI nationality coordinator, Beirut, 8 
March 2010. 
11. Interview with Linda Matar, LLWR President, Beirut, 3 March 2010. 
12. Interview with Joumana Merhi, LWDG president, Beirut, 21 May 2008, 11 and 
22 January 2010. 
13. Interview with Joumana Moufareg, NCLW executive director, Beirut, 31 March 
2010. 
14. Interview with Zoya Rouhana, KAFA executive director, 8 January 2010, Beirut, 
Lebanon. 
15. Interview with Nizar Saghieh, lawyer, Beirut, 10 November 2009. 
16. Interview with Elena Zambelli, IDC Gender Program Manager, Beirut, 1 April 
2010.  
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Appendix II: Women NGOs, Type, Demands and Relationship with Sectarian 
Elites249 
NGO NGO Type Demands Relationship with 
Elites 
LCW Corporatist Political Participation Cooperative 
NCLW Corporatist semi-official body CEDAW implementation 
Political Participation 
 
Cooperative 
LLWR Grassroots voluntary-based 
leftist 
Personal status laws 
Penal codes 
Nationality Law 
Political participation 
Economic empowerment 
Critical 
LWDG Grassroots leftist Personal status laws 
Penal codes 
Nationality Law 
Political participation 
Economic empowerment 
Critical 
KAFA Grassroots professional Domestic Violence 
Nationality law 
 
Pragmatic 
CRTDA Grassroots professional Nationality Law 
Economic Empowerment 
Domestic Violence 
 
 
Critical 
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 Based on fieldwork and data analysis from Chapter 4. 
